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Abstract 
In the study I analyze the conflicting aspects of project portfolio evolution in a firm. 
The evolutionary principles of variation, selection and retention are applied to the 
management of new product development projects. Managers select projects for 
prioritization. A selection rule is the prioritization rule. In biology, living creatures 
develop specific features for adaptation as a result of selection rules. However, the 
selection of specific adaptive features carries along the retention of other, even 
unforeseen non-adaptive features. Drawing on the evolutionary principles forwarded by 
Darwin I examine how they manifest in the project portfolio. I define this non-adaptive 
mechanism as co-selection. By analogy, in portfolio management, if the selection rule 
for project priority is high revenue and feasibility to global access, other features also 
survive when the selection rule relating to the prioritization of projects is applied. The 
evolution of the new product development project portfolio in the case firm displays 
conflicting trends in the emerging project portfolio over time. Managers pursue 
prioritization to decrease product development times. But, alas, in the project portfolio 
the prioritized projects age to a greater degree than non-prioritized projects. Managers 
prioritize the projects held by the focal business unit more often than those of other 
business units. However, ultimately the focal business unit has less than a due share of 
prioritized projects in the portfolio. The results of this study question the applicability 
of optimizing models in R&D portfolio management in the presence of co-selection. 
The project portfolio management literature does not provide a mechanism to account 
for this type of portfolio development. Co-selection provides a mechanism that explains 
the observed evolution. The study contributes to the conceptualization of the notion of 
co-selection. The study also provides empirical evidence on co-selection, a non-
adaptive evolutionary mechanism to modify R&D project portfolio outcome. The 
findings give a better understanding of portfolio management of R&D driven new 
product development projects.  
 
Keywords: Co-selection, evolutionary theory, selection mechanism, project portfolio 
management, R&D projects 
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Abstract in Finnish 
Tutkimuksessa analysoin kohdeyrityksen projektisalkun evoluutiota. Evoluutio 
kuvataan käsitteillä variaatio, valintasääntö ja kertautuminen. Sovellan tätä periaatetta 
tuotekehitysprojektien johtamiseen. Valinnan mekanismina toimii priorisointisääntö. 
Biologian piirissä elävät olennot mukautuvat valintasääntöjen seurauksena. 
Mukautumista auttavien piirteiden ohella valikoituu toisia, jopa ennakoimattomia, 
mukautumisesta riippumattomia piirteitä. Sovellan Darwinin esiintuomia evoluution 
periaatteita selittämään vastaavanlaisia havaintojani projektisalkun kehityksessä. 
Kutsun tätä ilmiötä rinnakkaisvalikoitumiseksi. Näin voi käydä myös 
tuotekehityssalkun hallinnassa. Jos valintasääntö projektia priorisoitaessa on korkea 
myyntiodotus ja globaali markkinoitavuus, muitakin projektin piirteitä säilyy 
rinnakkaisvalikoitumisen vuoksi. Tutkittavassa yrityksessä sattui, että tuotekehityksen 
projektisalkun sisältö muuttui ristiriitaisella tavalla. Johto priorisoi projekteja, koska 
haluttiin lyhentää tuotekehitysaikoja. Silti tuotekehityssalkun priorisoidut projektit 
ikääntyivät enemmän kuin muut projektit. Johto panosti yrityksen keskeiseen 
liiketoimintayksikköön ja priorisoi siinä useampia projekteja kuin muissa yksiköissä. 
Mutta keskeiselle liiketoimintayksikölle ei kuitenkaan karttunut eniten priorisoituja 
projekteja tuotekehityssalkkuun. Tutkimustulokseni kyseenalaistaa optimointimallien 
soveltuvuutta tuotekehitysprojektisalkun hallintaan, kun rinnakkaisvalintaa esiintyy. 
Projektisalkunhallinnan kirjallisuus ei tunne tapaa selittää näitä muutoksia. 
Rinnakkaisvalikoitumisen mekanismi selittää havaitun tuotekehityssalkun evoluution. 
Tutkimukseni määrittelee rinnakkaisvalikoitumisen käsitteen. Esitän kokeellista 
havaintoja tukemaan rinnakkaisvalinnan käsitettä. Rinnakkaisvalinta muokkaa 
tuotekehityssalkun sisältöä. Tutkimustulokseni lisäävät ymmärrystä siitä, miten 
tuotekehityssalkkua tulee johtaa ottaen huomioon rinnakkaisvalikoituminen. 
 
Avainsanat: Rinnakkaisvalikoituminen, evoluutio, valintamekanismi, tuotekehityksen 
johtaminen, tutkimusprojektit 
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1. Synopsis 
 
In biology, living creatures develop specific features as a result of selection rules. 
However, the selection of specific adaptive features brings with it the inheritance of 
other, even unforeseen non-adaptive features. Darwin’s example, from the intentional 
breeding of domestic animals, is that white blue-eyed cats are deaf. Employing 
Darwin’s example I define this non-adaptive mechanism as co-selection. The retention 
of white fur and deafness together with the selection rule to obtain blue-eyed cats is an 
instance of co-selection. Co-selection is caused by internal unalterable dependencies on 
dominant design in a cat’s build-up. People do not pursue the breeding of deaf cats. 
Blue eyes are selected purposefully but deafness is co-selected. These co-selected traits 
survive even without intentional human breeding. They are functionally either neutral 
or harmful to the cat. In short, they are non-adaptive with regard to the selection rule. 
The fundamental premise of this thesis is that co-selection is as equally valid a concept 
in business as it is in biology. 
 
From the perspective outlined above, I investigate the impact of top managers on the 
dynamics of their R&D project portfolio in a global pharmaceutical firm. In particular, 
I analyze conflicting portfolio dynamics through a theoretical framework that draws on 
evolution. The evolutionary principles of variation, selection and retention are applied 
to the portfolio management of intensive new R&D product development projects. 
During the period of observation, the case firm strongly expanded product development 
in one focal business unit. The evolution of a portfolio of new product development 
projects in the case firm displayed trends that would serve as a collision course for the 
outcomes of the emerging project portfolio over time. Managers increased R&D 
investment in a focal business unit at the cost of other business units. Managers pursue 
prioritization to decrease product development times. But, alas, in the project portfolio 
the prioritized projects become older than other projects. Managers prioritize projects 
of the focal business unit more often than those of other business units. However, in the 
end the focal business unit has less than a due share of prioritized projects in the 
portfolio.  
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By analogy, in portfolio management, if the selection rule for project priority is high 
revenue and the potential for global access, these features survive due to the application 
of the prioritizing projects selection rule. In addition, other project features such as 
business unit membership are co-selected. The selection rule does not specify business 
unit as such; once projects fulfill the prioritizing selection rule, projects from other 
business units, not only from focal business unit are also selected. Prioritizing is a form 
of vicarious selection, which means that it reflects managerial beliefs, and is internally 
driven. Although the selection rule for priority is, in the best intentions of the 
management, adaptive for the firm, the co-selection of other project features is non-
adaptive. Co-selection accounts for the accumulation of projects from various business 
units of different ages into the portfolio if the projects fulfill the prioritization selection 
rule. 
 
The dominant design in cats causes blue eyes and deafness to go together. By analogy, 
the dominant design of new product development projects determines the internal 
within-project dependencies of various project features. For example, the dominant 
design of new product development projects in pharmaceutical R&D consist of many 
strictly sequential development phases and a particular business unit membership. The 
prevalent dominant design accounts for the appearance of co-selection of project 
features when selection of the priority of projects that follow the selection rule is 
carried out. 
 
Conducting new product development is uncertain, in the sense defined by Knight 
(1921). Probability estimates for the technological or commercial success of a single 
project are not known. Thus, technological failures of some projects that lead to project 
termination are unforeseen until they materialize as surprises; like the proverbial black 
swans. Managerial decisions to terminate projects result from external, usually 
technological causes. In the case firm, prioritized projects in the focal business unit 
were terminated much more often than in the other business units, although there were 
cumulatively more prioritized events in the focal business unit. Hence, the prioritized 
projects of the focal unit did not enrich the portfolio. The combined effect of 
undetected co-selection and unforeseen termination modified the portfolio dynamics in 
a path-dependent way so that prioritized projects aged and the focal business unit did 
not acquire the majority of prioritized projects. The interactions between prioritization 
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decisions and the independent project stage development decisions reinforced the effect 
of co-selection on project aging. 
 
The study contributes by conceptualizing co-selection in the business context. It 
provides empirical evidence on co-selection; an important non-adaptive evolutionary 
mechanism to modify the outcome of a R&D project portfolio. The study extends the 
research concerning different selection mechanisms in intra-firm environments, which 
have been little investigated in the previous literature. The results of this research 
question the applicability of optimizing models in R&D portfolio management and the 
assumptions behind them because of co-selection and under conditions of true 
uncertainty. The project portfolio management literature does not provide a mechanism 
to account for conflicting portfolio development. Co-selection provides a mechanism to 
explain the peculiar form of evolution that was observed.  
 
The study contributes to a better understanding of portfolio management of new 
product development projects that is driven by R&D. To compensate the effects of 
undetected co-selection, when unforeseen terminations are likely to occur, managers 
should increase variation in the form of new project initiatives. Slack resources should 
be available to achieve more variation. Further studies of the co-selection mechanism in 
intra-firm evolutionary studies are encouraged. 
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2. The problem statement and research question 
 
2.1 R&D project portfolio and top management 
Innovations are of major importance for firms to be successful in competing to serve 
their customers and generate tomorrow’s profit. For many firms, intensive investment 
in R&D effort is a necessary determinant of innovative new product development. 
Innovation activities are usually organized into projects. According to the results of 
recent bibliometric studies, the mainstream academic discourse concerning strategy and 
portfolio management has paid increasing attention to projects (Kwak & Anbari, 2009). 
Managing new product development projects in a portfolio has received ongoing 
attention from scholars (Adams, Bessant, & Phelps, 2006; Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 
2004; Artto & Dietrich, 2004; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Cooper, Edgett, & 
Kleinschmidt, 2004; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Milosevic, 2004; Martinsuo & 
Lehtonen, 2007a; Loch & Kavadias, 2008a).  
 
Top management is important not only for supporting the success of single innovations 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Milosevic, 2004), but also maintaining an innovative 
multi-project portfolio in the long run (Nobeoka & Cusumano, 1995; Artto & Dietrich, 
2004). Building future success through new product development is a significant part of 
corporate investment strategy and a major managerial challenge (Bower, 1970; van de 
Ven, 1986; Noda & Bower, 1996; Burgelman, 2002b; Burgelman & Grove, 2007).  
 
In practical business contexts, managers allocate resources for new product 
development that is driven by R&D by selecting and rejecting projects. Resourcing new 
product development projects is similar to capital business investment projects, albeit 
riskier (Bower, 1970). Portfolios of new product development projects consist of 
different categories of projects or programs depending on the firm or industry, and 
accordingly these portfolios are managed in different ways (Milosevic, 2004). In 
project portfolio management all projects are compared against each other in order to 
select a collection of preferred projects with which to work. Prioritizing projects is the 
core of project portfolio management. Top managers have to agree which projects are 
selected for prioritization. The selection of project portfolio by top management occurs 
during periodic reviews in portfolio committees. In portfolio committee reviews, 
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managers settle a balance between different types of projects, choose to prioritize 
projects, and initiate and terminate projects (Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 1999, 2004; 
Cooper, Edgett & Kleinschmidt, 1998; Cooper, Edgett, Kleinschmidt, 2000).  
 
Scholars observe that firms tend to have difficulties in sustaining innovative 
development (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Burgelman 1994, 2002a; Christensen & 
Bower, 1996). For example, such difficulties may relate to choosing between an 
explorative or exploitative strategic orientation (Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Greve, 
2007), locking in to aging technologies or markets (Arthur, 1989; Tripsas & Gavetti, 
2000), or maintaining speed (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995), innovative impetus 
(Dougherty & Hardy, 1996) and firm growth (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Both the 
objectives and the success factors of new product portfolio management have been 
described in the portfolio management literature (Cooper et al, 1998). However, 
empirical evidence from the portfolio management literature suggests that, quite often, 
firms also have problems succeeding with R&D project portfolio management (Cooper, 
Edgett & Kleinschmidt, 2001a, 2004; Griffin, 1997; Griffin & Page, 1996).  
 
The academic literature dealing with the strategic selection of investment projects and 
product development projects has largely focused on models that address optimizing 
decision outcomes (Schmidt & Freeland, 1992; Cooper, Edgett & Kleinschmidt, 2001b; 
Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 1999, 2004; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Dean & Sharfman, 
1996), with less focus on decision processes (Bower, 1970, Burgelman, 1983ab, 1994; 
Greve, 2007). Both content and process issues are important when studying innovative 
development projects (van de Ven, 1986). Studies in decision making have shown that 
strategic choices are often taken when there are mixed goals and preferences and under 
conditions of ambiguity (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; March, 1994b; Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani & Théorêt, 1976; Nutt, 2002). Observing decision making reveals that 
people follow rules rather than optimize (Page, 2008). However, decisions to prioritize 
projects by optimizing are the focus of studies that examine R&D project portfolio 
selection (Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 1999; Cooper, Edgett & Kleinschmidt, 2001b). The 
recommendations of scholars to practitioners are therefore partly based on an 
incomplete understanding of project portfolio management. In fact, no more than 50 % 
of firms use any form of portfolio management in implementing corporate strategy to 
projects (Jamieson & Morris, 2004). This indicates that top managers are 
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uncomfortable with the tools they have at hand. In contrast, firms report that almost 
every firm uses project management processes.  
 
Senior managers are important actors for determining the outcomes of new product 
project portfolios. Their actions and the consequences to a R&D project portfolio in the 
long run should be studied in more detail and from various perspectives. Because top 
managers give more time and value for current over new business, many portfolio 
decisions are made with an eye on short term considerations, (Dougherty & Hardy, 
1996; Greve, 2008). In this respect exploitation is preferred over exploration. Managers 
may alter their prior choices and also re-direct the project outside of the strategy and 
product development processes (Steffens, Martinsuo & Artto, 2007). The portfolio 
selection literature gives examples of “mandatory” or “sacred cow” projects that are 
selected in any event (Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 2004). These “under the table” and 
“pet” projects do not fit any pre-defined portfolio evaluation framework (Loch, 2000; 
Blichfeldt & Eskerod, 2005; Martinsuo & Lehtonen, 2007a). Decisions to terminate 
projects depend on advocacy and performance thresholds (Green, Welch & Dehler, 
2003). Project champion behavior is a key predictor of project performance (Howell & 
Shea, 2001).  
 
Top managers’ support is an essential factor affecting the success of new product 
development projects (Burgelman, 1983b; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Milosevic, 
2004); however the influence of these managers on a portfolio has received less 
attention. Shenhar, Dvir, Levy & Maltz (2001) consider the replicability of project 
success to be an important criterion for a firm’s future success; however these authors 
do not address the idea of portfolio success at all. Very few organizations and scholars 
(Cooke-Davies, 2004) seem to pay attention to continuous portfolio success as opposed 
to project success. The management of new product development projects at a top 
executive level is largely an open research problem (Kavadias & Chao, 2008). There is 
a gap in the academic literature. The way top managers actually influence new product 
project portfolio in the long run is not thoroughly understood. Ultimately, R&D project 
portfolio decisions are strategic choices about the investment in innovations. If the 
goals of portfolio management are recognized but not achieved, it is likely that the day-
to-day practical resolutions concerning a portfolio emerge from, and are consequences 
of, underlying mechanisms yet to be discovered in R&D project portfolio research.  
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My goal in this work is to study intra-firm selection mechanisms. In this study I 
consider the way that top managers in a pharmaceutical case firm assign priority to new 
product development projects driven by R&D as an example of evolutionary selection. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, new product development is essentially dependent on 
R&D activity. The outcomes of research efforts become new products from 
development projects over the course of many years, or even a decade. It is therefore 
appropriate to regard new product development projects as R&D development projects. 
The real consequences of prioritization in the case firm in this study turn out to be not 
quite in line with the expectations based on portfolio optimizing models, which is 
puzzling. This conflict led me to study the selection process that senior executives 
apply in portfolio management, and how this process influences the total portfolio of 
new product development projects. I seek better theoretical understanding of the 
observed evolution of the total R&D project portfolio in the case firm. I argue that 
optimizing project portfolio management is not sufficient to explain the real portfolio 
evolution that was observed. This idea seems plausible in the light of the following ten 
arguments. 
  
1. Decision models for project portfolio management do not include all the factors 
which business leaders consider essential or pay attention to in strategic 
decision making (Bower, 1970; Jamieson & Morris, 2004; March & Shapira, 
1987; March, 1994b). Since not all factors are modeled or can be modeled, this 
introduces ambiguity to decisions.  
2. Managers make portfolio decisions to shape strategy jointly in teams where 
coalitions and power play an important, and sometimes even a dominant, role. 
In the context of top management teams, uniform rational decision making is 
constrained by conflicting opinions of goals, means, and preferences (March, 
1994b).  
3. Projects within a portfolio interact with each other, for instance, through 
competing for the same resources simultaneously. Thus, not every project 
obtains resources in a fully optimized way. Some projects are prioritized. For 
this to happen, executive judgment, including bargaining, is needed.  
4. Managerial decisions at different levels may interact. Whereas portfolio 
prioritization can be changed at will, product development proceeds in a 
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sequence which cannot usually be rearranged. Hence, prioritizing cannot 
generally overrule the development sequence. 
5. Decision models regard projects as fully decomposable into features, which can 
be optimized separately and then aggregated to yield a unique project ranking 
list of project candidates. However, the project development process has both 
interdependencies and an internal sequential structure with embedded milestone 
stage decisions. They restrict the optimizing of single features by inducing 
negative externalities for other features. This makes ordinal optimizing difficult.  
6. Any instantaneously “optimal” portfolio needs to be reviewed from time to time 
by senior management. The impact of decisions about a portfolio made 
yesterday carries over to today’s decisions. The past decision sequence, at least 
to some extent, creates path dependence affecting subsequent actions. The 
process of administering a project portfolio generates inertia. When new 
external or internal signals emerge, the existing administrative momentum 
influences future action, for example in the form of holding up resource 
redeployment.  
7. Although Chandler (1962) claims that managerial choice of strategy shapes 
organizational structure, other scholars support the view that organizational 
structure shapes strategic decision making (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983ab; 
Fredrickson, 1986). In the light of the empirical literature it is likely that 
“structure shapes strategy” much of the time (Bower, 2005). Behavior and 
learning in organizations is based on routines (Levitt & March, 1988). Hence, 
the way project portfolio management is organized and conducted would 
matter.  
8. The outcomes of decisions may not be those that were intended. The realm of 
decision making beyond bounded rationality to cope with uncertainty is poorly 
understood and seldom used to explain managerial action in project portfolio 
management (Pich, Loch & De Meyer, 2002). Even assuming rational decision 
making, all combinations of managerial choices to select preferred project 
attributes are not possible due to the constraints and connections within 
projects. The unanticipated consequences of decisions can be very subtle and 
may become visible only after a while.  
9. Despite all the planning, the unexpected does occur (Knight, 1921; Keynes, 
1937). Environmental changes are sometimes sudden or drastic. Managerial 
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foresight cannot fully anticipate an uncertain future outcome when initiating or 
prioritizing projects (Klein & Meckling, 1958). Unforeseen decisions may be 
inevitable.  
10. Top executives do have other ongoing processes and issues to care of, such as 
securing quarterly and annual financial performance targets. Hence, their 
attention is often diverted from R&D project portfolio management (Ocasio, 
1997). 
 
2.2 Research question 
In managing R&D project portfolio, top management does not appear to rely only on 
decision models (Bower, 1970; Jamieson & Morris, 2004). Moreover, as observed by 
March & Shapira (1987), in studies of managerial behavior, managers do not associate 
risk with a fixed numerical probability. And yet, top executives pursue costly and 
uncertain R&D strategy through managing a project portfolio. This leads one to 
wonder, what is really going on in the management of portfolio of new product 
development projects that are driven by R&D. New theoretical approaches are 
therefore encouraged (Kavadias & Chao, 2008), and to this end I study the evolution of 
portfolio in one large pharmaceutical firm with intensive research activity. In the 
evolutionary framework I introduce the construct of co-selection to describe a specific 
evolutionary mechanism that constrains managerial decision making. The research 
question is formulated as follows: 
 
How does the co-selection mechanism explain R&D portfolio evolution in the case firm 
over time? 
 
In particular, four specific questions arise:  
1. How are the activities of top managers described as selection mechanisms?  
2. Which managerial activities are conducted on R&D projects in the case firm?  
3. What is the evolutionary path of the R&D project portfolio in the case firm over 
time? 
4. How do top management activities relating to R&D projects influence project 
portfolio evolution? 
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The structure of my thesis is as follows. In the next chapter, chapter 3, by reference to 
the literature, I formulate the concept of co-selection in the framework of intra-firm 
R&D portfolio evolution and introduce the theoretical constructs. In chapter 4 I then 
describe the methodology to make these constructs operational, give detailed 
information of the case firm and characterize measurable entities. The findings of the 
study are presented in chapter 5. The discussion of results and the justification for my 
conjecture on co-selection follow in chapter 6. Finally the implications of the study are 
presented in chapter 7.  
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3. Literature review  
 
3.1 Previous studies on intra-organizational evolutionary theory 
3.1.1. Evolution: variation and selection 
Historically, the term evolution has referred to two very different concepts of change. 
On the one hand, it refers to a process of teleological development based on a pre-
existing and unfolding, known or unknown plan. This notion, dating back to Aristotle, 
is exemplified, for instance, in the works of Herbert Spencer. Development is a series 
of necessary improvements to a “better” state in comparison compared to the previous 
historical state. On the other hand, evolution also refers to a process in a population of 
entities where the set of current specimens are the descendants of a variety of 
predecessors, some of which were selected to survive whereas others did not. It 
includes the idea of development, but not necessarily the idea of improvement to 
anything “better”, beyond sustained persistence. This study uses the term evolution in 
this latter sense, and is that advocated by Charles Darwin in his theory on variation 
driven and selection based evolution of a descendant population (Hodgson, 1993).  
 
Examining the literature of the past fifty years about firm evolution, Silva & Teixeira 
(2009) conclude in their bibliometric analysis that the field of evolutionary research 
lacks an overarching analytic framework from an intra-firm level to the level of firm 
populations. It also appears that a population ecology and intra-firm level of analysis do 
not approach each other. Based on keyword relatedness analysis, Järvinen & Sillanpää 
(2007) conclude that the connections between evolution and population ecology have 
declined and the connections between evolution and strategy and evolution and 
capabilities have increased. The connection between evolution and innovation has 
persisted over time. According to Nerur, Rasheed & Natarajan (2008), the contributions 
of evolutionary scholars to the strategic literature since 1980 also divide across 
different streams rather than constitute a coherent hub. Reviewing the literature of 
intra-organizational evolution, Warglien (2002) and Galunic & Weeks (2002) observe 
that much more theoretical than empirical research has been conducted. Although 
lacking overall consistency, many scholars think that the evolutionary approach will 
gradually offer a plausible dynamic mainstream theory to compete with classical 
equilibrium economic theory (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2004; Hodgson, 2007c).  
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There is confusion between teleological and Darwinian approaches in evolutionary 
scholarship. The bibliometric analyses of published evolutionary research also call for 
clear and precise definitions of constructs and measurable entities. This is necessary to 
better differentiate various meanings embedded in them, and to clarify their usage.  
 
3.1.2. Sources of evolutionary thinking 
The central idea in Darwin’s (1859) view of evolution is to causally explain change and 
development in the flora and fauna dwelling in nature, including humankind. For this 
purpose, the logic of evolution is introduced. The components of evolutionary logic are 
variation, selection and retention. Evolutionary theory is about the fate of a collection 
of individuals, not about a single individual. The driving force of biological evolution is 
a Malthusian abundance of variation in the form of excessive offspring. Specimens of 
offspring express individual variation. When resource supply is locally limited and the 
opportunities of finding a better settlement are restricted, not all of the offspring 
survive to reproduce. Some cope with the circumstances better than others. The 
circumstances in the environment provide a selection mechanism for survival. The next 
generation of the surviving offspring tends to do better in the same environment if the 
surroundings do not change. Scarcity of resources drives the selection process (Aldrich 
& Pfeffer, 1976; McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983). Differential rates of birth and death 
explain selection (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984, 1989; Carroll, 1984). Sometimes 
the rapid rate of replication may be more successful than the superior fitness and slow 
death rate in adaptation. Evolution always occurs relative to the local current 
environment and is historically specific. The evolutionary process provides a causal 
explanation for the outlook of future generations of offspring that are retained.  
 
Darwin had many predecessors of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences, for 
example: Mandeville, Hume, Smith, and Bagehot (Hodgson, 1993; Nelson, 2006). 
Hodgson (2004) provides an excellent introduction to the subtle history of ideas on 
evolution first posited by Darwin (1859) and others from the 19th century on. The great 
tradition of American pragmatists – Charles Peirce, William James, Thorsten Veblen 
and John Dewey – made efforts to cultivate Darwinian evolutionary thinking into social 
science, with some, but not an enduring, success. For various twists of circumstance in 
the history of ideas, the concept of evolution in the field of social theory, that had 
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already been introduced a century ago, were largely lost (Foss, 1993; Hodgson, 2004). 
This started to first reappear after many decades of dormant interest.  
 
The first formal account on human ecology was given by Hawley (1944). Building on 
his ideas and evolutionary heritage found in biology, Campbell (1969) introduced the 
few fundamental assumptions which are needed for an evolutionary theory in the socio-
cultural realm. From this perspective, a process is evolutionary if the following three 
criteria are met. First, there must be a source of variation. Selection mechanisms do not 
have a chance to operate if all members in a population are identical. It makes no 
difference whether the causes of variations are natural, blind and haphazard, or cultural, 
purposeful and agent-induced. Second, a mechanism of selection must exist in order to 
account for differential survival rates of members in the population. The selection 
criteria must remain relatively constant to achieve propagation or elimination. Third, 
one needs a retention mechanism to preserve or duplicate the in-selected variants for 
selective accumulation for the future. The principle of evolutionary selection is not 
enough to explain sources of variance alone (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2008). A 
historically specific description of the precise circumstance needs to be added for a 
fuller evolutionary explanation. 
 
Organizational structures offer resistance to adaptation (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Most 
organizations seem to have considerable inertia; they tend to resist change. 
Organizations often do not adapt readily when external conditions – business 
opportunity, competitive situation, legislative frame, or customer demand – change 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977). There are restrictions to making and implementing 
strategic choices to effectively alter the destiny of the firm. On the other hand, 
organizational inertia is itself an outcome of responses to selective pressures. The 
sequence of previous successful survivals has created inertia. Over time, organizational 
responses tend to get simpler and more rigid (Miller, 1993, 1999). Changing 
environmental landscapes open new opportunities to some firms and remove such 
opportunities beyond the reach of others. These environmental changes can be too rapid 
or too discontinuous for an organization to adapt and survive.  
 
There are many possible levels of analysis in selection and evolution (Lewontin, 1970; 
Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). Scholars who focus on the dynamics of whole industries, where 
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firms are units of observation, do not make a forecast about which particular 
organization will survive or which mechanisms provide new entries (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; McKinley & Mone 2003).  An intra-firm approach offers the 
possibility for more detailed study on the causes of firm level survival.  
 
3.1.3. Firm level focus 
Intra-organizational evolutionary research focuses on ecologies inside an organization, 
and on questions concerning the origin of variation and selection mechanisms. The 
notion of environment as a contingency to organizational function and success was 
introduced by Lawrence & Lorsch (1967). Piecemeal policy adjustment relying on past 
experience of what works is more typical than executing a grand plan of policy 
(Lindblom, 1959). Policy is made and re-made continuously. Decision making behavior 
in organizations can be “irrational” in order to make action possible (Brunsson, 1982). 
According to the behavioral theory of the firm, much of organizational “life” is about 
processes and procedures (Cyert & March, 1963). Organizations are also described as 
action generators (Starbuck, 1983). Action generators are automatic behavior programs 
that require no information bearing stimuli because they are activated through job 
descriptions, clocks and calendars. Organizations thus amplify the human propensity to 
generate behavior programs, or habits. In a firm, they include formalized procedures, 
training and rituals. For example, such procedures are periodic meetings, the planning 
and setting of evaluation criteria, or the circulation of documents for data retrieval or 
signature. In short, habits and routines are everywhere (Hodgson, 1997). 
 
Early protagonists of the evolutionary perspective, McKelvey & Aldrich (1983) 
polemically state that the influence of a single individual manager in organizational 
action is often rather small. Intra-firm evolutionary theory postulates that internal 
selection rather than adaptive strategic decision making is the major driver of success 
or failure of an individual organization (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). Rational adaptation 
is restricted because of obstacles in knowledge accumulation, and the existence of 
habits and routines (Hodgson, 2009). The causes of organizational selection structures 
are habits (Hodgson, 2007a, 2009). In evolutionary theory, organizations are often 
viewed as bundles of routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982, 2002). In this regard R&D is 
also regarded as a search routine (Nelson, 1995). Behavior in organizations is mostly 
programmed; this is even the case for non-routine decisions (Mintzberg, Raisinghani & 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           26 
 
 
Théorêt, 1976). Organizations remember and act through routines that individuals 
perform. Behavioral evidence claims that organizational action stems from 
appropriateness, or logic of identity, not from intention or logic of consequence (Levitt 
& March, 1988).  
 
Strategy is about how to be successful (Nag, Hambrick & Chen, 2007). In the strategic 
literature, firms or managers are often optimistically assumed to be capable of rapid 
and large adaptation or optimal redeployment of resources to meet the demands of the 
outside environment (for example, see Burgelman, 1983a, 1991, 1996). Rational 
adaptors are assumed to learn from experience as a way of adapting their actions. 
Organizational learning is either exploratory or exploitative (March, 1991), however, 
the exploitative learning mode drives piecemeal and process improvements, creating a 
“competency trap” with the curse of success breeding failure. Explorative learning may 
be too wasteful and myopic (Levinthal & March, 1993). Learning occurs not only 
through an extensive search but also through imitation (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & 
Welch, 1998).  
 
Evolutionary theory contrasts sharply with the “rational adaptor” approach proposed by 
Chandler (1962, 1977), and Child (1972, 1997), and by many other scholars of strategic 
theory. Evolutionary theory is independent of any specific assumptions about human 
behavior or rationality (McKelvey, 1994). Hence, it is parsimonious compared to the 
notion of strategic intent. An evolutionary approach allows shrewd action and best 
effort. Individuals may have foresight and intention. Maintaining that structural 
selection mechanisms inside the firm are important, Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) allow 
more executive intention than many other evolutionary theorists. They argue that 
strategy, in the context of intra-organizational ecology, could be described as guided 
evolution. Top management gives direction by communicating their strategic intent 
throughout the organization. This pursuit of sense making by top management in 
shaping the direction adds human and social capital as further critical units of selection 
into the model; taking the model beyond only structure. In other words, it is not just 
structures, but also people that are involved and the relations between people do matter. 
Following Penrose’s (1952) criticism of the lack of intentionality in biological 
evolutionary models, Augier & Teece (2008) also insist on a more prominent role for 
managers in firms. They perceive strategy as evolution with design. One way to 
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incorporate intention and evolution is to introduce co-evolution; defined as the joint 
outcome of managerial intentionality, environment and institutional effects (Lewin & 
Volberda, 1999). 
 
Scholars do not necessarily have to choose sides in the adaptation – selection debate 
(Astley & van de Ven, 1983; Burgelman, 1983a, 1991; Lewin & Volberda, 2003a). 
Intentionality or adaptation and selection can be treated as complementary (Hrebiniak 
& Joyce, 1985) or interrelated (Levinthal, 1991). For example, investment and new 
product development decisions are intentional. Darwin constantly gives examples of 
selection, by reference to when farmers breed domestic animals, where intention is 
present. But Darwin insisted that one must explain the causes of calculation, foresight 
and intention as well (Hodgson, 2004). The science of choice must go as far as 
explaining the reasons of “choice” beyond just assigning intentions and preferences to 
be the grounds (Hodgson, 2009). This justifies the use of an evolutionary framing when 
studying strategic intentions.  
 
Applying the adaptation hypotheses uncritically leads to the danger of inventing ex post 
Panglossian irrefutable adaptive explanations to everything (Maynard Smith, 1978; 
Gould & Lewontin, 1979). No assumptions about progress, foresight, sense-making or 
success should be made in advance (Hodgson, 2004; Astley & van de Ven, 1983). 
Explaining success with the intention to succeed is retrospective reasoning (Aldrich, 
McKelvey & Ulrich, 1984; van de Ven & Engleman, 2004). In the pursuit of explaining 
success with intention, one should also take bad intention, folly, mistakes and luck into 
account. One should question an outlook according to which managers’ intentional 
design produces success, whereas bad results stem from insurmountable obstacles of 
circumstance, not from managerial failure. Recently, Levinthal & Posen (2007) report 
that adaptation may limit selection if myopic selection selects “in” short term adaptive 
performance, and selects “out” long term performance. However, selection is always 
local and historically specific. Truly long term performance is, generally, inherently 
unknown at the time of selection. Hence, no long term fitness exists separately from 
short term survival, whether the actions are intentional or not.  
 
An early critic of profit maximization as a meaningful guide to managerial action, 
Alchian (1950), raised concerns about uncertain foresight and proposed luck and 
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chance as alternatives to the intention of rational profit maximization as a way of 
determining the course of a firm. Maximizing or optimizing behavior is not the only 
possible explanation for managerial action (Klein & Meckling, 1958). Behavior ruled 
by inertia also leads to profit maximization (Hodgson, 1997, 2007a). The concept of 
maximizing as such is also unable to differentiate between different scopes of time. 
Quarterly maximizing differs from annual and longer term maximizing. Short time 
maximization does not imply long term profitability or survival. The concept of level of 
aspiration offers an alternative to maximization. Aspirations trigger search and are 
performance drivers for investment. Business leaders maximize up to “good enough” 
performance, as specified by aspiration levels or stakeholders’ interests that they have 
learned about (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Greve, 2007, 2008). 
Selection is not an optimizing force. In biology, it makes no sense to try to specify what 
type of optimizing process would work; whether it is Pareto or another maximizing 
approach (Maynard Smith, 1978). Strategies successful at one time may be 
unsuccessful at another (Lamberg & Tikkanen, 2006). According to Barnett & 
Burgelman (1996), the space of possible business strategies is not given in advance. 
Analyzing only today’s successfully surviving strategies or firms results in a sample 
selection bias. One must ask how one particular distribution in a population came about 
and not another (Nelson, 1995).  
 
I have addressed managerial intention and optimization in order to point out that there 
are many approaches where intentions or optimizing need not be included in order to 
explain all managerial actions. Chance and coincidence play a role and events follow 
their own logic (De Rond & Thietart, 2007). Evolutionary selection in itself is not 
purposeful, “progressive” or “efficient”. It does not necessarily produce better or more 
advanced individuals, species or firms (Hodgson, 2004). Evolution is not necessarily 
moving from the simple towards the more complex or towards a pre-established goal. 
Evolution in the sense used in this study does not follow “prescribed” (van de Ven & 
Poole, 1995), “necessary” or “emergent” trajectories of events.  
 
In strategy research, Mintzberg & Waters (1985) have made a distinction between 
intended and realized strategies. They define strategies as patterns of actions. Decisions 
arise from intentions, but some of the intentions might not actualize. The evolutionary 
perspective encourages the study of the realized consequences of managerial action 
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rather than managerial intentions. Just being lucky can be justified later as managerial 
intention. Intentions cover the hunches of a gambler as well as the inspirations of a 
perseverant visionary (Knight, 1921; Keynes, 1937; Thompson, 1967; March 1994a; 
Burgelman, 2002a). However, even intentions should be explained, lest they remain 
“the prime mover” without causes (Hodgson, 2004). In harmony with the distinction 
put forward by Mintzberg & Waters (1985), I observe both managerial actions 
(intended or not) and realized portfolio strategies arising from these actions or from 
other causes. I compare them in order to see whether they are coherent and aligned, or 
contradictory and conflicting. I do not examine sense-making (Weick, 1995), attention 
(Ocasio 1997) or the aspiration level (Greve, 2003ab, 2007), each of which precede 
action. I acknowledge the primacy of action over analysis in accordance with the ideas 
of Weick (1995), Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld (2005), and Brunsson (1982).  
 
Evolutionary theory defines retention as correspondence between the retained 
population with the original one (Price, 1995). To achieve this, no genetic mechanism 
is necessary (Knudsen, 2004). In social science, entities that resemble genes in biology 
that sustain the specimen selected by evolutionary mechanism in the population have 
been proposed by a number of authors (McKelvey, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Nelson, 1995; Weeks & Galunic, 2003). But evolution does not presuppose genes. 
Neither Darwin (1859) nor Campbell (1969) incorporated genes to their thinking. Since 
selection in biology operates at a phenotype level, not at gene level, entities such as 
genes are not needed to explain selection mechanism (Warglien 2002). According to 
Hammerstein (1996) and Maynard Smith (1978), the relationship between a genetic 
message and phenotype in biology are inherently complex and do not display anything 
like a one-to-one correspondence. The information in genes is not enough to determine 
the development of an entity. The distinction between phenotype and genotype is 
blurred in social evolutionary theory (Warglien, 2002). A retention mechanism 
involves genes in biological evolution but not necessarily in socio-cultural evolution. 
Hence, it is not helpful to try to find an analogy here that may not exist (Singh & 
Lumsden, 1990). A mechanism of replication can be something entirely different 
(Price, 1995). For example, routines have been identified as entities that can be 
retained, but this does not assume that they are like genes (Vromen, 2004; Hodgson & 
Knudsen, 2004; Hodgson, 2007a). 
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3.1.4 Selection in intra-firm R&D project population 
In empirical studies on intra-organizational populations, scholars have paid attention to 
organizational processes as objects of selection. These include, for example, imitative 
rules of behavior (Alchian, 1950), routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982, 2002), 
competencies – “comps” – (McKelvey, 1982), changing routines (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003), capabilities (Vromen, 2004), rules and procedures (Levitt & March, 1988), 
habits and routines (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004), jobs (Miner, 1991), rules (Schulz, 
1998), manufacturing competences (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Zander & Kogut, 1995), 
cultural factors and values (Miller, 1993; Burgelman, 1991), “memes” (Weeks & 
Galunic, 2003), sense making frames (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005), technology 
diffusion (Cool, Dietrickx & Szulanski, 1997), co-operative strategies (Axelrod, 1984), 
and economic policies (Witt, 2003).  
 
Very few scholars have studied populations of material artifacts, such as strategic 
business initiatives (Burgelman, 1983ab, 1991, 1994, 2002a), product families (Lovas 
& Ghoshal, 2000) or technologies (Mokyr, 2000). In building the framework for intra-
firm evolution I make two choices. First, I focus on populations with material artifacts. 
As Burgelman (1983b), Lovas & Ghoshal (2000) and Mokyr (2000) point out, objects, 
such as new product development projects, rather than routines or capabilities directly 
relate to the external world and are easy to detect and measure. Organizational 
structures and processes to manage projects are also well defined. R&D driven new 
product development projects are objects for vicarious selection in the internal 
environment, and their outcomes compete as new products in the external environment. 
Following Bower (1970) and Burgelman (1983ab), I treat R&D projects as risky 
strategic investment initiatives or new business ventures. As a second choice I focus on 
the mechanism of selection. My use of the term evolution denotes an open-ended 
selection process. A selection mechanism is essential to deliver evolutionary 
explanations. As Ruse (2009) points out, Darwin very clearly indicated the necessity to 
causally explain evolution with a selection mechanism. His followers were rather vague 
about mechanisms and emphasized other aspects of evolution. Considering the 
importance of selection events in shaping evolutionary outcomes (Aldrich, Hodgson, 
Hull, Knudsen, Mokyr, & Vanberg, 2008; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Hodgson, 2004; 
McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983; McKinley & Mone, 2003; Nelson, 1995; Singh & 
Lumsden, 1990), the lack of more detailed documentation on selection mechanisms is 
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remarkable. Indeed, selection mechanisms warrant an empirical study. Variation may 
interfere with selection (Maynard Smith, 1978). For that reason the variation in 
population is also studied. 
 
Managerial activities on R&D projects drive an internal vicarious selection process 
inside the firm. Internal selection serves as a proxy for the external selection system 
whereby new products survive or fail in the outside world (Campbell, 1994). One does 
not know for sure, if the projects preferred today are successful or survive in a future 
competitive environment. Vicarious selection may be intentional or not and vicarious 
mechanisms may or may not follow external selection (Meyer, 1994). Internal selection 
processes may be driven by diffusion, imitation, and promotion or incentive systems. 
Imitation of “good” practices and avoiding the “bad” is vicarious learning (Delacroix & 
Rao, 1994). Vicarious learning can also be superstitious. Imitation and fad are simple 
least action types of learning.  
 
Prioritizing R&D projects is vicarious selection. Project terminations due to outside 
circumstances such as technological or competitive failure are instances of external 
selection. The two ecologies inside a firm and outside it have two distinct sets of 
selection mechanisms. Internal selection is not wholly adapted to an external 
environment. Internal selection may be good, neutral or harmful (Aldrich & Ruef, 
2006). Internal selection and external survival tend to be loosely coupled (Aldrich & 
Ruef, 2006). Three mechanisms of internal selection promote this. First, there are 
pressures toward internal stability and homogeneity. Second, past selection criteria tend 
to persist. Third, organizational stakeholders approve lower performance thresholds 
than are present in the environment. Strategic choice scholars claim that establishing a 
strategic direction followed by organizational design select a successful strategy (Lovas 
& Ghoshal, 2000). Scholars should not implicitly assume that internal selection 
mechanisms are effective at anticipating outside selection mechanisms (Warglien, 
2002: Galunic & Weeks, 2002). All managerial guidance is not likely to be successful. 
For example, vicarious selection of development projects may conflict with termination 
in the outside world due to unforeseen technological hazards.  
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3.1.5. Selection mechanisms 
Investment in new product development for future success is complex and risky and 
involves many levels and processes in a firm. New business venturing occurs through 
experimentation and selection of some initiatives from a variety of strategic investment 
projects rather than through planning and optimizing (Bower 1970, 2005). Mechanisms 
for resource allocation of strategic new business initiatives also apply to investment 
decisions about R&D projects (Bower, 1970). Both are iterative selection process 
(Noda & Bower, 1996). Different firms starting from the same platform arrive at 
different results as a consequence of their actions and decisions (Bower, 2005).  
 
Utilizing Bower’s (1970) investment model, Burgelman (1983ab) constructed a two-
way process model of the evolution of project and business development strategy. 
According to Burgelman (1983b), strategy formation occurs, at least partially, through 
experimentation, and selection of strategic initiatives rather than through explicit 
strategic planning. He identifies two kinds of strategic activities. One type of strategic 
behavior is “induced” by the firm’s current concept of corporate strategy. Another type 
of strategic behavior, internal corporate venturing, emerges from “autonomous” 
activities that fall outside the current concepts of strategy. Building on Bower (1970), 
Burgelman observes that strategy formation, such as a major capital investment 
decision, contains both top down and bottom up processes, manifested as induced and 
autonomous behavior. Corporate structure, however, is built to reinforce the current 
strategy and behavior that supports this strategy, namely induced behavior. Corporate 
structure, set up by top management, is a collection of various administrative 
mechanisms. It includes the overall levels of hierarchy in organizational configuration, 
formalization of positions and relationships, project screening criteria, measures of 
performance, appointment of middle level managers, and risk minimization over time. 
Current structure does not favor autonomous activities, such as internal new business 
venturing. Rather, structures try to select “out” any such initiative that falls outside 
current corporate strategy.  
 
For Burgelman (1983ab), “structural context” is a selection mechanism in the stream of 
induced strategic behavior which backs an “orthodox” initiative. Few projects have a 
significant impact on changing the concept of strategy under standardized quantitative 
project screening procedures and uniform categories of strategic planning systems. The 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           33 
 
 
selection of higher managers to their jobs favors those candidates who show strong 
corporate orientation in their decision making. Hence, this structure has selective 
effects on the stream of strategic behavior at the middle manager level. Another 
mechanism, “strategic context” is a selector for autonomous behavior. It favors 
unorthodox approaches with high reward. The mechanisms of structural content and 
strategic content work differently. Structural context serves the purpose of aligning 
projects to corporate strategy. The selection process leads to retention of conservative 
rather than novel initiatives. “Normal” product development has an advantage over new 
business ideas in the administrative structure. However, somehow some “autonomous” 
initiatives survive in lower structures with the help of project championship. Successful 
“autonomous” behavior is later justified to be rational. This retroactive rationalization 
legitimizes autonomous initiatives to be treated as normal strategy and they are 
perceived as induced initiatives. Managing strategic initiatives is essentially a two-way 
process. 
 
To escape the sieve of existing selection structures, autonomous initiatives need to gain 
political support but they may also happen by chance. Burgelman (1983ab) is 
somewhat vague about the details of how autonomous initiatives circumvent the sieves 
of selection structure. Burgelman does not always clearly distinguish between selection 
structure as an entity or routine in the organizational hierarchy and the selection rule as 
a criterion for retention. He sometimes refers to selection mechanisms as an “internal 
selection environment”, comprising both structural (organizational) and strategic 
(content) issues (Burgelman, 1991). Burgelman gives examples of vicarious selection 
in terms of an “internal selection environment”, “selection structure” or “organizational 
culture”. However, he precisely identifies both a selection rule and selection structure 
when middle level operations managers succeed in circumventing the induced strategy 
when they reshape product lines (Burgelman, 1994).  
 
Other scholars also have noted Burgelman’s vagueness in the way that selection 
mechanisms are described. According to McKinley & Mone (2003) and Warglien 
(2002), Burgelman does not focus on describing selection mechanisms by level of 
hierarchy in any detail. According to Galunic & Weeks (2002), Burgelman does not 
define routines clearly. Selection in internal routines may have causes other than 
adaptation to the external environment, which may be neutral or harmful in adaptation 
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to external conditions (Galunic & Weeks, 2002; Meyer, 1994). Long term survival for 
the organization as a whole depends on the fit between internal ecological processes 
and external ones (Galunic & Weeks, 2002). If a routine is maladaptive, it should be 
possible to replace it with some other routine; otherwise no selection mechanism will 
build up selection pressures within organizations. There is no guarantee that internal 
routine selection produces external adaptation. Intra and inter-organizational selection 
and evolution must be defined independently. Lewin & Volberda (2003a) claim that 
Burgelman (1994) assumes correspondence between external evolutionary selection 
criteria (demand of microprocessors increases) and internal selection environment 
(wafers are more profitable). Moreover, they claim that Burgelman (1983ab) is not 
specific about the interplay between levels of hierarchies where selection happens.  
 
Levinthal (1997) suggests that loose coupling between different parts of the 
organization enables autonomous activities. The problem of internally supporting 
autonomous initiatives is that top managers may not always correctly perceive the 
opportunities in the external environment (Burgelman, 1996). Maintaining a pragmatic 
balance between “induced” exploitative and “autonomous” explorative processes is a 
major challenge (Burgelman, 2002a). Variation increases in the exploratory mode and 
decreases in the exploitative mode. There is evidence that this might often happen in 
cycles (Burgelman, 1983b; Burgelman & Grove, 2007). When the new CEO 
repositioned Intel to an exploitative mood, he, according to Burgelman (2002a), was 
“lucky” in anticipating the change in environment “early enough”. According to de 
Rond & Thietart (2007), strikes of luck do occur, but this does not explain managerial 
foresight. It ignores the question of how to explain bad luck and managerial failures. It 
creates a selection bias (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996). As Burgelman & Grove (2007) 
describe, Intel switched from exploration to exploitation and back. The question of how 
to manage internal vicarious selection in order to cope with external selection still 
remains open. 
 
I suggest that in order to improve the conceptual analysis of an internal vicarious 
selection mechanism one should distinguish three parts within it. First, a selection 
structure provides the organizational conditions under which selection takes place. A 
selection structure includes organizational hierarchies, procedures and routines. The 
importance of organizational connections to selection has been emphasized (Vromen, 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           35 
 
 
2006). Second, a selection rule specifies the criteria for preference that is applied in the 
selecting mechanism. Third, a selection object refers to the entity upon which a 
selection rule is applied within the selection structure. A selection mechanism is 
defined when all the three aspects are well characterized. A selection event is the exact 
temporal manifestation of a selection mechanism at work. A vague characterization of a 
selection mechanism may lead to problems in distinguishing between vicarious and 
environmental selection and defective causal explanations. It is not easy to explain the 
causes of the continuous shifts between explorative and exploitative strategic behavior 
Burgelman & Grove (2007) report a lack of a specifying a mechanism that explains 
these shifts and the changes in variation. On the contrary, the argument for causal 
connection is especially strong when a selection mechanism has been specified in 
detail; as is the case with Burgelman (1994). Observing the various selection 
mechanisms characterized in Burgelman’s research, Table 1, I rearrange some of the 
results of his main studies with the help of my own framework.  
 
Table 1 Internal selection mechanisms found in Burgelman’s research 
Nr* Selection mechanism Selection structure Selection rule Selected entity 
1 Choose induced initiatives  
 
 
Choose autonomous 
initiatives 
 
top management, internal 
selection environment 
 
 
top management, internal 
selection environment 
aligned to strategy  
 
 
good champions, 
political success, 
belief in external fit 
strategic business 
initiatives, projects  
 
strategic business 
initiatives, projects, 
middle managers 
 
2 Internal administrative and 
cultural mechanisms, 
strategic planning, 
managers’ assessment  
 
top management resource allocation 
rules, managers’ 
promotion 
strategic business 
initiative, project, 
middle managers 
3 Choose type of products 
for manufacturing 
middle management highest production 
site profit margin 
raw production wafer 
4 Choose induced initiatives CEO led top management choose specific 
product family 
strategic business 
initiatives, projects  
 
5 Choose induced and 
autonomous initiatives in a 
cyclic manner 
 
many CEO led top 
management teams 
choose, maintain and 
change product 
families 
strategic business 
initiatives, projects  
 
* References: 1: Burgelman, 1983ab; 2: Burgelman, 1991; 3: Burgelman, 1994; 4: Burgelman, 2002a; 5: Burgelman 
& Grove, 2007. 
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3.2 Co-selection and research framework 
3.2.1 Introducing co-selection 
In his influential treatise “On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection”, 
Charles Darwin (1859) observed a phenomenon he called “correlation of growth”. 
Pondering on why certain features appear together in organisms growing to maturity 
and considering malformations as an extreme example of this phenomenon, he wrote:  
 
“Some instances of correlation are quite whimsical: thus cats with blue eyes are 
invariably deaf; color and constitutional peculiarities go together, of which many 
remarkable cases could be given amongst animals and plant.”  
 
A few lines later, noting correlations recurring from generation to generation, he wrote:  
 
“Hence, if man goes on selecting, and thus augmenting, any peculiarity [of animals or 
plants], he will almost certainly unconsciously modify other parts of the structure [of 
animals and plants], owing to the mysterious laws of the correlation of growth” 
(Darwin 1859, Chapter I, in Watson 2005, page 351)  
 
Later on, he explicitly notes that correlation is independent of utility:  
 
“Hence we see that modifications of structure […] may be wholly due to unknown laws 
of correlated growth, and without being, as far as we can see, of the slightest service to 
the species.” (Darwin 1859, Chapter V, in Watson 2005 page 423)  
 
Darwin described instances, where human endeavors in breeding for specific features 
of plants or animals result in the inheritance of other features, although these are not 
selected. If you want white-fur blue-eyed cats, you will also have a deaf cat. This is 
caused by the inner connectedness of traits in cats. The selection rule for choosing blue 
eyes results in co-selecting other features that will be presented in a bundle; for 
example those that cause deafness. A selection rule, whether occurring naturally or 
chosen intentionally, picks one feature for retention whilst other features attached to the 
selected one are retained by co-selection. By analogy, I suggest that when selecting 
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R&D development projects for priority in a population then co-selection of project 
attributes occurs.  
 
I define co-selection in projects as follows: 
 
When a selection rule referring to a specific attribute of a project is applied to a 
project, co-selection causes some other attribute of the project being selected which the 
selection rule does not address. 
 
The co-selected attribute does not by itself fulfill the criteria of a selection rule 
regarding a project. In R&D project portfolio management, the selection of survival is a 
project prioritization. Co-selection attaches additional attributes to the prioritized 
project. In biology, Darwin’s correlation effects that caused co-selection are often hard 
to detect (Endler & McLellan, 1988; Stern, 2000). Co-selection is an example of a non-
adaptive evolutionary mechanism. A non-adaptive mechanism does not select for 
current fitness, but affects evolutionary outcome in an indirect way. The co-selected 
features of the internal selection process are externally neutral or maladaptive.  
 
In biology, the timing of an adaptive feature is crucial. A non-adaptive trait may also 
become adaptive in two ways. First, a trait selected for some specific function starts to 
serve another function. Second, a trait, the origin of which is not a result of a selection 
rule, starts serving a new current function. In other words, unselected traits start to be 
useful in a novel way. The reverse is also true. Former adaptive traits may become non-
adaptive or harmful. The notion of ex-aptation in biology has been introduced to 
account for fitness resulting from traits which were non-adaptive at the time of 
selection, but were later opted for use (Gould & Vrba, 1982). In the organizational 
context the concept of ex-aptation has been used to describe innovation development 
(Dew, Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2004; Villani, Bonacini, Ferrari, Serra & Lane, 
2007), and resource generation (Grandori, 2007). Ex-aptation is often seen in evolution 
(Murmann, Aldrich, Levinthal, & Winter, 2003). The concept of ex-aptation makes it 
easy to understand the temporal nature of fitness and adaptation in biology (Gould & 
Vrba, 1982). Developing the taxonomy proposed by Gould & Vrba (1982) adding co-
selection leads to a classification, where time, adaptive value as fitness, and a selection 
mechanism are all included. Co-selection is a non-adaptive evolutionary mechanism. 
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The retention of a co-selected attribute does not depend on the selection rule that drives 
the primary selection mechanism. In the terminology of Gould & Vrba (1982), direct 
action of natural selection refers to a selection mechanism which selects the fit for 
survival. My use of the term co-selection refers to the broader class of non-aptation 
referred to by Gould & Vrba (1982); this includes neutral or detrimental effects. Table 
2 is useful for comparing adaptive and non-adaptive selection mechanism.  
 
Table 2 Co-selection, adaptation and fitness 
Timing of selection 
event 
Process description Adaptive value as 
current fitness 
Selection 
mechanism 
Gould & Vrba 
(1982) 
Current Natural or artificial 
selection shapes the 
character for a 
current use  
Current adaptation Selection Adaptation 
Past  A characteristic 
previously shaped by 
natural or artificial 
selection for a 
particular function, is 
co-opted for a new 
use 
Past adaption, 
current new 
adaptation 
Selection Ex-aptation 
Current A characteristic 
whose origin cannot 
be ascribed to the 
direct action of 
natural or artificial 
selection 
Current non-
adaptation 
Co-selection  Non-adaptation 
Past A characteristic 
whose origin cannot 
be ascribed to the 
direct action of 
natural or artificial 
selection is co-opted 
for a current use  
Past non-adaptation, 
current adaptation 
Selection  Ex-aptation 
 
One might object to the use of the term co-selection since it detaches the idea of 
selection from adaptation and fitness. I think there are four reasons to define the 
construct of co-selection as suggested. First, co-selection specifically refers to the 
micro level mechanism of non-adaptive selection as a means to distinguish a detailed 
mechanism from a larger set of adaptive transformation with imprecise references to a 
“selection environment” that causes the selection for fitness. Second, a historical 
differentiation between the instant of a selection event and its subsequent consequences 
is more easily kept in mind if co-selection as a mechanism is identified. Third, using 
the term co-selection makes it clearer that the selection event itself may give rise to 
unforeseen consequences that not only increase but also decrease fitness. This is even 
more important in artificial selection, where, due to rapid changes, the limits of 
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adaptation are hard to conceptualize and easy to reach. Fourth, co-selection arises from 
the connections of features in bundles due to the overall design and hierarchy of an 
entity. This helps to further analyze the roots of the phenomenon.  
 
The main reason for Gould & Vrba (1982) to advocate ex-aptation as a concept, in the 
Darwinian spirit, was to displace the term pre-adaptation and thereby to avoid the 
misleading ‘pre’ suffix connoting the teleological concepts of pre-planning and 
purpose, which do not belong to Darwinian evolutionary theory. In the innovation 
literature, their approach has been both challenged (Cattani, 2005, 2006, 2008) and 
defended (Dew, 2007). As a term, pre-adaptation is used casually (Murmann et al, 
2003). I suggest one should follow Gould & Vrba (1982) for clarity on timing the 
appearance of the new aptation. This differentiates between an adaptive and non-
adaptive selection mechanism more precisely at a given instant in time. The timing of 
the act of selection is important. Using the term pre-adaptation is blurring the fact that, 
in general, there is no possible way to distinguish in advance, a beneficial pre-
adaptation or “fit” from a non-adaptation.  
 
I offer an example of co-selection in the business context. The celebrated case history 
of Intel’s strategic exit from memory devices documented by Burgelman (1994) 
resulted from a co-selection process. Production wafers at Intel constitute a population. 
The population of wafer starts is selected based only on a production capacity 
prioritization rule in order to maximize profit when bottlenecks of production capacity 
arise. This rule for production co-selects specific types of devices (processors) designed 
for new end-users, that is, new products and markets, in an unanticipated way and 
against strategic intent. Co-selection provides a micro-level causal explanation of what 
initially led to the switch of Intel’s strategic focus over time. The mechanistic 
explanation of co-selection digs deeper towards understanding the root causes of the 
selection phenomena. Therefore, I suggest that it is important to be more specific about 
a selection mechanism than Lewin & Volberda (2003a), who label the Intel 
development as “micro co-evolution”. The use of this term is also at odds with their 
definition of co-evolution. According to their definition (Lewin & Volberda, 1999) 
managerial intentionality is assumed, however this is not present in the case of Intel at 
the top management level.  
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3.2.2. Research framework and construct definitions  
Developing the ideas of evolutionary scholars, I have derived the following model for 
studying intra-firm evolution of R&D project portfolios. Project prioritization is an 
internal vicarious selection event and project termination is an external natural selection 
event. I have adopted the evolutionary logic of variation, selection and retention 
proposed by Campbell (1969), as previously described. As suggested by Lewin & 
Volberda (2003b), I allow for intentionality. My framework has analogies with the 
variation, selection and retention framework used by Burgelman (1983a, 1991, 1996). 
For example, as shown in Table 1, a variety of induced and especially autonomous 
strategic initiatives are put forth (Burgelman, 1983a). Internal mechanisms select from 
these business initiatives the ones fulfilling selection criteria based on resource 
allocation (Burgelman, 1991) or strategic alignment and project championship 
(Burgelman, 1983a). The initiatives selected are then pursued in the organization. 
However, managers making selection may not always recognize external opportunities 
(Burgelman, 1996). In building my framework, the work of Aldrich & Ruef (2006), 
Aldrich, Hodgson, Hull, Knudsen, Mokyr, & Vanberg (2008), Bower (2005) and the 
conceptual analyses of Hodgson (1993, 2002, 2004) have been valuable. I have 
conceptualized the co-selection phenomenon based on the examples on “correlation of 
growth” given by Darwin (1859). The role of internal constraints has been presented in 
the writings of Gould & Lewontin (1979) and Gould & Vrba (1982). For a general 
background on evolutionary theory, I refer to Stern (2000), and to Endler & McLellan 
(1988). The conceptual framework is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework 
New projects
Completed projects
Co-
selection
SelectionVariation
Selecting for priority
Terminated projects
Retention
Retention 
Prioritized
Co-retention of 
co-selected 
attributes
 
 
The selection of projects to a portfolio and their being given a priority is essential for 
portfolio management. Definitions of project portfolio selection emphasize that 
selection has a repeating process nature, some projects are prioritized over others, and 
selection has a long time horizon and influential strategic consequences (Archer and 
Ghasemzadeh, 1999, 2004; Cooper et al, 1998; Standard for Portfolio Management, 
2008; Jamieson & Morris, 2004; Thiry, 2004; Artto & Dietrich, 2004; Dye & 
Pennypacker, 1999; Milosevic, 2004). In the following, I always refer to portfolio of 
new product development projects when discussing portfolios. In the literature, project 
selection may mean a process in which projects which are not selected are killed 
(Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 1999), or a process where projects are prioritized or not 
prioritized, but not killed (Cooper et al, 1998). A comparison of concepts used in 
evolutionary theory and in project portfolio management is presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3 Comparison of concepts in evolutionary and portfolio literature 
Evolutionary theory  R&D project portfolio management 
Population Project portfolio 
New project Decide to initiate a new project 
Variation The total scope of projects and their attributes in the portfolio  
Selection  Choosing projects in the portfolio 
Select for priority Decision to prioritize a project 
Co-selection Set of project attributes accompanying a project which is prioritized 
Retention Set of projects remaining in the portfolio 
Prioritized retention Set of prioritized projects remaining in the portfolio 
Co-retention Set of co-selected project attributes in prioritized projects remaining in the portfolio  
Attribute Property of a project 
Completed projects A set of projects which end successfully 
Terminated projects A set of projects which are terminated 
 
The following definitions explain the concepts used in more detail. I define the 
concepts: population, project, project portfolio, project attribute, variation, selection, 
selection mechanism, selection event, selection rule, selection structure, decision, 
prioritization, retention, co-selection, co-retention, new project, project termination and 
project completion.  
 
Population is the collection of entities inside an organization under study. Entities in 
this study are R&D new product development projects. 
 
Project refers to an R&D driven product development project. If successfully 
completed, it will enter the market as a new product or lifecycle improvement. 
 
Project portfolio is the population or the totality of R&D development projects. It is 
synonymous with population in this study. 
 
Project attribute is a property of a project. Examples of project attributes are 
membership of a business unit, project age or development stage.  
 
Variation in the project population arises from either new project entries or an ongoing 
project development process to push new projects to the successive development stage. 
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Selection is the set of actions concerning objects that lead to their retention or exit. 
Selection denotes a selection mechanism at work.  
 
Selection mechanism consists of selection structure, selection event and the object of 
selection. Objects of selection are projects. 
 
Selection events are decisions about projects in instances of time when applying the 
selection rule leads to their retention or rejection. Decisions occur repeatedly in 
selection structures.  
 
Selection rules specify the criteria for selecting objects at selection events. 
 
Selection structures are organizational committees at different levels of hierarchy in the 
organization whose members are managers and where selection mechanisms are 
localized. An example is the portfolio committee. 
 
Decisions are selection events of managerial action regarding projects. Examples are 
project initiations and terminations or project prioritizations and de-prioritizations. 
 
Prioritization is a decision by which management gives the project prime access to 
resources in bottlenecks and in this way reduces time to market in comparison with 
other projects. Prioritization and selecting for priority are synonymous. De-
prioritization is the negation of prioritization. 
 
Retention is the outlook of the remaining project population when the selection 
mechanism is choosing “in” some projects of the population. This population is 
reselected over time. Examples include the population of prioritized projects.  
 
Co-selection is the mechanism that causes some other attributes of the project to be 
selected when a selection rule referring to specific attributes of a project is applied on 
that project. Examples include the retention of business unit membership during 
prioritization.  
 
Co-retention is the retention of a co-selected attribute. 
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New project refers to the initiation of a new project to increase variation in the 
portfolio. New project entry is decided by top managers. 
 
Project termination refers to the exit of any project. Exit is decided by top managers. 
Termination is one type of selection mechanism  
 
Project completion refers to a successful ending of a project. Project delivers an 
innovative product as an outcome. 
 
3.2.3 Co-selection and project dominant design 
The conceptualization of co-selection utilizes a fruitful analogy from biology. The 
concept of dominant design also has its roots in biology. Biological organisms are not 
decomposable to unrestricted combinations of traits for malleable adaptation (Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979). White blue-eyed cats are deaf (Darwin, 1859). Forcing effects of 
internal constraints bind different traits together. These constraints like Darwin’s 
correlation of growth can be used to understand the origin of co-selection. Ex-aptation 
(Gould & Vrba, 1982) and pleiotropy (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Hodgkin, 1998) are 
well-known constraints to adaptation. Pleiotropy means that one biological entity, such 
as a gene, an enzyme or an organ, executes a number of different functions. High 
pleiotropy describes a system where many things change when one trait or component 
is changed due to a physical connection or dynamic interrelatedness. The notion of 
pleiotropy has been used to conceptualize dominant designs in innovations (Murmann 
& Frenken, 2006) or more generally in technologies (Mokyr, 2000).  
 
Pharmaceutical R&D product development projects display a typical stepwise 
dominant organizational and technological design (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; 
Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Foulkes & Morris, 2004; Langlois, 2002; Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996). The contents of different stages of the dominant design are described 
in more detail in chapter 4. Figure 2 presents an overview of the dominant design of 
R&D projects in the pharmaceutical field.   
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Figure 2 Dominant design of pharmaceutical R&D product development project 
Regulatory phases for pharmaceutical products by FDA (USA), 
EMEA (European Union), and PMDEC (Japan)
Development stages in R&D project dominant design in case firm
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6
 
 
The dominant design of a pharmaceutical R&D development project consists of 
different development stages. They are unique and must be conducted in sequence 
rather than in parallel. This design has evolved due to extensive medical regulatory 
requirements for product safety and attempts to reduce technology and market risk in 
product development. Development stages are regarded as project attributes. The 
sequential development in stages of a pharmaceutical product is a dominant design in 
the sense that it is an industry standard enforced by regulatory authorities (Suárez & 
Utterback, 1995). Regulatory authorities categorize these steps as phases. The 
correspondence of development stages and regulatory phases is illustrated in Appendix 
6. Development stages or phases are also cognitive categorizing models for defining 
project milestones in the industry (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995). 
Modularity in innovation project design and design of organizational structure reflect 
some similarity (Langlois, 2002, Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). McGrath, MacMillan & 
Tushman (1992) suggest that managers can or should pursue activities that shape the 
dominant designs of new products.  
 
Project dominant design accounts for co-selection. Managers prioritize projects whose 
attributes are connected; connections that are retained after prioritization. A new 
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product development process is hard to change once goals have been set (Milosevic, 
2004.) Revisions can arise either from “external” factors, such as the lack of scientific 
evidence to support project goal, or “internal” factors, which depend on the firm’s 
ability to innovate. In quite a number of cases in pharmaceutical R&D, new product 
development projects just fail to meet specification criteria. The candidate product 
either is not effective enough to treat the condition for which it is being developed, or 
some serious adverse event may become evident that makes the product unsuitable for 
use by humans. If the project does not quite achieve its goals, the product may 
occasionally be approved for a restricted therapeutic application only. For the project, 
this is a change in goal and specification and radically affects the commercial outlook 
for the product. Sometimes, in early development, an improvement in pharmacological 
properties or a synthetic production route may be needed, which cause delay and 
additional investment, but do not necessarily damage the project. However, if revisions 
arise, most of these projects are terminated.  
 
Some of the development stages can be accelerated, others cannot. For example, firms 
must know and provide data to authorities on the stability of intermediate chemical 
compounds used in the manufacturing process and in the end product for many years. 
These processes can be accelerated. Increasing temperature to decrease observation 
time is a scientifically valid method to check stability. However, it is not medically 
valid to run a clinical study where patients receiving long term treatment require an 
observation time for two years in less than two years by just increasing the number of 
patients in order to obtain the same number of days of exposure with shorter duration of 
treatment. Sometimes parallel development is possible but there are also limits here. To 
conduct clinical trials on patients, one must use the final form of the drug product 
intended for commercial use. This means that it is necessary to complete all stability 
trials relating to manufacturing before one can proceed to treat humans. Toxicology 
studies must also be completed before human clinical trials commence.  
 
Every managerial decision concerning a project changes at least one of its attributes. 
Project attributes add up to portfolio level attributes. However, the literature is not clear 
about what are the most relevant categories and attributes and how they are derived 
(Crawford, Hobbs & Turner, 2005). Based on a large survey, the results of Crawford et 
al (2005) indicate that the categorizing of products varies a lot across firms and 
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between industries. The average number of attributes used to categorize projects in 
general is between five (mode) and eight (median). This is not a large number, but 
categories vary a lot from firm to firm. For strategic alignment, the themes that are 
important include commitment to capability, prioritizing, managing risks, allocating 
budget, balancing the portfolio, and identifying an approval process.  
 
Categorizing products by size and development stage is extremely common. 
Geographic scope and market potential are explicit or implicit in prioritization. Project 
attributes and organizational purposes are interconnected and inseparable. They also 
serve multiple purposes and are not exclusive. The dominant attributes of innovation 
projects for normative portfolio management include size and risk, and project stage 
(Cooper et al, 2001b). All portfolio selection activities rely on this kind of listing of 
industry-specific categories (Suárez & Utterback, 1995; Porac et al, 1995). However, 
due to industry and firm level idiosyncrasies, it is by no means certain that these 
categories relating to project selection accurately reflect the dominant modular design 
of project. Since modularity, dominant design, and pleiotropy are connected, any 
“optimizing” level of modularity in dominant designs is based on a process of trial and 
error (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004).  
 
3.2.4 Uncertainty and evolution 
In his analysis of risk and uncertainty, Knight (1921) made a fundamental distinction 
between forthcoming events to which managers can assign “a priori or statistical” 
probability estimates, and events where “there is no valid basis to classify instances”. 
According to Knight, it makes sense to talk about risk only when probability estimates 
apply and the risk can be insured against. However, some events or outcomes are 
inherently unknowable beforehand until they materialize. The definition of uncertainty 
further distinguishes between known unknowns and unknown unknowns. Known 
unknowns refer to states of affairs that are perceived as possible future eventualities, 
but there is no meaningful way to talk about their probabilities. Unknown unknowns 
refer to events that are not anticipated at all (Thompson, 1967; Nutt, 2002). When no 
exact probability or probability distribution measure for an event to occur can be made, 
then the event is inherently uncertain. Not all future events can be anticipated even at a 
concept or category level.  
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The precise wording that Knight himself used yields two interpretations. Some scholars 
maintain that Knight (1921) included both known and unknown unknowns to his 
definition of uncertainty (Langlois & Cosgel, 1993; Dequech, 2006; Loasby, 2001; 
Nightingale, 2000). Others consider he only referred to known unknowns (Davidson, 
1991; Golosnoy & Okhrin, 2008; Sommer, Loch & Dong, 2009). I concur with the 
argument of Langlois & Cosgel (1993) who base their claim on careful text analysis of 
Knight’s (1921) work and the general background of his philosophical thinking. 
Following Langlois & Cosgel (1993) and Loasby (2001), in this study I shall refer to 
Knightian uncertainty as covering both known and unknown unknowns. Post-
Keynesian economists, especially Davidson (1991, 1996, 2004), point out that Keynes 
(1937), in his general theory, assumes an unknown future. The study by Lawson (1988) 
on the nature and relations between Keynesian and Knightian views on probability and 
uncertainty also suggest this.  
 
Scholars provide many ways to estimate risks in product portfolios, and techniques to 
manage such risks; for example, mathematical models (Chapman & Ward, 2002, 2003), 
the experimental project risk funnel (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992), trial-and-error 
experimenting and selection for unforeseeable events (Loch, De Meyer & Pich, 2006; 
Sommer, Loch & Pich, 2008) or preparing for a broad variety in organizational 
response (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Risk estimates from extrapolating past experience 
(Wheelwright & Clark, 1992) give rough guidance, but they do not include surprises 
due to Knightian uncertainty in fat tail distributions (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004), 
metaphorically called “Black Swans” (Taleb, 2008). Some scholars of risk estimation 
deny Knightian uncertainty and maintain that managers always estimate subjective 
probabilities (for example, see Chapman & Ward, 2003). Their rejection of true 
uncertainty is not in line with what we know about managerial behavior connected with 
risk (March & Shapira, 1987). It also conflicts with the ideas of Knight (1921), 
Thompson (1967) and Weick (1995), that humans in an uncertain world are unable to 
categorize even future occurrences, not merely their probabilities of occurrence. 
 
The notion of uncertainty must not be confused with the notions of complexity and 
difficulty (Page, 2008). The research tradition advocated by Simon (1947, 1955) and 
many others tends to assume that complexity is the cause of uncertainty. If one could 
understand the computationally difficult behavior of complex entities then uncertainty 
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would vanish. Bounded rationality and “satisficing” solutions would be put aside as 
unnecessary approximations. This view presupposes a universe where rational 
calculation about future states is possible. Evolution would be the teleological 
unfolding of events from potential to actual in a life cycle manner, with an imminent 
goal.  
 
If future events are essentially predictable based on past information this type of world 
is called ergodic (Davidson, 1996). In a sense, the future is like the past. The notion of 
ergodic systems is borrowed from the mathematical physics of particles moving on 
trajectories in phase spaces. In an ergodic world the future is predictable. Any future 
event will be arbitrarily close to being similar to some previous event. Assuming 
eternal absolute time, once all event categories and their combinations have made their 
presence on the world stage they start to reappear. History repeats itself.  
 
In a non-ergodic world, some realized events are unforeseen and genuinely 
unpredictable. In a non-ergodic world the future is not a repeat of the past (Arthur, 
1989; Davidson, 1982; Dunn, 2000). Davidson (2003) gives a devastating critique of 
using a mathematical axiomatic model in economic theory based on the assumption of 
an ergodic future. Davidson’s argument of for true uncertainty follows from the idea 
that the world of economics is non-ergodic, path dependent historical and irreversible.  
 
Path dependence implies some form of historical irreversibility. Although intuitive, 
path dependence is difficult to define precisely. Many definitions have been presented 
in the strategic and evolutionary literatures (Lamberg & Parvinen, 2003). In path 
dependence, different sequences of past events cause different future outcomes. In 
strong path dependence, this is always the case. In weak path dependence, this is not 
always the case (Page, 2006). Nevertheless, the sequence of events matters. There are 
many types of phenomena related to, but not necessarily manifesting, path 
dependencies. Expressions to describe different kinds of concepts related to path 
dependencies in social theory include “increasing returns”, “self-reinforcement”, 
“positive feedback”, “founder process”, and “lock-in”. Not all of these constructs need 
to be path dependent. Path dependence may be forgetful so that only more recent events 
count. According to Mahoney (2000b), there are two types of path-dependent event 
sequences. Self-reinforcing sequences refer to a pattern of events (“increasing returns” 
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or “lock in”). Reactive sequences refer to inherently causally dependent events leading 
to outcome as time unfolds.  
 
In a project portfolio negative externalities exist. This is because selecting for priority 
to distribute limited resources occurs repeatedly, unless all projects are prioritized 
(Page, 2006). The later set of projects is not likely to be the same as earlier ones. Since 
prioritizing implies queuing for resources, R&D project portfolio management is path 
dependent, and the prioritizing of decisions makes negative externalities inevitable. 
According to Page (2006), selection rules derived through optimization cannot be path-
dependent. Sequential decision making may lead to path dependence even under the 
unrealistic assumption of full rationality (List, 2005). According to List (2005), in 
collective sequential decision making a “discursive dilemma” or Concordet’s paradox 
may arise, where “agenda setting” influences the outcome of the decision process. 
Portfolio selection is a recurring process. In this context, self-reinforcement is likely to 
occur. Because new projects are introduced that were not there in the past and projects 
pass to new development phases there is ongoing variation. Hence, project portfolio 
selection is neither an ergodic nor a Markov process (Page, 2006). Furthermore, the 
sequence in which selections are made over time does matters. It is quite likely that 
permuting the ordering – in time – of project proposals results in a different set of 
approvals.  
 
In the strategic intention stream of research, path dependence is often regarded as 
harmful; whereas in evolutionary theory, it is considered necessary (Lamberg & 
Tikkanen, 2006). The escalation of commitment in concerted decisions refers to 
behavior where the initial course of action is maintained in spite of negative feedback 
from the outcomes. In resource allocation, this is paraphrased as the effect of sunk costs 
(Staw & Ross, 1978). An escalation of commitment does not necessarily reverse 
although increasing information is available (Schmidt & Calantone, 2000). 
Bikhchandani et al (1998) observe that the cause of this is information cascading. In 
sequential decision making people start to ignore their private information and conform 
to previous decisions. This gets amplified by others who act alike. This mechanism is 
behind also fads and fashions. Different factors are likely to influence escalation in 
different contexts and points of time (Brockner, 1992).  
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Past research has found no explanation for the escalation of commitment to older 
products other than sunk costs (Brockner, 1992). However, sticking to one’s choices is 
beneficial in trial and error learning and experimenting with many probes (Garud & van 
de Ven, 1992; Turner & Keegan, 2004). Long term commitment to competitive strategy 
is beneficial for firm survival (Lamberg, Tikkanen, Nokelainen & Suur-Inkeroinen, 
2009). To conclude, path dependent phenomena arise in evolutionary models, but not in 
ergodic optimizing models. Co-selection is a manifestation of path dependence in 
evolution. Structures from the past are the building blocks of new structures. 
 
Selecting a novel frame of study, a new ontology, is a way to tackle conceptual 
impasses (Weick, 2006). Portfolio management decisions are not optimal (Klein & 
Meckling, 1958). Scholars suggest trying alternative theoretical perspectives beyond 
rational equilibrium economic theory and “optimizing” (Alchian, 1950; Cyert & 
March, 1963; Greve, 2008; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2008; Nelson, 1995; Nightingale, 
2008; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Framing the problem of managing a project portfolio in 
a novel way could help to explain the empirical bias found between portfolio 
management dynamics in practice and the expectations provided by normative decision 
theory based on optimizing. Interestingly, the rational optimizing approach in resource 
allocation for R&D development projects was conceptually challenged many years ago 
(Klein & Meckling, 1958). Some scholars suggest that variation and selection is an 
alternative way to analyze portfolio management without using traditional normative 
decision theory or portfolio models (Pich, Loch & De Meer, 2002; Loch, De Meer & 
Pich, 2006; Loch & Kavadias, 2008b). Indeed, evolutionary theory provides a 
framework to study time dependent processes longitudinally. Importantly, evolutionary 
theory can conceptually cope with Knightian uncertainty (Brandon & Carson, 1996).  
 
The framework of intra-firm evolution allows a fresh look into portfolio dynamics. 
There are three main reasons to use an evolutionary perspective to study innovative 
R&D project portfolio dynamics rather than the traditional, rational optimizing, form 
portfolio management. First, the evolutionary approach can cope with the notion of 
Knightian uncertainty. Second, the evolutionary outlook does not employ rational 
normative decision theoretical tools as a means of optimizing and does not share the 
associated assumptions. Third, in evolutionary theory no specific assumptions about 
managerial intentions and human behavior are made. This allows me to choose a 
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framework where neither normative optimizing nor strategic intentions are used as 
theoretical constructs, but with which the phenomenon of portfolio dynamics can be 
tackled.  
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Research methodology 
4.1.1 Realism in ontology and epistemology 
According to Nightingale (2008), we are witnessing a major change of deeply seated 
research paradigms in social science. There is a shift from an optimizing, reductionist, 
axiomatic, static and deterministic mindset towards a one that is dynamic, evolutionary, 
and history-dependent. Rational choice theory is losing its privileged status (Hodgson, 
1993; Simon, 1979; Whitford, 2002; Vanberg, 2004). The mode of inquiry is moving 
away from explaining events and things with the help of “essences”, such as factors, 
towards recognizing the primacy of variation in the world. This change of atmosphere 
in social science increasingly encourages the inclusion of both time and variety in 
academic research (Beinhocker, 2006; Nightingale, 2008), also in project portfolio 
management (Kavadias & Chao, 2008).  
 
The philosophical outlook in this study is scientific realism (Popper, 1963, 1972; 
Niiniluoto, 1999a). According to the realistic position, social phenomena, such as 
organizational hierarchies and managerial decisions, exist objectively in the world 
irrespective of the researcher who studies these phenomena. Although the world is not 
assumed to be deterministic, it is appropriate to look for internal and external causes of 
events. The fallible realism of evolutionary epistemology pursues an explanation of 
why some entities survive through analyzing the variation of these entities, together 
with the changes in external conditions (Popper, 1974; Campbell, 1960, 1974; 
McKelvey, 1999).  
 
The Darwinian evolutionary framework maintains that causal explanations are to be 
pursued with the help of selection mechanisms (Darwin, 1859; Gould, 2002; Hodgson, 
2004). Causality in the ontological context of determinacy means that all events have 
causes, though these may not be unique (Hodgson, 2004). Causality is assumed to be 
determinacy and selection can be carried out by human agents (Hodgson, 2002; 
Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006). The criticism of evolutionary ideas as deterministic is not 
tenable (Singh & Lumsden, 1990; Hodgson, 2004). According to Hodgson (2004) the 
various ideas lumped together as “social Darwinism” arose from an autonomous life of 
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many concepts; biological reductionism perhaps being the most prominent one. Co-
operation, not just self-interest, is also a prevalent adaptive option in nature (Hodgson 
& Knudsen, 2008). Evolution does not imply the reductionist notion that sociological 
or psychological phenomena can be explained with the concepts of biology (Vromen, 
2004). Still, human intentions and preferences ought to yield to causal explanation, too 
(Hodgson, 2007c). Evolutionary theory provides a causal explanation of the retention 
observed in the population (Nelson, 1995).  
 
4.1.2 Process research 
Processes describe how things evolve over time and why. The observer looks at the 
time axis of unfolding events rather than dissects a slice of the chain of events at a 
certain instant of time. A process is a sequence of events that tells how things change in 
the historical perspective. After decades of elegant variance-based scholarship there is 
an ever stronger trend to pay more attention to process based approaches (van de Ven 
& Poole, 1995; Abell 2004; Mayntz, 2004). Scholars have proposed process 
perspective as a means to understand innovations, uncertainty, evolution, selection, and 
causal pathways (van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Beinhocker, 2006; Dooley & van de Ven, 
1999; Nightingale, 2008; Pich, Loch & De Meyer, 2002). Although many scholars have 
advocated a process approach, few researchers (for example Bower, 1970; Garud & 
van de Ven, 1992; Noda & Bower, 1996; Burgelman, 1983ab, 1991, 1994, 1996, 
2002a; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Pajunen, 2008) have conducted process studies inside 
firms. Older reviews on process research (van de Ven, 1992; Pettigrew, 1990, 1992a; 
Miller & Friesen, 1982), and those that are more recent (Pettigrew, Woodman & 
Cameron 2001, van de Ven & Poole, 2005, van de Ven, 2007), reveal a remarkably 
sluggish pace of advancement. The challenges for studying organizational change with 
process research have persisted. The methodology is developing slowly, and 
accordingly, the shift of emphasis is gradual.  
 
As a means to study managers, Pettigrew (1992b) promotes a process approach, which 
has the following characteristics. Process study is embedded in the day to day 
unfolding of events. A process extends across a number of levels of analysis. The 
temporal interconnectedness of holistic actions is retained, and problem sensing is 
acute. Explaining events such as actions, decision makings, and outcomes through 
actors and the involvement of participants is possible. Through a process approach one 
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can analyze temporal interconnectedness in order to detect antecedents and causes of 
events.  
 
In the terminology of van de Ven & Engleman (2004), I pursue an event driven 
explanation. In the forward looking event driven explanation, observed events defined 
in the study are causes to later outcomes which are also observed. An event may act as 
a necessary cause meaning that this event is necessarily needed to occur to observe the 
outcome, but other events are needed too. A sufficient cause is one where the 
consequent outcome needs no other causes to occur. Standard regression frameworks 
incorrectly estimate causal effects when there is a need to postulate necessary or 
sufficient causes (Mahoney, 2004). Following Mayntz (2004), I choose process theory 
research as a methodology in order to explain causal effects and mechanisms rather 
than variance theory research that delivers outcome-driven explanations. Mayntz 
(2004) defines mechanisms as recurrent processes generating a specific kind of 
outcome. Mechanisms are causal links to explain events. Portfolio selection fits this 
criterion of a mechanism.  
 
To conduct process research on the portfolio of projects I conduct historical 
comparisons between projects to unveil patterns of change. Event histories from many 
projects are cross-compared to uncover their similarities and differences. In historical 
social science, there are no repeated experiments that one can carry out at will. Yet, it is 
possible to observe many event sequences and their outcomes in different times and 
places, where some but not all conditions are equal. Event sequences cannot be 
reproduced, but one may argue by analogy. This “replication logic” captures something 
from a series of independent experiments (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). One compares 
many event sequences and their outcomes to learn about larger scale similarities and 
rejects smaller scale dissimilarities. The concept of evolution entails a process outlook. 
Analyzing process data requires a means to conceptualize events and detect patterns 
among them. Both Miller & Friesen (1982) and Pettigrew (1990) propose historical 
data sources as a convenient and relatively fast way of carrying out a process study. 
Defining a process is far from unique (van de Ven, 1992, 2007; van de Ven & Poole, 
1995). The process research design in this study integrates practices from various 
authors (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Poole, van de Ven, Dooley & Holmes, 2000). The 
seven steps of study design are described in the flowchart presented in Table 4.  
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Table 4 Flowchart of methodological steps in collecting and analyzing data 
 
 Step in analysis 
 
Outcome 
1 Data coding from primary source 
 
I identify managerial reviews and decisions on 
projects as events of study from primary archival 
sources on project and portfolio meeting histories. I 
code all managerial events. To categorize project 
attributes I follow R&D project dominant design and 
industry conventions. I code changes in project 
attributes due to managerial events.  
 
Primary data matrix 
 
- Unit of analysis is a project 
- Primary data matrix on Excel sheet 
- Managerial actions coded as events  
- Project attributes and their changes coded 
- Ordinal time sequence conserved  
- Project attributes persist in time unless managerial 
events change them. 
 
2 Data development to portfolio level and 
aggregation to annual level 
 
I add together data on project attributes of all projects 
to express the properties of total portfolio at any 
instant of time. I aggregate coded data from primary 
data matrix to characterize event sequences and 
changes in portfolio at annual level. This temporal 
bracketing helps the comparison of annual financial 
data with event data.  
 
Tables of annual time series on portfolio attributes and 
managerial events 
  
- Unit of explanation is the portfolio  
- Project data are added up to portfolio attributes 
- Project attributes aggregated as annual median 
averages  
- Managerial events aggregated as annual total sum of 
events 
 
3 Analyzing annual data tables and listing portfolio 
level events and changes 
 
I observe trends and changes in managerial events 
and portfolio attributes to specify interdependencies. I 
catalogue the findings. I include the analysis of 
financial data from annual reports.  
Summary tables of managerial actions and portfolio changes 
 
- Summary tables on trends and amounts of changes 
- Managerial events on different levels of hierarchy 
- Portfolio dynamics 
- Project development stage dynamics 
- Figures to illustrate main findings 
 
4 Cross comparison of events and portfolio 
attributes and their patterns 
 
I compare longitudinally the observed trends and 
deviations between trends across portfolio. I make a 
list of conflicting findings in portfolio dynamics and 
managerial events. I apply case firm definition on 
prioritizing criteria and other internal conventions. 
The observed trends in portfolio are realized 
strategies. 
 
List of conflicting findings to be explained 
 
- Conflicting trends between managerial events and 
portfolio outcome 
- Conflicting trends in portfolio outcome 
- Conflicting trends in managerial events  
- Triangulation from financial data and industry 
evolution 
- Pairs of conflicting strategies 
 
5 Conducting QCA analysis  
 
I construct a QCA data input table. The focal event is 
prioritization. I calculate the project attributes which 
are logically necessary conditions of prioritizing 
events. 
Data input table and table of co-selected attributes 
 
- Primary QCA data input table 
- Project attributes that are necessary conditions to 
prioritization as the co-selected attributes 
 
6 Arranging managerial events to selection 
mechanisms 
 
I apply definitions of selection mechanism to 
construct a set of selection rules and selection 
hierarchies to describe managerial events. I 
characterize how portfolio dynamics is determined by 
managerial intended events and other unpredictable 
events. 
 
Table of selection mechanisms  
 
- Two levels of selection structures 
- Portfolio and project meeting level selection rules 
- Non-adaptive co-selection 
- Unforeseen terminations 
 
7 Preparing causal explanation 
 
I describe how the co-selection mechanism provides 
explanation for observed conflicting realized 
strategies in portfolio dynamics. I compare the causal 
narrative with other different explanations and 
previous literature. I compose the narrative to 
illustrate the coherent pattern that integrates 
managerial action and portfolio outcome. 
 
Narrative 
 
- Causal explanation of portfolio dynamics with 
selection mechanism 
- Interdependence of variation and selection  
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Different temporal patterns of various frequencies can be distinguished in a long term 
longitudinal observation. Pattern matching is a powerful tool for the falsification of 
conjectures. I use pattern matching to study the effect of managerial events regarding 
portfolio changes, selection mechanisms, interactions of selection levels, and how 
project age and project development stage are related.  
 
I use triangulation by collecting data from different sources. Archival documents 
disclose the dynamics of the internal project portfolio and managerial behavior. Annual 
reports provide to the public financial and other history details of the firm. They reveal 
the firm’s cost structure and success in collecting revenues and earning profit. 
Publications concerning the historical development of the industry, and the rise of R&D 
cost in particular, put project portfolio evolution into an external context.  
 
4.1.3 Qualitative Comparative Analysis  
I use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to infer the causally necessary 
conditions for a co-selection mechanism during prioritization events. I interpret the 
necessary conditions as evidence for co-selection of these attributes. Initially developed 
for macro-social research, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was first proposed 
by Ragin (1987) as a way to use Boolean algebra in comparative case analysis in order 
to find joint causes of outcomes in different event histories. According to Mahoney 
(2000a), extensive combinations of antecedents can be most conveniently handled with 
Boolean algebra. I shall use QCA to show that when an event in which a selection rule 
for project prioritization occurs, co-selection of some project attributes takes place. 
QCA is highly suitable for analyzing the presence and absence of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. The work of Fiss (2007) provides a review of the potential of 
using QCA in organization research. QCA is also increasingly applied in strategic 
management research (Pajunen, 2004; Greckhamer, Misangyi, Elms & Lacey, 2008). 
 
The comparative method of QCA imitates John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement for 
causality (Ragin, 1987). If investigators want to know the cause of a certain outcome, 
they should first identify instances of the outcome and then determine which 
circumstances invariably precede its appearance. These are the antecedents to the 
outcome. Mill’s indirect method of difference can also be incorporated. If a second set 
of instances shows the absence of both the outcome and its invariantly preceding event, 
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the conclusion is that the outcome did not occur for lack of its antecedents. Many 
possible causal explanations are permitted at the start of analysis. The approach aims to 
achieve maximum variability and therefore it is appropriate for using in an evolutionary 
framework. The main epistemological problem of QCA is that Mill’s ideal method is 
not fully replicated; this is because the list of possible coded attributes has to be 
truncated for practical reasons. In order to select relevant events for coding, comparison 
and for the drawing of conclusions, researchers need good judgment, both theoretical 
and empirical, about the phenomenon they are analyzing. As, Amenta and Poulsen 
(1994) suggest, reasoning through the assistance of QCA is conjectural; QCA helps to 
conduct a dialogue between conjectures in order to suggest justification for a conjecture 
put forward by the researcher through a process of  abduction. 
 
QCA has the power to preserve the richness and complexity of event histories; 
however, to compare effectively such histories, data reduction may be necessary. Data 
that is analyzed by this method must be coded in a discrete binary yes/no form; the 
event or outcome is either present or not and it is usually necessary to use both 
partitioning and clustering of data from event histories. In this respect further data 
reduction through selective coding and meta-level aggregation may be needed. This 
therefore makes coding a creative procedure. Many visual display techniques can be 
used to make cross-history and cross category clustering plausible. For example, levels 
of data from event histories are easily presented in the form of a meta-matrix ordered in 
time. 
  
After explaining event histories and outcomes, all earlier events about an outcome of 
interest in different cases are examined. One discovers whether one or more antecedent 
events always precede the outcome event. The aim is to also examine whether there are 
instances, in which no outcomes occur, and the antecedents were absent. If both of 
these conditions are fulfilled, then the antecedents are the cause of the outcome. The 
presence or absence of antecedents for an outcome in all different event histories is 
then compared in a logical procedure following the rules of Boolean algebra. 
Propositional calculus or elementary set theory is an equivalent formulation of the 
technique using Boolean algebra. 
 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           59 
 
 
After the comparative analysis according to the logic of Boolean algebra, one arrives at 
expressions for antecedents that are logically reduced to a minimum. However, 
sometimes it may be more sensible to abstain from complete minimization; a richer 
structure of antecedents may better reflect a theory that explains the observed process. 
Observing which arrangements of antecedents and outcomes are not present may 
further help to provide justifications for researcher’s conjecture and in this regard there 
are additional techniques and concepts in Boolean algebra to elaborate the analysis 
whereby sufficient conditions - prime implicants - for an outcome can be derived. Such 
minimization and prime implicant analyses simplify complex and lengthy logical 
sentences. Factoring is used for determining equivalences of logical sentences, and here 
De Morgan’s rule for substituting logical connectives may be helpful for analyzing 
which antecedents go together with negative outcomes. 
 
Antecedents in Boolean logical expressions that need to be present for consequent 
outcome to appear are called necessary causes. I apply QCA to detect the necessary 
conditions for prioritizing events and I interpret these necessary antecedent conditions 
for prioritizing as evidence of the co-selection of these attributes. All of the attributes 
that are attached to the project, and only these, are co-selected because they were parts 
of the project at the time of prioritization. Hence, I do not analyze whether collective 
attributes such portfolio size are antecedents to prioritization. It is possible that there is 
more than one necessary cause to prioritizing, and therefore more than one attribute 
may be co-selected. The application is summarized and presented in table 5. 
 
Table 5 Application of QCA to warrant co-selection 
QCA Application for detecting co-selection 
Focal event Managerial action to prioritize a project 
Antecedent Project attribute 
Necessary antecedent Co-selected project attribute 
 
There are a number of limitations to using QCA as a research method. The number of 
antecedents should be small compared with the number of event histories, since 
otherwise all event sequences for an outcome would be unique. QCA in its elementary 
form does not differentiate between antecedents that occur in the proximal or the distal 
past. However, these concerns do not matter when applying QCA for necessary causes 
in this study as there are ways to overcome this issue. One may introduce temporality 
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by allowing antecedents from the more distant past to fade or totally vanish. One can 
also aggregate data to macro-level time epochs. These content-determined epochs 
provide a temporal demarcation between different sets of antecedents. A third method 
is to treat the different sequential permutations of antecedents in time as separate event 
histories for an outcome (Caren & Panofsky, 2005). In explaining causes, QCA is able 
to utilize only those antecedents which have been categorized to enter the comparison. 
QCA is sensitive to coding errors (Ragin, Schulman, Weinberg & Gran, 2003). 
Moreover, there is no mechanism to exclude “non-significant” attributes. The 
researcher must judge this from the context of the study or from theoretical 
considerations. It is worth bearing in mind that QCA does not resemble the aims of 
variance analysis which are to “explain” more or less of the observed variance; neither 
does it assess net effects. Rather QCA considers combinations of causes, and it is this 
property of QCA that is used when treating the co-selected attributes as necessary 
causes for prioritization. 
 
4.1.4 Inference by abduction   
Reasoning by abduction means the formulation of conjectures (denoted by A in the 
quotation that follows) that are evaluated in order to make sense of puzzling events 
(denoted by C in the quotation that follows). Charles Peirce (1903, CP 5.189) 
introduced the concept of reasoning by abduction “for studying facts and devising a 
theory to explain them”: 
 
“The surprising fact C is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.” 
 
Substituting “conflicting strategies” for C and “co-selection” for A, the inference reads: 
 
Conflicting strategies are observed. But if co-selection were true, observing conflicting 
strategies would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to believe that co-
selection is true.  
 
Today, abduction as a method of explanation by establishing novel ideas has secured a 
seat in the canon of reasoning. A conjectural explanation is fallible and tentatively valid 
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until proven false (Niiniluoto 1999ab; Peirce, 1878, 1903; Popper, 1972). One infers 
causes as antecedents from their observed effects. The cause → effect relationship 
constitutes a mechanism. Compared with a formally consistent syllogism, abduction 
presents a strategy for gaining new knowledge rather than merely consolidating old 
knowledge at hand (Hintikka, 1998). Syllogistic reasoning is placing formal 
consistency of knowledge and avoiding mistakes above the growth of knowledge 
(Paavola, 2004). Syllogism is also a way of making the knowledge derived from 
axiomatic systems irrefutable knowledge, i.e. dogmatism (Hodgson, 1993; Vanberg, 
2004). In this regard, syllogistic inference is the foundation of an axiomatic 
methodology.  
 
Pursuing the growth of knowledge is in accord with Nightingale’s (2008) demand for a 
shift in the foundations of new social science and also a hallmark of Popper’s (1972) 
theory of conjectural knowledge required to solve Hume’s problem of empirical 
inductive inference. Cultivating abduction logic invites scholars to engage in a 
continuous interplay between observational and conceptual work. Increasing numbers 
of scholars in business research turn to abduction as the model of reasoning in order to 
provide explanations (Weick, 2006; van de Ven, 2007; van Maanen, Sorensen & 
Mitchell, 2007). Scholars increasingly realize that all statements relating to evidence 
about measurement and history, even statistical tests of significance, involve abduction 
(Niiniluoto, 1999b). Using abduction invites scholars to offer justifications to support 
their conjectures and encourages others to refute them. I offer a conjecture relating to a 
co-selection mechanism and seek justifications from case data regarding conflicting 
developments in portfolio dynamics to justify this conjecture. 
 
4.2 Research strategy and case context  
The choice of research strategy is interplay between research question, the nature of 
data and the choice of method. In this study the data source is a unique archival history 
of events. The nature of data invites a process approach and event-driven mode of 
explanation. The history of projects describes a process where events occur at specific 
instances time, and changes over time are explicitly documented. The objective of my 
research is to discover, how co-selection explains the evolution of project portfolios. 
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Evolutionary theory is selected as a research framework. This perspective is able to 
incorporate the notion of Knightian uncertainty.  
 
4.2.1 Case firm and its R&D project portfolio 
I employ a longitudinal, explanatory case study in one international pharmaceutical 
firm that is R&D intensive and has a strong portfolio relating to innovative new product 
development. For reasons of confidentiality, the case firm has been given the 
pseudonym “Cinnamon”. It is a listed pharmaceutical company present in all major 
markets. The company was organized into global business units that developed new 
products and delivered these to local subsidiaries for marketing and selling. At the time 
of study, the company had four business units, here each given color code names 
“Lime”, “Lavender”, “Blue” and “Tan”. Lime and Lavender were the two larger 
business units. They both had a very large number of ongoing innovative R&D 
projects. Based on the number of new project initiations, Lavender was the focal 
business unit for Cinnamon. More R&D initiatives were launched in Lavender than in 
the other business units. The customer base of Lavender was different from, and more 
diversified than, that of Lime. Blue was smaller than Lavender and Lime and Tan the 
smallest of these units. Divergent from the three other business units, Tan was not 
really a global unit. R&D and product development were separately organized in each 
business unit, but controlled jointly by all business unit executives and other top 
managers. A pre-project research phase relating to innovation development was 
conducted separately from new product development projects and this was excluded 
from this study. 
  
Some time before the nine year observation period that is the focus of this research the 
case firm divested their other smaller businesses to become a single industry 
pharmaceutical firm. The firm made acquisitions shortly before the observation period 
and consolidated the new pharmaceutical firms which were purchased. The years that 
were the focus of observation for Cinnamon were characterized by few and small 
changes in corporate structure. The business unit structure remained stable. No major 
acquisitions or divestments were made during the observation period. Some time after 
the observation period, following a merger with a global multi-industry firm, the case 
firm ceased to exist as a separate legal entity. During the observation period, the firm 
achieved steady organic growth of sales and maintained a high level of investment 
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R&D, and a constant R&D investment to sales ratio. No sudden cataclysmic events in 
the industry took place during the period and market and competitive trends were 
somewhat different for each of the different business unit during these years. In 
general, the growth of generic manufacturing firms and the increase of R&D cost were 
typical for the pharmaceutical field.  
 
Each product development program started as a new project from a pre-project 
discovery stage. Projects that were completed were released to market. Innovative 
R&D projects in the firm constituted a population. Variation was provided through new 
projects that entered the development process and through the progress of projects 
towards new development stages. Top management set up rules of procedure and 
organizational structures for the selection of R&D projects. In this regard an 
organizational selection structure – a review committee - channeled all projects to 
periodic portfolio reviews. Some projects were prioritized to shorten time to market and 
they were given a privileged position in terms of the allocation of resource. This 
prioritization was the mechanism for selecting projects to form a preferred population 
of projects in the portfolio. At any moment, a project was either labeled as “prioritized” 
or “normal”. Termination and completion were the mechanisms that were employed to 
end the project. Some projects were terminated prematurely, due to either technological 
or to commercial hazards. Completed projects were either launched as new products or 
these projects were out-licensed. The activities of top management team constituted 
selection events, and therefore selection can be perceived as a consequence of top 
management decisions. The selection process led to the retention of preferred projects. 
Because a project portfolio review took place many times a year, every project was 
exposed to repeated selection during different development stages.  
 
4.2.2 Defining measurements 
Cinnamon had a long history of reviewing and selecting new product development 
projects. According to company documents, the structures and procedures for project 
and portfolio reviews were revised a year before the observation period commenced. 
The selection rule for prioritization was also formulated at this time. Organizational 
selection structures, processes and routines were then quite stable during the 
observation period. Project and portfolio evaluations were carried out in two 
committees at two levels of top managerial action. Details of managerial committees 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           64 
 
 
are given in appendix 5. The routines for new product development followed a 
consistent milestone decision procedure for passing projects to the next development 
stage. They had been established in Cinnamon a long time previously. Cinnamon 
followed a typical normative portfolio management process. The dominant design of 
product development in the firm corresponded to a sequential life cycle model with 
milestone decisions. Details of the product development process are given in Appendix 
6. Following Bagozzi and Phillips (1982), a holistic model of constructs and 
measurable entities was crafted. Figure 3 shows the relations between constructs and 
measurable entities.  
 
Figure 3 Constructs and measurable entities 
Coded events from
archival sources
Annual aggregated 
data
Constructs 
Decisions as
acts of
selection
Project
level 
attributes
Portfolio
level 
attributes
Selection
patterns
Portfolio
patterns
Selection
mechanisms 
Retention
Co-
selection
Co-reten-
tion of co-
selected 
attributes
 
 
In the following I define the following constructs and measurable entities: business 
unit, instant of time, project age, project lifetime, project average age, project 
development process, project development stage, milestone decision, portfolio 
decision, project committee, portfolio committee, criteria for project prioritizing and 
termination, criteria for milestone decision, portfolio attribute, and pattern. Other 
constructs seen in Figure 3 have been defined earlier. 
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Business units to which any project is assigned are designated as: Lavender, Lime, Blue 
and Tan.  
 
Instant of time refers to the actual moment of recording an event. These are the dates of 
committee meetings. 
 
Project age is the chronological age of a project at any specific instant of time. The age 
of the project indicates how long that project has been running since initiation. 
 
Project lifetime is the total time that has passed from project initiation to completion or 
termination.  
 
The average age (median age) of projects represents the duration in time when half of 
the projects are younger and the other half are older. 
 
Project development process means to run a project from initiation to completion by 
executing all development stages of the project in the sequential order defined by 
industry dominant design of a project. 
 
Project development stage is a part of the project development process. It is a sub goal. 
A project consists of a number of consecutive stages through which the development 
process runs. Examples of stages in new product development in the pharmaceutical 
industry are animal toxicology studies, pharmaceutical development and clinical trials. 
A project is within one development stage at time. The process consists of five stages 
designated as S2, S3, S4, S5 and S6. Some projects in stages S5 or S6 were already 
marketed and the project goal was, for example, either to follow up or a new 
therapeutic application. A pre-project discovery stage indicating that it was awaiting 
project initiation was not recorded in this study. 
 
Milestone decisions steer the development process of a project. Access to the next 
project development stage is granted as a milestone decision. The more stages a project 
passes, the further product development has advanced. The five milestone decisions are 
designated as D2, D3, D4, D5 and D6. For example, a project approved for milestone 
decision D3 moves to stage S3 and remains in this stage until milestone decision D4. 
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Portfolio decisions refer to actions taken when the whole portfolio is examined. The 
decisions are project initiations, prioritizations, de-prioritizations, successful project 
completions, and terminations. 
 
There were two permanent committees that undertook a project and portfolio review. 
Committee membership was authorized by top executives. Both committees had a 
meticulous approval procedure and a tradition of producing meeting minutes to 
document their decisions. These committees were the two selection structures for the 
whole population of R&D projects. 
 
Project committee granted or recommended milestone decisions for entering the next 
development stage. It was responsible for project resource release according to 
milestone. A milestone decision presupposed that the previous stages in the project had 
been accomplished. Thereafter resources for the next stage were granted. Members of 
the project review committee were function and business unit leaders. For milestone 
decisions, the accomplishment of technological goals and risk was evaluated, but 
business and market risk or financial attractiveness beyond positive net present value 
threshold was not. Formal milestone criteria for achieving sub goals were applied. The 
process utilized all medical and regulatory understanding in the firm. Company 
business units were not entitled to approve milestones wholly on their own. Milestone 
decision for an individual project affected the overall portfolio resource status.  
  
Portfolio committee decided on project prioritizations, de-prioritizations, initiations, 
completions and terminations. It was also able to veto a positive milestone decision but 
not overrule a negative milestone decision for not achieving a sub goal. The milestone 
decision D5 from pre-clinical stage to resource intensive clinical development stage S5 
was formally approved in portfolio review after approval in project review. Members of 
the portfolio review committee were top executives, including the CEO. Formal criteria 
for terminations were established. Projects could be terminated for technological or 
commercial reasons. Terminations resulted from technology risk more often than from 
commercial risk. Prioritizations were clearly the most significant decisions in 
guaranteeing access to resources for running projects that were competing for limited 
resources. Prioritizations were proposed by the business unit. A portfolio board 
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assigned formal prioritizations for projects. Although formal project technological and 
financial evaluation criteria were defined for the project review, no formal portfolio 
evaluation criteria existed for prioritization in the portfolio review.  
 
Criteria for prioritizing projects, according to the managerial intention documented in 
the archival minutes, were to shorten time to market for products with high market 
potential and the opportunity for global exploitation. The two criteria were 
interdependent but not reducible to a single ordinal measure. For example, global 
access was important in itself for maintaining market presence and local sales 
organizations. This selection rule classified projects either to the category “prioritized” 
or to the category “normal”. Portfolio reviews utilized different techniques for 
evaluating and comparing projects, but according to the archival documents there was 
no specific procedure for establishing a unique ranking. Managers were entitled to take 
into account various sudden and unexpected twists of circumstance when making 
decisions about the portfolio. Decisions to prioritize represented real selective actions 
under uncertainty, with no guarantee for success.  
 
Criteria for terminating projects were technological failure or re-evaluation of 
commercial potential and exploitation opportunity. 
 
Criteria for milestone decisions were to fulfill the technological success criteria of a 
development stage. 
 
Portfolio attribute is a property of the collection of projects that is not reducible to a 
project attribute. For example, the total number of projects, and the rate of change in 
portfolio size are portfolio attributes. 
 
Pattern refers to the overall evolution of portfolio or selection properties based on 
annual aggregated data. 
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4.3 Data gathering and analysis 
4.3.1 Coding of events  
The primary data in this study were archival records of past portfolio committee and 
project committee meetings. The meeting minutes were reviewed and approved by the 
participants and thereby they constituted an authoritative internal record on what 
actually happened, which decisions were made, and what actions were taken. They 
were not intended to be publicly available. These reports formed an uninterrupted 
source of documented managerial action. Internal research and development handbooks 
covering the years of study were used as sources for clarifying standard operational 
procedures in the project and portfolio management. Additional data sources included 
the case firm’s annual reports, and their website for detail of the general financial 
performance and firm structure. This study did not try to discover the internal process 
of arriving at the documented decisions. Furthermore, archival data from committee 
meetings did not provide details of any discussions during the meetings that revealed 
the rational, political or bargaining decision processes in the interactions of top 
managers.  
 
In the process of coding information from archives, the critical question for each 
meeting document was: what happened? What were the actions taken or decisions 
made by this body of managers? The coding of events was mostly straightforward, 
since archival documents were written in a brief manner, only for internal use. The 
language of archival records was English. The following quotations from archives 
indicate the minimalistic, even laconic style and easy readability of the text that 
required coding. 
 
The milestone decisions of the project committee were typically recorded as follows:  
 
“Stage 3 was granted [to the project x]”   
“The decision for stage 4 was granted [to the project x].”   
 
The decisions to prioritize were also short, as the following examples from the portfolio 
board committee meeting minutes show: 
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“The project [x] was redefined to global and prioritized.”  
“Project [x] status was switched to priority.”  
“Top prioritized development projects are listed in the [table in the] appendix.”  
“Milestone for stage 5 was granted. The project [x] was prioritized”  
 
Decisions made by the portfolio and project committee (who recommend the decisions 
to the portfolio board committee) to initiate and terminate or complete a project were 
reported like this: 
 
“The development [of project x] was terminated due to insufficient bioavailability.”  
“The stage 2 [for project x] was approved.”  
“The decision to terminate [project x] was approved.”  
“The project [x] was terminated due to successful completion of development.”   
 
During the period, in total the top managers discussed 274 projects. For some projects, 
part of the data was missing. Some projects were so short lived that it was not possible 
to document initiation and end in a reliable way. In addition, for some projects, 
development stages were not fully recorded. A few projects were renumbered or united. 
I coded the project attributes of all projects (stage of development, age, business unit 
membership, priority status) at the point of the project and portfolio meeting during the 
project’s lifetime. If a project was not discussed at a meeting, for coding purposes I 
assumed that its attributes were unchanged from the previous meeting. I also 
chronologically coded all decisions and other actions made in the project and portfolio 
committee meetings that changed project attributes as events (project initiation, project 
completion, project termination, project prioritization, project de-prioritization, project 
milestone decision, and project review). This resulted in 508 portfolio committee 
decisions and 347 project review committee decisions. A total of 746 review events 
where no specific decision on change of attributes was made were also recorded. 
Altogether, 10 different types of project attributes and 11 types of managerial actions 
and decisions were recorded. Decisions and portfolio status were recorded between 6 to 
9 times annually for 9 years. In total, 83 meetings were held during the time period. 
The sequence and timing of actions and events were preserved. Data on all project 
attributes and events was coded by a nominal yes/no classification according to the 
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presence or absence of an attribute of any project, or an event at an instant of time. A 
full data coding dictionary is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
The sequence of time found in the primary archival data was chronological. Data 
included the date for the meeting and the approval of the minutes. In this study, time 
was represented as an ordinal scale, which preserved the temporal order. Events were 
also aggregated to obtain annual average or cumulative figures. This temporal 
bracketing permitted comparison between event data with the corporate financial data 
collected from annual reports.  
 
The unit for measuring time was the chronological number of a committee meeting. 
Meetings had ordinal numbers from 1 to 83. The number of and type of meetings by 
year is set out in Appendix 4. The project age was chronologically given as the number 
of meetings of the project and portfolio committees from project initiation to present. 
For example, a project initiated in meeting 23 was 14 units of time old at the time of 
meeting 37. The meetings took place at almost, but not quite, regular intervals. Their 
number per year varied a little. It might have been possible to measure time with an 
interval calendar scale; however this approach would not improve the explanatory 
power because the intervals between meetings differed by only a few weeks. The time 
interval between actual meeting date and the approval date of the recorded minutes was 
typically 2 weeks. These differences were small against the study period of nine years. 
Moreover, data was aggregated to an annual level. The date when a meeting was held 
was recorded as the time of an event. Appendix 4 presents the chronology of committee 
meetings and units of time.  
 
Project age provided a crude proxy for measuring the resources used for the project 
from initiation until present. Resources for development stages S2 to S6 were not 
generally interchangeable. This was particularly the case when clinical trials were 
conducted in stages S5 and S6; they needed resources radically different from resources 
required for stages S2 and S3.  
 
Budget planning and investment decisions for research facilities were not addressed in 
primary data. Total R&D resources were allocated to business units through annual 
budgeting. 
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4.3.2. Constructing data matrix and aggregating data  
Following Miles & Huberman (1994), event histories were developed for each project; 
they were recorded in an Excel file. Time sequences and types of action were 
conserved in the data reduction. All other variables were discrete and nominal; however 
the timescale was an ordinal, indeed almost interval. The data matrix contained 22742 
rows and 21 columns in binary coding. Portfolio evolution was examined based on the 
data matrix. The observational unit of analysis was a project, whereas the explanatory 
unit of analysis was a project portfolio.  
 
Event histories at a micro level may be too rich in detail for analysis. After coding was 
completed, project data was aggregated to annual median values. The aggregates of 
project attributes are portfolio attributes (number of projects, number of prioritized 
projects, number of projects by business unit, number of projects by development stage, 
and number of projects by age). Changes in project attributes in meetings created 
annual level changes in the portfolio. Event data concerning managerial actions was 
aggregated to an annual total number of events. The actions are portfolio level changes 
(number of prioritizations, de-prioritizations, initiations, terminations and completions, 
reviews, and milestones decisions).   
 
The aggregated managerial events formed patterns which were examined as a means to 
understand managerial action. The aggregated portfolio attributes formed patterns 
which were examined to understand portfolio evolution. The analysis was carried out at 
an annual level to gain an understanding of the action pattern, portfolio development 
pattern and their matching. The time series of managerial action was compared with the 
time series of portfolio outcome. Managerial actions and portfolio changes were 
compared internally in order to detect patterns of change, and their consonance or 
dissonance.  
 
Due to incomplete information, the age of projects initiated before year 1 could not be 
determined accurately. This left margin bias affects the data on project age and 
previous prioritization. To avoid left margin bias, portfolio meeting minutes from three 
previous years were examined to reveal the priority status decisions before year 1. This 
information was incorporated into the coded data. There are two systematic errors in 
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recording project age. For projects that were initiated before the observation period, 
data on project age is incomplete in the archives of the three previous years that were 
available. For lack of complete data, project age was not calculated for years 1 and 2. 
From year 3 on, projects surviving over 2 years would actually be older than project 
median age which is 2 years, as calculated in chapter 5. The error would result in some 
projects being older than was coded. The exact date of some project initiations was not 
visible in archival meeting minutes. This is because no meeting records existed until 
the project was evaluated for the first time after being given project status. The overall 
development time for projects varied a lot because medication for acute use (days to 
weeks) require a shorter time for clinical trials than products for chronic use (years).  
 
Because some decision was documented in two separate meeting minutes a few 
decisions were recorded twice. It was hard to identify, after which of the two 
committee meetings a decision was really put to action. For example, the portfolio 
committee confirmed the fact that project committee had effectively, but not formally, 
terminated a project for safety reasons. Here, the consequences of the two coded 
decisions had an effect on one project only.  
 
Some projects in Cinnamon continued although the product had already been launched. 
This was either due to regulatory requirements for collecting phase 4 clinical data, or to 
the documenting of new applications or other ancillary properties in stages S5 or S6. 
All these cases had a project team assigned to perform R&D project development, so it 
was appropriate to list the ongoing activity as product development project; hence, it 
was not an artifact of the project notation conventions. Some projects were combined 
or the number switched, but this occurred only a limited number times.  
 
4.3.3 Detecting co-selection 
The attributes of and managerial actions relating to 274 projects were recorded to create 
QCA data input table. The software used was that developed by Ragin, Kriss & Davey 
(2006). The focal event was the prioritization decision. The attributes which could be 
co-selected were coded; these were business units (4), development stages (5), and 
previous prioritization. The QCA data input table had 274 rows and 11 columns. The 
simplified example in Table 6 with three attributes depicts the process of analysis. The 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           73 
 
 
label attribute C in the Table represents that the project had already been an object of 
managerial prioritization.  
 
Table 6 Extract from QCA data input table  
Attribute A 
“Member to 
Lavender” 
Attribute B 
“Member to 
Lime” 
Attribute C 
“previously 
prioritized” 
Attribute D 
“project stage 
S5” 
Focal event P 
“project 
prioritized” 
Number of 
instances 
 
0 1 0 0 0 43 
1 0 0 0 0 17 
0 1 0 0 0 8 
0 1 0 1 1 3 
1 0 1 0 1 3 
 
The analysis proceeded in three steps. First, the QCA data input table was constructed. 
Three possible co-selected attributes were listed. The number of projects for each event 
history was also displayed. When analyzing a single event history, one checks which 
attributes are present and which not. The Boolean values for a given attribute are either 
1 (true) or 0 (false). In Table 6, rows 4 and 5 denote different event histories with the 
outcome “project prioritized”. In 43 projects, the sequence of antecedents was the same 
as displayed on row 1.  In the second step, once all projects have been included, Table 
6 shows the combination(s) of attributes present when the outcome event occurs. Third, 
necessary conditions are identified. The analysis compares attributes across projects 
using Boolean truth tables to discover which logical alternatives for co-selected 
attributes are realized.  
 
Consider rows in Table 6 where the truth function in the column P takes the value 1 
(true). The Boolean comparison shows that when prioritizations of projects occurred, 
then, as necessary conditions, either the attributes business unit Lime in development 
stage S5 were co-selected or the attributes of business unit Lavender and previously 
prioritized status were co-selected.  
 
4.3.4. Testing reliability and validity 
There is an ongoing debate on how to estimate reliability and validity in qualitative 
research (see for example Shenton, 2004). In the present study, which considers a 
single firm’s R&D portfolio in which projects are embedded as cases within the case 
firm, validity and reliability are evaluated following the quality criteria presented by 
Yin (2003) with regard to case studies, and by the work of Singleton & Straits (1998) 
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and van de Ven (2007). Reliability and validity are interdependent. Highly unreliable 
measures are not valid but highly reliable measures can still be quite invalid (Singleton 
& Straits, 1988).  
 
Reliability measures how well another investigator can reproduce the findings of the 
study by following the same procedure (Yin, 2003). Reliable findings are consistent 
and repeatable (Singleton & Straits, 1998).  
 
The principal data sources employed in this study were internal archival documents. 
There are problems associated with extracting events from historical records (Bryant, 
2000). All meeting minutes for the period under study were preserved; however, there 
were some inconsistencies in the archival record, and some events may have remained 
unreported. Their style varied a little according to the person who had written them but, 
overall, they were short notes regarding the decisions that were made. Generally, the 
archival documents did not contain background information regarding discussions or 
arguments about how decisions were arrived at. I used the electronically archived 
original source documents in a pdf-format so that the need for any later editing would 
be unlikely.  
 
Analyzing the wealth of narrative historical data leads to simplifications (Abbott, 
1992). However, the style of archival documents was short, even laconic. The interest 
of the writers was only to report what specific types of decisions were made at the 
meetings on projects. I have provided quotations from archival material to illustrate the 
precise style of the documents. From the researcher’s perspective a benefit of 
examining such concise texts is that their coding is easier than that of a very lavish text. 
Hence, interpreting which scripts refer to the events for coding was much less 
problematic than for most archival records. Two key informants gave advice with 
regard to details on the coding of events, operational procedures and organizational 
structure. However, these key informants did not review the results for reasons of 
retrospective bias. For selected samples of documents the reliability of coding of the 
events from archives was tested with the help of a third person, and was found to be 
consistent with the author’s own coding scheme.  
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The database containing primary data table was produced on Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets, and the collating of such data were conducted by standard tools available 
in Excel. The coding for QCA analyses was copied from an Excel data sheet to a QCA 
data sheet. To ensure completeness and of transfer the copying between the different 
software products was checked by paper and pencil.  
 
Validity, with regard to measurement, means the congruence between an operational 
definition and the concept it is supposed to measure (Singleton & Straits, 1998). High 
validity means a good convergence of various findings. The problem remains that we 
do not usually know the “correct” value or answer, and therefore the assessment of 
validity is either subjective or indirect. The assessment of validity is inherently more 
problematic than the assessment of reliability. In qualitative empirical research, tests of 
validity are most often used to examine construct validity, internal validity and external 
validity (Yin, 2003).  
  
Construct validity refers to how well operational measures capture the meaning (but not 
necessarily the accuracy) of the concepts being studied. Data collection affects 
construct validity. To assure good construct validity I used multiple sources of evidence 
in order to carry out data triangulation. The study relied on two types of archival data: 
internal meeting minutes, not meant to be publicly available, and publicly available 
annual reports. I compared the evidence from internal sources with public financial data 
sources. I also used research papers published about the evolution of the industry as a 
means to reflect on the institutional and competitive environment in which the case 
firm was embedded during the period of analysis. For internal consistency the standard 
categories of pharmaceutical industry and project portfolio management were 
employed. Operationalization was conducted according to the outline proposed by 
Bagozzi & Phillips (1982) which was adapted for qualitative research. 
 
Although triangulating with the help of data from interviews is often useful, a 
retrospective bias might easily confuse the explanatory narrative; particularly in this 
study so because the time span is a decade and therefore, differentiating between 
intended and realized outcomes in portfolio management could be affected. Although 
retrospective data sometimes provides information that is not available from other 
sources, distortions may arise when interviewers require actors or subjects to looking 
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back and explain the past. The problem of bias relating to memory of the past 
(retrospective bias) has been recognized, and techniques to minimize such bias have 
been presented (Huber & Power, 1985). However, according to Huber & Power (1985), 
individual and universal biases in combination “can be expected to have important 
impacts on retrospective report from strategic-level managers.”  
 
Retrospective bias has been documented, for example, in the context of research 
leaders reporting their research projects (Huber, 1985). Sometimes there may be an 
intentional motivation to do so. There is also empirical evidence of the limitations to 
reliability and validity when top managers retrospectively account for a firm’s strategy. 
Scholars such as Golden (1992) seriously question using retrospective accounts in 
management research, and Miller, Cardinal, & Glick (1997) warn against 
indiscriminate use of retrospective reports. For this reason it was decided that 
interviews did not offer a satisfactory source of data, although key informants were 
used to check the reliability of coding.  
 
Internal validity in explanatory studies is an estimate on how strongly the causal 
explanations are derived from data analysis. As suggested by Miles & Huberman 
(1994), I employed a data matrix to analyze coded events. Following Langley (1999) 
and van de Ven (2007), as a means to identify event patterns from coded data I used the 
synthetic processes of the temporal bracketing of data – aggregating events at an annual 
level – and visual mappings to seek patterns in the data. I aggregated information from 
individual projects to numerical tables and pictures in order to reflect the whole 
portfolio.  
 
Sequences of events and outcomes, visual mappings, temporal bracketing, and 
narratives are considered helpful ways to make sense of patterns and mechanisms 
(Langley, 1999). In building an explanation I used pattern matching. I aggregated data 
into annual time series in order to detect such patterns and tabulated observed events 
and portfolio outcomes and compared these against each other and pair-wise. I used 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin, 1987) to logically validate co-selection as a 
new type of evolutionary mechanism. I also addressed and analyzed a number of 
alternative rival explanations.  
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Following Abell (2004) and Pentland (1999), I condensed my descriptive findings into 
a concise narrative synthesis as a means to causally explain evolutionary events with 
co-selection mechanism; thus the composition is chronological. Actors are managerial 
teams. The narrator is the author of this study; a story that describes managers in 
pursuit of success for the business units of the case firm. Over time, constraints for 
making choices emerged. 
 
External validity addresses the generalizability of the results of the study. I used the 
evolutionary theory framework of variation, selection and retention. In addition to the 
theory framework, I formulated the conjecture that co-selection should be regarded as a 
novel evolutionary mechanism. In this respect, I applied an analogy from biology 
(Darwin, 1859) and I inferred by the logic of abduction that there are justifications for 
this conjecture. To an extent, QCA applied replication logic to units of measurement at 
project level. However, it is important to underline that the conjecture was theory 
driven.  
 
Of importance is that the conjecture of co-selection can also be falsified; a distinct sign 
of critical theorizing (Bacharach, 1989). The utility of the conjecture derives from the 
fact that no such entity is previously described in management theory. Therefore, by 
analogy, the concept is used to bridge two theoretical discourses and thereby serves as a 
valid explanation mechanism. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Managerial action on R&D portfolio  
The results of the analysis of R&D portfolio and managerial action in Cinnamon are 
reported in three parts; these follow the steps that were presented in Table 4. First, the 
action patterns of managers are portrayed and summaries of these patterns are 
presented. Second, the dynamical pattern of change in R&D projects and portfolio is 
described and the key findings are crystallized. Third, key findings are grouped 
together to form a set of contradictory statements. Tables of aggregated numerical data 
are presented in Appendices 7 to 12. The annual aggregated data is also displayed as 
Figures 4 to 10 in text and in Appendices 13 to 27. The figures display the numerical 
data of tables in the appendix in a concise and easily perceivable form. Key figures are 
presented in the text and others in the Appendices. 
 
The results relating to managerial influence on projects are summarized in the 
following statements as conclusions. The annual event sequences are tabulated in 
Appendix 7. The figures that illustrate annual event sequences are given in Figures 4 
and 5 and in Appendices 24 to 26. The details of QCA crisp-set Boolean analyses are 
presented in Table 7 and Appendix 12.  
 
Altogether 26 portfolio committee meetings and 57 project committee meetings were 
held fairly regularly during nine years. The total number of all events was 1601. Of 
these events, 855 were decisions and 746 were reviews. The portfolio committee made 
508 decisions and the project committee made 347 decisions. The portfolio committee 
undertook 72 reviews and project committee undertook 674 reviews. The number of 
review events decreased over time. Conclusion: the project and portfolio committees 
differed substantially with respect to numbers of events, the proportion of decisions to 
reviews, and the frequency of assembly.  
 
There were 192 project initiations (Appendices 7, 25). Initiations were at a maximum in 
year 4. There were 83 initiations in the Lavender business unit, more than in any other 
business unit. There were 50 initiations in the Lime business unit, and their number was 
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decreasing. Conclusion: The number of initiations was largest in the focal Lavender 
business unit. The number of initiations in Lime business unit decreased. 
 
There were 118 project prioritizations (Appendix 7). Attaching priority was at the 
lowest level between years 3 to 6, and a maximum at year 9 (Appendix 7). In the 
Lavender business unit, 51 events of prioritization occurred. In Lime, 37 occurred. 
Some prioritizations were applied to a project already prioritized. Conclusion: The 
number of prioritization events in the focal Lavender business unit was larger than that 
in Lime or the other business units, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Acts of prioritization by business unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the nine years covered by the observation period, 22 de-prioritization decisions 
were made (Appendix 7). For 17 events to de-prioritize, termination events soon 
followed. Two projects were de-prioritized twice. The lowest levels of de-
prioritizations were between years 5 to 8, and a highest in year 9. Conclusion: The 
number of de-prioritizations was small. 
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Project terminations, totaling 103, were at there highest in years 4 and 5, and a lowest 
in years 6 to 8 (Appendices 7, 26). There were 40 terminations in the Lavender 
business unit and 26 terminations in Lime. The rate of initiations to terminations was 
48 % in Lavender and 52 % in Lime. Conclusion: The rates of terminations to 
initiations in Lavender and Lime business units were comparable. 
  
Altogether 27 % of prioritized projects were terminated against 40 % of all projects. Of 
the projects prioritized by Lime, 2 were terminated. In Lavender 12 prioritized products 
were terminated. Conclusion: The number of terminations of prioritized projects in the 
Lavender business unit was much higher than in the Lime business unit, as shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Terminations of prioritized projects by business unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The total number of completed projects was 18, of which 4 were prioritized. The 
number of completed prioritized projects was 2 for the Lime business unit and 1 in 
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only ones that were introduced to the market or out-licensed. Some projects delivered 
products that were launched in some markets and the project continued for filing in 
other countries (USA, Europe or Japan), or for more extensive documentation due to 
post-launch follow up commitments. Conclusion: There were few completed projects. 
 
The total number of project committee milestone decisions peaked in year 4 (Appendix 
7). Project milestone decisions by phase did not vary over time. Milestone decisions D2 
for projects to enter stage S2 were the most numerous. Not all projects commenced at 
stage S2 because some benefited from earlier development work and may have started 
at later stages. Conclusion: Milestone decisions were almost evenly spread across 
years. 
 
The QCA results displayed in Table 7 are evidence that the various attributes were co-
selected when the selection rule for prioritizing was applied. Projects prioritized once in 
business unit Lavender were in stages S2 and S3. Projects prioritized twice or more 
were in stages S4 and S5. The priority status of projects in development stages S4 and 
S5 in Lavender was reinforced by reprioritization. It is noteworthy that only 12 
configurations of attributes out of a possible 40 possible were co-selected. Conclusion: 
Necessary causes of prioritization include the selected development stages in business 
units. 
 
Table 7 Project attributes that were co-selected in prioritizing projects 
Business unit Development stage Development stage of previously prioritized projects 
Lavender S2, S3 S4, S5 
Lime S2, S3, S4, S5  
Blue S3, S4 S6 
Tan S3  
 
5.2 Portfolio evolution 
The major findings concerning portfolio dynamics over nine years are summarized in 
thirteen statements. The illustrations of annual event sequences are provided in Figures 
6 to 7 and in Appendices 13 to 16 and Appendices 21 to 23. Numerical data on 
portfolio evolution is displayed in Appendix 8. Numerical data on the age distribution 
is provided in Appendices 9 to 10 and figures in Appendices 17 to 20. Performance and 
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R&D cost data gathered from annual reports are presented in Appendix 11 and in figure 
form in Appendix 27.  
 
The total number of projects in the portfolio initially increased up to year 7 from 56 to 
95 projects, and then declined to 85 projects (Appendix 8). From years 5 to 8 there was 
a plateau of the maximum portfolio size. Conclusion: Portfolio size first increased and 
then decreased.  
 
Projects in the Lavender business unit increased from 16 to 36 corresponding to a 
growth of the portfolio from 29 % to 43% (Appendix 8). After year 3, Lavender was 
the largest business unit. Conclusion:  The focal Lavender business unit grew to have 
the greatest number of projects, as seen in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Number of project by business unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Lime business unit increased slightly in size from 27 to 30 projects. This business 
unit declined in relative size from 48 % to 36 % of the portfolio and lost the majority to 
Lavender. The Blue and Tan business units were smaller. The relative size of the Blue 
business unit decreased during the nine year period and the Tan business unit almost 
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died out (Appendix 8). Conclusion: The number of projects in the other business units 
decreased relative to those in Lavender. 
 
The number of prioritized projects increased from 11 to 29, amounting to 35 % of 
portfolio projects in year 9 (Appendix 8). During years 6 to 9 there was a constant 
number of projects in the portfolio, but a relative increase of prioritized projects. 
During nine years, the portfolio size increased by 34 %, and the prioritized projects by 
171%. Of the total of 20 de-prioritized projects, 17 were soon terminated. One de-
prioritized project was quickly reprioritized and two projects remained de-prioritized 
until completion or to the end of the observation period. Conclusion: The number of 
prioritized projects increased both relatively and absolutely. 
 
Prioritized projects in the Lime business unit grew from 5 to 10. The Lavender business 
unit grew from 3 to 15. In year 8, Lavender still had less prioritized projects (11) than 
Lime (12). During the observation period, the Lime business unit altogether held 84 
prioritized projects, and Lavender held 73. Conclusion: The number of prioritized 
projects in the Lime business unit remained larger than in the focal business unit 
Lavender, as seen in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Number of prioritized projects by business unit  
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The cumulative age of the total portfolio increased (Appendix 9). The annual median 
average project age rose to 37 unit of time by year 8, after which it started to decline. 
The age of a project varied from less than 1 to over 9 years. The annual median age of 
projects increased during the observation period. Median age of a project was 2 years. 
The median age of projects in all business units increased until year 9, with a slight 
decrease on that year (Appendix 9). The frequency of very old projects was highest in 
the Lime business unit (Appendix 9). The mean age of projects particularly increased in 
the Lime business unit, to 46 units of time compared to 35 in Lavender. Conclusion: the 
age of the projects increased. 
 
The age of prioritized projects increased. The annual median average age of prioritized 
project rose to 52 units of time by year 8, after which it started to decline. Prioritized 
projects were older than other projects. In the Lime, Lavender and Blue business units 
prioritized projects were markedly older than other projects. Prioritized projects were 
older than all projects in terms of development phase. Although the mean age of 
prioritized projects in these three units and those in Lavender declined in year 9, those 
in Blue and Lime increased to 70 and 59 units of time respectively (Appendices 9 and 
10). Conclusion: Prioritized projects grew older than other projects.  
 
The mean age of projects particularly increased in the Lime business unit to 46 units of 
time compared to 35 units in Lavender. Although the mean age of all prioritized 
projects and prioritized projects in Lavender declined in year 9, those in Blue and Lime 
increased to 70 and 59 units respectively. Conclusion: Prioritized and other projects 
were older in the Lime business unit than in Lavender. 
 
There were 7 prioritized projects in Lime that were older than 60 reviews and 
correspondingly, 1 project in Lavender (Appendix 10). There were 16 prioritized 
projects in Lavender that were younger than 20 units of time and 2 projects in Lime. 
Conclusion: There were more old prioritized projects in the Lime business unit than in 
Lavender. 
 
Due to left margin error, the age of all projects initiated before year 1 could not be 
determined accurately. The age of all projects was therefore set zero in the beginning of 
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year 1 (Appendix 7), and project age for comparison purposes was reported first from 
year 3 on. Since there were 48 initiations and 17 terminations during the two first years 
(Appendix 7), the number of young projects at the beginning of year 3 was at least 31, 
compared with the total average of 65 projects during year 2. The left margin error 
would mean that no more than 34 projects were older than 2 years at the beginning of 
year 3. The lag of 2 years in reporting the ages was selected because it is the median 
age of all projects in the observation period. Technically, this means that the average 
ages are somewhat higher by a constant than those reported, and this only diminishes 
because 40 % of all projects were terminated during the nine years (Appendix 7). 
Hence, the annual increases in project age are not an artifact, although the real values of 
median ages are higher than reported.  
 
The distribution of projects to different stages remained remarkably stable with respect 
to all stages over the years (Appendix 8). But for year 3, projects in stage S2 were the 
most numerous throughout the years. In year 8, projects in stage S5 become more 
numerous than those in stage S2. Conclusion: Distribution of projects by development 
stage remained approximately constant in the portfolio. 
 
There were more old projects in stages S5 and S6 both overall and with regard to 
prioritized projects (Appendix 10). Conclusion: Projects in stages S5 and S6 were older 
than the others. 
 
Prioritized projects in stage S5 dominated the portfolio between years 5 to 8. The 
number of projects in stage S6 increased steadily (Appendix 8). The average age by 
project stage increased (Appendix 9). Conclusion: Prioritized projects in stages S5 and 
S6 increased in the portfolio, as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Mean age of prioritized projects by development stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The total number of prioritized projects in stages S5 and S6 taken together is larger in 
the Lime business unit than in Lavender. In Lime, the majority of prioritized projects 
were in stages S5 and S6 taken together. In the Lavender business unit the prioritized 
projects were more evenly distributed by phases (Appendix 8). Conclusion: Lime had 
more prioritized projects than Lavender in stages S5 and S6, as seen in Figures 9 and 
10. 
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Figure 9 Prioritized Lavender projects by development stage  
priority of lavender projects by stage
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
year
n
u
m
be
ro
f p
ro
jec
ts S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
 
 
 
Figure 10 Prioritized Lime projects by development stage  
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The total number of completed projects was 18, of which 4 were prioritized. No 
projects were completed between years 4 to 7 (Appendix 7). Conclusion: The number 
of completed projects was low, and there was a gap in the middle years. 
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Total investment in R&D increased 72 % over the nine year period. R&D costs 
increased more than the 34 % increase of the number of projects in portfolio over the 
years in question, but less than the 171 % increase of the number of prioritized projects 
in the portfolio (Appendix 11). Conclusion: The annual R&D costs increased more than 
portfolio size, but less than the amount of prioritized projects.  
 
The overall development of R&D spending compared to sales and earnings was fairly 
constant. Earnings developed more slowly than sales in years 5 to 7. R&D funding was 
constant between years 7 to 8 (Appendix 11). The duration of a project provides a 
crude proxy for R&D investment used by the project and business units. Conclusion: 
The rate of R&D investment to sales remained constant. 
 
5.3 Comparison of empirical findings 
Data from the case firm at an annual level is condensed into five tables displaying core 
empirical findings. The analysis of managerial action in Table 8 reveals a historical 
development that also displays managerial intentions. The majority of the project 
initiations were in focal business unit Lavender. Managers prioritized more projects in 
the Lavender business unit more often than elsewhere. Terminations occurred evenly in 
the two largest business units. However, in the focal unit many more prioritized 
projects were terminated than, for example, in Lime.  
 
Table 8 Patterns of managerial selection action 
Action / Target Initiations Prioritizations Terminations Completions 
Total projects peak in middle low in middle low in middle low 
On Lavender projects largest number largest number moderate low 
On Lime projects decrease moderate moderate moderate 
On prioritized Lavender projects n. a n. a high low 
On prioritized Lime projects n. a n. a low low 
 
The empirical results relating to portfolio development in Table 9 show that in 
Cinnamon, the management invested continuously in R&D projects. Total spending 
and investment by projects increased. However, due to the remarkable increase in 
prioritized projects, R&D investment calculated per prioritized project nominally 
decreased. The specific historical situation at Cinnamon at the beginning was that the 
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Lime business unit held the majority of projects. Lime also held the majority of 
prioritized projects. The development history of the focal business unit Lavender 
presents a conflict, as seen in Table 9. Lavender soon became the biggest business unit 
in the R&D project portfolio. However, this unit did not achieve the largest business 
unit status in the subset of prioritized projects.  
 
Table 9 Patterns of portfolio evolution 
Entity Pattern Volume/Quantity  
Number of projects, portfolio size First increases and then diminishes 
 
Portfolio size doubles at the peak to 
diminish somewhat 
 
Number of prioritized projects Grows  
 
Absolute and relative increase 
Number of Lavender projects Grows Absolute and relative increase to 
become the biggest business unit and 
overtake Lime 
 
Number of prioritized Lavender 
projects 
Grows Absolute and relative increase does 
not lead to overtake Lime in the 
number of prioritized projects 
 
Number of Lime projects Almost flat 
 
Absolute increase but relative decline 
Number of prioritized Lime projects Grows 
 
Absolute increase but relative decline 
R&D spending Grows 
 
Constant to sales and earnings 
R&D spending per project Grows 
 
Constant to sales and earnings 
R&D spending per prioritized project Diminishes 
 
Constant to sales and earnings 
 
The distribution of managerial decisions in comparison with reviews in the two 
committees presented in Table 10 differs remarkably. In the portfolio committee, very 
few reviews were conducted. Most of the reviews were conducted in the project 
committee. 
 
Table 10 Patterns of selection structures 
Property Portfolio committee Project committee 
Decision pattern 
 
Fluctuates Constant 
Decision volume 
 
Somewhat lower Somewhat higher 
Review volume 
 
Very low Very high 
 
Looking at the progress of project development at a portfolio level (Table 11) reveals 
that there were no large changes in the distribution of projects at each stage. In 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           90 
 
 
particular, the proportions of projects in stages S5 and S6 remained constant. In 
contrast, the proportion of prioritized projects at stages S5 and S6 increased. Projects in 
stages S5 and S6 were accumulated in the subset of prioritized projects. The 
distribution of prioritized projects by stage differed from the distribution of all projects 
by stage.  
 
Table 11 Patterns of project development stage evolution 
Entity Pattern  Volume/Quantity 
Project in stages S2, S3, 
S4, S5, and S6 
The distribution by stage fluctuates but 
no changes in relative ratios 
 
Absolute increase in all development stages 
 
Projects in stages S5 and 
S6 
The distribution by stage fluctuates but 
no changes in relative ratios 
 
Absolute but not relative increase 
Prioritized projects in 
stages S5 and S6 
 
Grows Absolute and relative increase 
 
The analysis of project according to chronological age history (Table 12) shows that the 
age of the total portfolio increased. Remarkably, prioritized products were older than 
all projects on an average. The older projects accumulated at stages S5 and S6 and were 
held by business unit Lime. Both the prioritized and all projects in the focal business 
unit Lavender were younger than those in Lime, and there were less at stages S5 and 
S6. 
 
Table 12 Patterns of project age evolution 
Project age Age pattern Volume/Quantity 
Total projects 
 
Increases n. a 
Lavender projects 
 
Increases younger than Lime projects 
Lime projects 
 
Increases older than Lavender projects 
Projects in stages S5 and S6 
 
Increases  older than projects in other stages 
Prioritized projects Increases  prioritized projects are older than other 
projects 
 
Prioritized Lavender projects 
 
First increases then declines younger than prioritized Lime projects 
Prioritized Lime projects 
 
Increases the oldest prioritized projects 
Prioritized projects in stages S5 and S6 Increases  Less projects in Lavender than in Lime,  
older than other projects 
 
The findings in case firm Cinnamon indicate that the relationship between actions 
relating to the project portfolio and portfolio evolution were not straightforward. The 
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evolution of the portfolio displayed conflicting pairs of actions and outcomes. For 
example, managers prioritized projects to shorten time to market, but the age of 
prioritized projects increased. The conflicting actions and outcomes are referred to as 
observations A and B. Six pairs of observations are presented in summary in Table 13.  
 
Table 13 Observed pairs of evolutionary patterns 
Number Observation A Observation B 
Pair 1 The total number of projects first increased and 
then diminished. 
The number of prioritized projects increased both 
absolutely and relatively.  
 
Pair 2 Managers prioritized projects to reduce time to 
market. 
 
The age of prioritized projects increased. 
Pair 3 Managers initiated more projects in focal 
business unit Lavender than in the other 
business units. Lavender became the biggest 
business unit. 
Management made more prioritizations of projects in 
focal business unit Lavender than in the other 
business units. Lavender did not become the biggest 
business unit by the number of prioritized projects. 
 
Pair 4 Managers terminated projects in equal 
proportion to initiations in all business units.  
 
Most of the terminations of prioritized projects 
occurred in Lavender business unit. 
 
Pair 5 Managers made milestone decisions at a fairly 
constant rate.  
 
The relative number of all projects by development 
stages S2 to S6 remained quite stable. The absolute 
and relative number of prioritized projects at 
development stages S5 and S6 increased.  
 
Pair 6 Managers made portfolio decisions to initiate, 
prioritize, terminate and complete projects at 
fluctuating rates.  
 
Portfolio productivity measured as the number of 
completed projects presented a gap. 
 
The observed pairs of actions and outcomes arose and were sustained in the R&D 
project portfolio in Cinnamon. To justify whether co-selection is a major mechanism to 
causally explain this pattern, one must clarify to what extent the findings are plausible 
if the conjecture of co-selection is assumed.  
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6. Discussion 
 
6.1 Co-selection in project portfolio evolution 
6.1.1 Prioritization as a means to focus R&D investment 
During nine years Cinnamon’s total investment in R&D increased by 72 %. This 
increase did not match the increase in cost of executing a single pharmaceutical R&D 
project. The amount of corporate resources available for R&D was limited by the 
relatively moderate 66 % growth in overall sales volume and 95 % growth in 
profitability over nine years. Moreover, the drop in revenues in year 7 resulted in flat 
R&D funding increase in years 7 to 8 which worsened the situation. This made it 
increasingly difficult for Cinnamon to maintain higher than average levels of R&D 
spending. Over the period, the number of Cinnamon’s R&D projects increased 34 % 
and the number of prioritized projects 171%. At the beginning, 20 % of projects in the 
portfolio were prioritized, by the end, the figure was 34 %.  
 
In the environment in which Cinnamon operated, developing new products became 
more expensive. The overall average R&D costs of a new drug were escalating in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The average total R&D cost to sales ratio doubled between 
years 1980 to 1993; from 7 to 13 % (Grabowski & Vernon, 2000). The complexity of 
clinical trials increased significantly in the 1990s which partially explained the fourfold 
increase of clinical trial costs in one decade (DiMasi, Hansen & Grabowski, 2003). 
This trend continued in the 2000s amounting to a tenfold increase of the real R&D 
costs per new molecule in a thirty year period since the mid-seventies (DiMasi & 
Grabowski, 2007). The escalation was larger in product development costs than in 
product discovery costs (DiMasi et al, 2003; Gilbert, Henske, & Singh, 2003). Despite 
the increase of R&D spending in the industry, the number of new chemical entities 
introduced decreased (Cockburn, 2004).  
 
Firm size has been shown to be a determinant of research productivity both in scale and 
scope (Henderson & Cockburn, 1996). Selecting and prioritizing the most promising 
new product development project is a standard technique in project portfolio 
management (Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 1999, 2004; Cooper et al, 1997ab, 1998; 
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Standard for Portfolio Management, 2008; Jamieson & Morris, 2004; Thiry, 2004; Dye 
& Pennypacker, 1999; Milosevic, 2004).  
 
Cinnamon was a sizeable global player but not one of the very few industry giants. 
Firm size may have emerged as a limiting factor in the attempts to maintain a 
diversified R&D project portfolio and four business units in Cinnamon. The allocation 
of resources in the firm was fully in line with the standard prescriptions relating to 
resource allocation and prioritizing in the project portfolio management literature. The 
growth in number of prioritized projects in comparison with portfolio size suggests that 
prioritizing in Cinnamon was a way to improve resource allocation in order to cope 
with the escalating R&D costs. According to corporate documents, prioritizing was 
pursued to shorten the time to market of these projects. This makes the increase of 
prioritized projects a plausible solution to the problem of managing expenses at the 
time when the total project portfolio was not growing, but rather diminishing. 
 
6.1.2 Prioritization and co-selection mechanism 
The construct of co-selection mechanism turns out to be a very helpful way to 
understand the divergence of managerial action and portfolio outcome in the focal 
business unit Lavender. The prioritization rule in Cinnamon was to select projects with 
high commercial potential and the opportunity of global exploitation. The selection rule 
for prioritization was built on managers’ best understanding of the anticipated adaptive 
success of a project in the future, not merely on the facts about external environment at 
the time. This type of internally driven selection was vicarious with regard to external 
environmental selection.  
 
When managers selected for priority, the prioritized projects had additional attributes 
which were co-selected. Applying QCA confirmed instances of co-selection of a 
selected set of attributes in Cinnamon. For example, when the focal business unit 
Lavender projects were prioritized, these projects were in development stages S2 to S5. 
When Blue projects were prioritized, these projects were in stages S3, S4 and S6 (Table 
7). In Lime, projects were prioritized throughout stages S2 to S5. Thus, in the act of 
prioritizing, different project development stages by business unit were co-selected. 
Business units were co-selected too. Co-selection was non-adaptive, since it did not 
follow as a consequence of the selection rule for prioritizing in itself, but rather from 
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internal constraints. Managers could not influence the dominant design of the 
pharmaceutical project stages. Since internal constraints between project features 
appeared, co-selection was unavoidable. Table 14 summarizes the selection 
mechanisms for priority at work in the portfolio committee at Cinnamon.  
 
Table 14 Selection and co-selection mechanisms in prioritizing 
Selection mechanism Selection structure Selection rule Selection object 
Prioritization decision 
vicarious selection 
internally driven 
Portfolio Committee high commercial potential 
and global exploitation 
opportunity to shorten time 
to market, vicariously 
adaptive 
Project 
Co-selection Portfolio Committee non-adaptive selection when 
applying prioritization rule 
Project attributes, like 
business unit and 
project stage  
 
Studies on managing portfolio of new product development projects recognize the 
challenge of interactions between different projects (Ghasemzadeh & Archer, 2000; 
Girotra, Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2007; Chan, Nickerson & Owan, 2007; Loch & Kavadias, 
2002; Kavadias & Loch, 2003; McCarthy, Tsinopoulos, Allen & Andersen, 2006). 
Types of project interdependencies have been classified (Blau, Pekny, Varma & Bunch, 
2004). Projects should be prioritized according to both project and portfolio level 
criteria (Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 1999, 2004). A portfolio ought to be balanced with 
the help of dividing the total available resources due to the constrained allocation to 
resource quota, by the type of project, the resource type, geography or business unit 
(Standard of Portfolio Management, 2008; Cooper et al, 2001b).  
 
Intra-firm competition of business units presents a challenge to achieving a balance by 
business unit. According to Birkinshaw & Lingblad (2005) and Galunic & Eisenhardt 
(2001) intra-firm competition may arise from a business unit charter overlap or by the 
fluid definition of a charter. The practical project portfolio management literature 
recommends the grouping of R&D projects into “buckets” according to various 
categorizations in order to balance risk and interdependencies (Cooper et al, 1998, 
2001b). Taking account of project interdependency requires the organization-dependent 
weighting of goals (Dickinson, Thornton & Graves, 2001). Empirical scholars suggest 
there is no one single technique that satisfies the needs of a practical R&D project 
selection technique (Ringuest, Graves & Case, 2004). Balancing requires that the 
project attributes are categorized. Project attribute categories and metrics to measure 
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them are firm and industry specific (Crawford et al, 2005). Dividing the R&D 
investment into a quota for explorative and exploitative (March, 1991) or “induced” 
and “autonomous” development projects (Burgelman, 1983ab) have been suggested 
(Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Artto & Dietrich, 2004).  
  
In Cinnamon, business units were buckets to which R&D funding was allocated 
independently from portfolio selection. This allocation did not limit project initiations. 
Business units in Cinnamon had high barriers as a result of rather permanent 
heterogeneous choices that defined fundamental customer orientation, therapy sector, 
research and marketing strategies, and therapy reimbursement policies. The business 
unit charters in Cinnamon did not change and their overlap was minimal due to 
different end-user customers. Business units naturally competed to attain increases of 
the annual R&D budget quota. The task of applying this allocation was given to the 
portfolio committee. The size of the R&D funding quota influenced initiations and the 
overall number of projects in a business unit. Prioritization was made across all R&D 
projects by the portfolio committee. Allocating R&D resources to buckets did not affect 
prioritizations as such. 
 
R&D project categories other than business unit memberships coded in Cinnamon were 
the project development phase and age. The number of prioritized projects in stages S5 
and S6 increased. Projects in stages S5, and especially in stage S6, when a new product 
had been already marketed, were exploitative rather than explorative by nature. 
According to the archival minutes, achieving a balance for these categories was not 
undertaken in the portfolio committee. There is no information available of whether 
any other attributes were balanced at the portfolio level. There is no mention in the 
archives to support the idea that prioritized projects were balanced against other 
projects. Clearly, their relative proportion increased. There is no straightforward 
explanation to the question of why managers reprioritized some but not all of the 
prioritized projects; especially in the Lavender business unit portfolio committee 
meetings. This may relate to the managerial focus of attention, agenda setting at 
business unit level, or it may have occurred by chance. During reprioritizations, the 
development stage could change, but the business unit would not.  
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I have found no mention in the previous project portfolio management literature that 
intra-project constraints due to the dominant design inside an R&D project affect 
selection. There is no overarching idea about the dominant design of projects that is 
explicitly stated in the literature. However, co-selection makes constraints by dominant 
design empirically visible. Co-selection caused the projects of business unit Lime and 
projects in development stages S5 and S6 to be retained in the prioritized project 
portfolio.  
 
6.1.3. Initiations, terminations and co-selection 
In Cinnamon, the size of R&D funding budget was fixed in relation to sales. To qualify 
as a new project, the initiative had to fulfill technical “proof of concept” requirements 
at the project committee approval stage D2 in order and to enter development stage S2. 
Business units were free to propose new projects under annual budget constraints. 
Initiations proposed by business units were approved by the portfolio board. There 
were 191 initiations. The highest amount of project initiations, 44 % of all, were made 
in the focal business unit Lavender compared to the remaining three units; indicating 
intent to invest heavily in this business unit over the nine years. The number of projects 
in portfolio at the same time was not restricted.  
 
The dynamics of project initiations (191 times), terminations (101 times) and project 
completions (18 times) in Cinnamon determined the net increase in portfolio size. 
Table 15 presents the termination mechanism.  
 
Table 15 Selection mechanism in termination 
Selection mechanism Selection structure Selection rule Selection object 
Termination decision 
environmental selection 
externally driven 
Portfolio Committee Technological failure or re-
evaluation of commercial 
potential and exploitation 
opportunity 
Project 
 
The highest amount of project terminations, 40 % of all, occurred in the focal business 
unit Lavender. However, 60 % of terminations in prioritized projects hit this same 
business unit, compared to 10 % in Lime. The unforeseen large number of terminations 
in the prioritized projects of Lavender business unit led to a relative dominance of the 
prioritized Lime projects. Looking backward, the prioritized projects in Lavender 
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business unit were riskier than those in Lime business units. The overall termination 
rates for all projects in business units Lavender and Lime were comparable. 
 
According to the funnel approach put forward by Wheelwright & Clark (1992) 
choosing the size of a R&D portfolio is related to risk and development success. The 
funnels are firm and industry specific and build on past experience. In the new product 
development literature there are no general criteria for choosing the optimal number of 
projects for total R&D resources (Adams et al, 2006). The number of R&D projects to 
be developed at a given resource level is dependent on the screening process (Lieb, 
1998). Scoring models are typically used to screen new project candidates, and their 
criteria are set at the firm level (Calantone, Benedetto & Schmidt, 1999). Measuring 
development capacity by total budget or by total resources for different project stages is 
not a very accurate approach (Seider, 2006). A recent review notes that scholars do not 
yet understand the relationship between selection tools and project portfolio size 
(Killen, Hunt & Kleinschmidt, 2007). The previous literature concurs that there are 
often too many projects for the amount of resources (Cooper et al., 2001a, 2001b, 
Engwall & Jerbrant, 2003), and that this may increase portfolio aging (Lieb, 1998).  
 
Managers’ decisions about the number of new projects given to business units are acts 
of business strategy. The project portfolio management process both aligns a portfolio 
with old strategy and creates new strategy (Cooper et al., 1998; Englund & Graham, 
1999; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2006). There are few tools to address the problem of 
alignment in portfolio management (Iamratanakul & Milosevic, 2007), although 
strategy table approaches are recommended for such alignment (Spradlin & Kutoloski, 
1999). However, comparative metrics fail to account for “mandatory” or “sacred cow” 
projects that get selected in any case (Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 2004). The normative 
models of project portfolio management cannot explain the two-way interaction found 
in empirical studies relating to project portfolio dynamics. The two-way interaction 
becomes plausible in studies reporting the struggle of autonomous explorative strategic 
initiatives for legitimacy (Burgelman, 1983b), the importance of project champions for 
project success (Howell & Shea, 2006) and the existence of individual project strategies 
(Artto, Kujala, Dietrich & Martinsuo, 2008; Jamieson & Morris, 2004).  
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The specifications of a new product development project are very hard to change once 
the project is set into motion (Milosevic, 2004). This restricts the opportunities to 
increase the portfolio variation by redirecting the goals in early projects. According to 
Christensen & Bower (1996), in allocating resources for new R&D investment, 
technological risk is underestimated, whereas market risk is overestimated. Hence, 
terminations for technology reasons tend to be unpleasant surprises which can only be 
overcome by new project initiations. 
 
In Cinnamon, the exact reasons for termination were not always available in the 
archival documents. In a few instances termination was reported to come about from 
changes in the market, and in other instances, milestone decisions were not granted for 
lack of fulfillment of technical criteria. If technological risk is generally 
underestimated, there is reason to suggest that project terminations in Cinnamon were 
quite often due to failures to meet technological specifications. Although managers 
formally decided to terminate projects, terminations were effectively caused by external 
selection that was based on either technological or commercial reasons.  
 
The projects in Cinnamon which were prioritized and not terminated were retained with 
their non-adaptive co-selected attributes, but prioritized project that were terminated 
were not. In Cinnamon, co-selection during prioritizing and unexpected terminations 
due to Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) shaped the realized strategy. Old 
prioritized projects in the Lime business unit accumulated at the expense of the focal 
business unit Lavender.  
 
The unexpected terminations of projects created a sudden need in Cinnamon to refill 
the portfolio with new project candidates for the Lavender business unit; this was not 
fully met. In the light of data from the firm, it was perhaps not very easy to swiftly 
replace projects that were suddenly terminated with new ones. Finding a candidate for 
pre-development discovery already required screening, therefore suitable candidates 
were not always hand in the pool of prospects; nor could projects that had already 
commenced be easily redesigned. Hence, it was not possible to immediately repair the 
consequences of unforeseen terminations in the Lavender business unit. The number of 
completed projects remained low. The unforeseen terminations helped the unexpected 
co-selected attributes to dominate the prioritized proportion of the project portfolio. 
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This suggests an explanation for the productivity gap which was not compensated by 
increasing variation.  
 
6.1.4. Project age, project stage and co-selection 
In Cinnamon, project age increased in the course of the observation period (Appendix 
9). Remarkably, the age of prioritized projects increased too. Moreover, as an average, 
the prioritized projects were older than other projects. The projects which had reached 
development stages S5 and S6 were older due to the sequential dominant design by 
stages in R&D projects in the pharmaceutical industry. The average age of projects in 
stages S2 to S4 showed fluctuation and a small increase, whereas the age of projects in 
stages S5 to S6 steadily increased year by year. 
 
Analyzing the overall frequency of project age by business unit in the course of nine 
years reveals an important difference between the Lime unit and Lavender, the focal 
business unit. Giving consideration to the difference between all business unit projects 
(Appendix 10), altogether there were 14 of 67 Lime projects aged over 70 units of time 
(over 7 years) compared to 6 of 91 projects in Lavender. There were 41 projects 
younger than 40 units of time (under 4 years) in Lime and 69 projects in Lavender. This 
trend is also visible in the prioritized projects. Altogether there were 5 of 16 Lime 
prioritized projects aged over 70 units of time (over 7 years), compared to none of the 
31 Lavender prioritized projects. Altogether 24 Lavender prioritized projects were 
younger than 40 units of time (under 4 years) compared with 8 Lime prioritized 
projects. This comparison shows that there were very many young prioritized Lavender 
projects in the portfolio and few old ones. 
 
Further analysis shows how age depended on the project development phase in 
Cinnamon (Appendix 10). All of the 11 prioritized projects aged older than 50 units of 
time (about 5 years) were in development stages S5 and S6. Of these, 8 projects were 
held by Lime and 2 projects to Lavender. As a result, prioritizing projects in the 
portfolio increased the project age of projects that were in development stages S5 and 
S6. .When Lime projects were prioritized their projects in advanced stages S5 and S6 
were retained. Since these projects were old to begin with, their retention contributed to 
the further aging of prioritized projects in the portfolio.   
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The projects’ chronological age increased daily until the projects were terminated or 
completed successfully. Project age also depended on prioritization to shorten time to 
market. Portfolio age as an aggregate attribute depended on the age of its projects. The 
rate of initiations and terminations or completion of projects set the pace of portfolio 
aging. By reference to unforeseen terminations in prioritized projects (Figure 5), as 
noted in the previous section, altogether 12 (60%) of these terminations took place in 
the focal business unit Lavender, and 2 (10 %) in the Lime unit.  
 
Due to Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) in project development, Lavender 
prioritized projects were hit by terminations but not Lime; this created a gap of missing 
Lavender projects. Hence, the proportion of prioritized Lavender projects did not 
surpass that of Lime. The effect of co-selection combined with unforeseen terminations 
that ‘knocked out’ young projects explains the problem of missing prioritized projects 
in focal business unit Lavender. This also reinforced the productivity gap since old 
projects were not completed, whereas they were continued in the Lime business unit. 
 
6.1.5. Milestone decisions for project development  
Managing the product development process took place in the project committee making 
milestone decisions to allow projects to advance to the next development stage. Making 
milestone decisions was also a selection event. The selection rule was the compliance 
with technical – rather than commercial – specifications. Selection occurred at every 
specific stage in a project. The successful fulfillment of project criteria by stage entitled 
the project to pass on, however, if the stage specifications were not met, the project 
stage was not changed. Indeed, the reasons to terminate projects by technical criteria 
usually arose from the fact that project stages were not completed. Milestone decisions 
reveal the micro-management of R&D projects. Table 16 presents the selection 
mechanism of project milestone decisions in Cinnamon.  
 
Table 16 Selection mechanism in milestone decisions in project development 
Selection mechanism Selection structure Selection rule Selection object 
Milestone decision Project Committee Fulfill the technological 
success criteria of a 
development phase  
Project development 
stage attribute 
 
In Cinnamon, milestone decisions were made at a fairly constant rate throughout the 
observation period. In the project portfolio, the number of projects at different 
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development stages fluctuated somewhat (Appendix 7). The proportion of projects in 
stages S5 and S6 was slightly larger, and the proportion of projects in stage S2 was 
slightly smaller in year 9 than in year 1. Remarkably, the overall relative distribution of 
projects by stage fluctuated but changed very little during nine years (Appendix 8). The 
constancy of both milestone decisions and total project distribution by development 
stage in the portfolio is in contrast to the increase in variation resulting from decisions 
to initiate projects. Five explanations to this constancy of distribution by development 
stage seem plausible.  
 
First, the project committee deliberately controlled the distribution through milestone 
decisions. If this were the case the following problems would arise. The portfolio 
would expand and shrink over time, which would make the task of controlling it more 
difficult than if portfolio size were constant. The milestone selection rule did not 
contain this type of empowerment. The project committee did not restrict the number of 
initiations, in other words, the number of projects at stage S2 of R&D funding. There 
were no comments to suggest this kind of behavior in the meeting minutes; nor was 
there evidence of bookkeeping of this kind of quota in other documents.  
 
Second, the effect arose from additional project specifications and ongoing changes in 
goal setting by external or internal stakeholders. Although regulatory requirements 
became more complex in some instances, this external effect was not evenly distributed 
across projects, business areas, and therapy fields. Hence, it could affect the overall 
portfolio age but not the balance of project distribution by development stage. The 
onset of this effect would be gradual. Although project goal setting was refined due to 
reconsiderations, and the results of new information from project development, this 
again could increase the total age of the project but not lock the distribution of projects 
in portfolio by project stage.  
 
Third, the capacity to execute tasks by development phase was 100 % saturated, and 
therefore a constant distribution of projects by project stage could arise. But these 
events would probably affect different development stages in different ways and cause 
deviating trends in quota rather than dampening them. If development capacity in all 
stages was already saturated before prioritizing started, then there were probably more 
projects than the development funnel could absorb. If the funnel is saturated, then there 
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is reason to prioritize, but if full capacity has already been reached then this leaves no 
room for prioritization. Since portfolio initiations grew in the early years, managers 
considered the funnel not fully saturated. Hence, this scenario is unlikely.  
 
Fourth, the portfolio committee intentionally balanced the portfolio by development 
stages. This view is not supported by the evidence from the archival data, where no 
reference of balancing was made. Nevertheless, should this have happened, the 
explanation goes against the consequences of applying the selection rule for 
prioritizing. Prioritized projects in development stages S5 and S6 in the Lime business 
unit increased due to co-selection. This fact is at odds with the idea of the 
undocumented balancing activity of top management. 
 
Fifth, the effect arose from restricted resource quota with regard to personnel, capacity 
and timing in the critical chain either at the business unit or corporate level. Some 
organizational friction may have arisen when corporate functions with different types 
of resources within R&D were negotiating the annual workflow. This could affect the 
critical path of ongoing projects. For lack of additional evidence, this proposal also 
remains conjectural.  
 
6.1.6. Interaction of portfolio and project committee selection rules 
In Cinnamon, the two organizational selection structures, the portfolio committee and 
the project committee, had different tasks and partly different people nominated to 
each. Both committees did have a say about the resourcing of projects, although in 
different ways. Both committees also observed whether projects should be terminated 
due to technological hurdles. The way the two selection committees worked differed 
radically with reference to review events. Projects were reviewed in both committees, 
and sometimes no changes to their status were made. These review events that did not 
result in further decisions can be regarded as events for information gathering. The 
review of any project could, for example, signal the importance of the project, lack of 
some critical information, or an unexpected turn of events. A project review event was 
an opportunity to gain more information about project status, although the decision was 
to make no decision on the project status.  
 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           103 
 
 
The two committees differed radically with regard to the number of review events. No 
less than 90 % of review events without decisions took place in the project committee, 
and only 10 % in the portfolio committee. There were about two times more reviews 
than decisions in the project committee and eight times more decisions than reviews at 
the portfolio committee. Portfolio committee meetings were also held less frequently 
than project committee meetings. This suggests that there was a lot of detailed fact 
gathering in project committee in order to make milestone decisions. Project specific 
issues regarding detailed information gathering were more important to project 
committee, but less significant to portfolio committee.  
  
In Cinnamon, there were inevitable interactions between the two selection committees. 
Prioritizations followed the selection rule to choose products of high commercial 
potential and global exposure. The portfolio committee initiated and prioritized projects 
so that priority status and portfolio size were advised to the project committee by the 
portfolio committee. But the dependencies between the two selection structures were in 
both directions. A project’s dominant design did not change when it was prioritized. 
The business unit membership and development stage remained unchanged. The stages 
of project development were strictly sequential and according to the dominant design. 
Internal procedures in accordance with regulatory requirements specified the selection 
rule for a project milestone decision. The project committee did not pass a milestone 
decision to release resources for the next development stage unless a project fulfilled 
technical specifications relating to the ongoing stage. If milestone requirements were 
not met, additional testing would cause delays, and such testing would require more 
resources. The timing of milestone decisions could not always be anticipated, but 
failure to pass project committee selection delayed the project, and this would affect 
time to market. Worse still, the portfolio committee sometimes had to terminate the 
project if the project committee refused to give a milestone decision to pass the project 
forward to the next stage.  
 
Although prioritized projects were allowed to let resources to sit in bottlenecks, they 
were unable to utilize these resources if milestone requirements were not met. 
Milestone decisions could delay prioritized projects but not accelerate them. Project 
committee could not accelerate product development beyond a minimal throughput 
time dictated by the dominant design even if resources were available for the prioritized 
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projects. In this regard the time to complete a development stage was hard to compress. 
In Cinnamon, the cumulative age of both total portfolio and the prioritized portfolio 
increased to lengthen time to market.  
 
The evolutionary literature suggests that different selection structures at different levels 
interact (Burgelman, 1983ab, 1994; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Murmann et al, 2003). To 
function at all, selection structures at different levels are suggested to be loosely 
coupled (Levinthal, 1997; Weick, 1995) or informal (Brown and & Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Studying Intel, Burgelman (1994) showed the conflict between two levels of a 
hierarchy. The hierarchies had two selection rules that conflicted. Top management 
wanted to sell memory chips. Middle management applied the selection rule for highest 
profit and initiated production wafers to manufacture processors, which were more 
profitable than memory chips. Applying the selection rule of middle management, 
processor as the product type was co-selected. This was against top management’s 
intent. There is very little project management literature on multi-tasking congestion in 
a multi-project environment where priority coordination is important (Adler, 
Mandelbaum, Nguyen & Schwerer, 1995).  
 
Optimizing resource interactions to maximize the efficiency of portfolio management 
by trading off capacity against speed, as recommended by Kolisch, Meyer and Mohr 
(2005), could not be realized in Cinnamon due to the project dominant design. 
Prioritizations could accelerate a project only up to the next milestone decision at any 
one time. Time to market has been measured for example by comparing on schedule 
delivery with an accelerated schedule (Filippini, Salmaso & Tessarolo, 2004). Some 
scholars pay attention to the difference between moment of entry and development 
cycle time (Artto & Dietrich, 2004; Langerak, Hultink & Griffin, 2008). Artto & 
Dietrich (2004) contrast efficient, goal setting clock time “chronos” required for 
planning with effective strategic opportunity timing “kairos” for choosing the right 
moment to act.  
 
The prior literature claims that prioritizing would speed up time to market (see Archer 
& Ghasemzadeh, 2004). Best practice studies have not specified the actual effect of 
prioritizing (Cooper & Edgett, 2003; Cooper et al. 1997a, 1997b, 2001b, 2004; Griffin 
& Page, 1996). Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) note that prioritization seeds efficacy. 
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Prioritizing is beneficial to pacing (Thiry, 2004), securing resources and scheduling for 
initiations (Leach, 2004), and determining portfolio size and balance (Archer & 
Ghasemzadeh, 2004). One should pursue to shorten time to market even at the expense 
of elevated development costs (Cohen, Eliashberg & Ho, 1996).  
 
The reasons to shorten time to market as much as possible in the pharmaceutical 
industry are twofold. First, a shorter time to market before expiry of the patent is 
directly related to brand saliency and growth of sales. It goes together with gaining 
access to a large territory as early as possible. Second, many new products try to 
establish a new therapy standard, which would be disruptive to old products at the 
marketplace, and can thus claim premium pricing. Product launches in the 
pharmaceutical industry usually follow the “Winner-take-all” model of market entry.  
 
In Cinnamon, selection structures at different levels of the organization had different 
selection criteria, and these levels did not function in a concerted manner. The 
interaction between the selection structures created a negative externality which served 
to delay project development. Top management would be likely to note if prioritized 
projects were not given fast lane, but whether they were delayed is another thing. The 
only legitimate delay would arise from selection in the project committee. For 
milestone decisions, specifications had to be met even if it created a conflict with 
project priority. The interaction between selection structures is suggested to explain the 
relatively constant quota of project development stages in project portfolio. 
 
According to the evolutionary literature, there is no necessary match between the 
hierarchies of populations and selection mechanisms (Baum & Singh, 1994; Warglien, 
2002). Interactions between portfolio management and project management at different 
levels of hierarchy that results in conflicting outcomes have not been addressed in the 
portfolio management literature. In this study this interaction arose from the conflicting 
selection rules of the two hierarchies and the resultant co-selection to block the 
resources of the ongoing development stage if a timely milestone decision was not 
made. This also affected time to market. 
 
Decreasing time to market was a highly relevant goal for Cinnamon. Prioritization was 
a deeply seated and well documented management practice in the firm and is typical 
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portfolio management practice. Evidence from Cinnamon challenges the view that 
prioritizing as such is considered effective in shortening project lead time. Scholars 
have not paid enough attention to selection rules and structures, their interactions and 
the need for additional resourcing.  
 
6.1.7. Portfolio management success 
The ultimate success of projects as launched products was not examined in this study. 
Very few new projects were completed successfully. Some projects in Cinnamon 
continued although the product was launched. This was either due to regulatory 
requirements or the documenting of new applications or other ancillary properties. 
These projects were in either stage S5 or S6. All these projects had a project team 
assigned to perform R&D project development, so it was appropriate to list the ongoing 
activity as a product development project. It would take some years to discover how 
successful a product launch was. However, it is possible to recognize a performance 
gap in the portfolio. Very few product completions at a portfolio level (Appendix 7) 
indicates that new market entries were rather a result of product improvements (new 
applications and galenic forms) and increase in the scope for marketing (regional to 
global) than with totally new products. Slow annual sales growth also suggests this. 
However, data relating to the exact unfolding of portfolio projects to products 
generating new revenue year by year was not available. Some products were launched 
although the project still continued to gather regulatory phase 4 clinical data for 
regulatory authorities.  
 
Measuring the success of Cinnamon with project output as revenues generated from 
completed development projects depends not only on portfolio success but also on, for 
example, the success of production and marketing functions. This approach equates 
portfolio success with firm strategic success. However, the two performance criteria 
differ. R&D portfolio success relates more indirectly to firm success and also 
reciprocally (Miller, 1999). It is not easy to determine the arrow of causality. Another 
problem in measuring success is the very long period of time – typically a decade or 
more - of R&D project deliverables before they have a large enough effect on firm 
revenue and profit (Burgelman, 1983b; Burgelman & Grove, 2007). 
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The success of project portfolio management in Cinnamon can be judged by asking 
whether the management did the best with what they had at hand. One can estimate if 
the processes in Cinnamon were efficacious. Ray, Barney & Muhanna (2004) suggest 
that observations from process effectiveness related to business processes, activities 
and routines can be used to construct a measure of firm performance. Three classical 
studies address processes in product development. Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) propose 
three success factors for product development. Firstly, organizational committees 
should have clear responsibilities and communicate priorities. Secondly, projects 
should be probes for the future. Finally, projects must also link with current business. 
Dougherty & Hardy (1996) state three criteria for sustained innovation. Firms should 
maintain adequate resourcing, they should design collaborative structures and 
processes, and they should connect innovations with existing business. Cooper, Edgett 
and Kleinschmidt (1997ab) present three normative interdependent objectives for the 
management of portfolio of new product development projects. Managers should 
maximize portfolio value, should balance the portfolio against different types of risks, 
and should align the project portfolio with firm strategy.  
 
Measuring new product development project performance beyond tactical success – in 
terms of time, cost, and quality – is still in its infancy due to problems in 
conceptualization and measurement (Tatikonda, 2008). Prior research has reported only 
partial results on the factors explaining actual performance in project portfolio 
management (Cooper, Edgett & Kleinschmidt, 1997ab, 1999, 2000, 2004; Nobeoka & 
Cusumano 1995, 1997: Fricke & Shenhar, 2000; Loch, 2000; Martinsuo & Lehtonen, 
2007b). Some correlation between the extent of using the control methods of portfolio 
management and project performance has been reported (De Reyck et al, 2005).  
 
The effect of control on performance has been questioned since project control systems 
in project based firms stifle innovation (Keegan & Turner, 2002). Too much control 
weakens the performance of new product development. Even interactive control 
negatively affects project performance (Bonner, Ruekert & Chao, 2002). Evidence 
from the USA suggests that formal portfolio management processes relate to success 
(Cooper et al, 2004). European evidence indicates that the formalization of a portfolio 
management process beyond alignment to strategic intent does not relate to success 
(Griffin & Page, 1996). Improving management processes has resulted in new product 
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development (NPD) narrowing to incremental innovations (Kavadias & Chao, 2008). If 
the firm has not defined its strategy in the way that can be of operational guidance for 
project resource allocation, then the effect of the methods is weak. A high level of 
exploration in projects benefits from autonomy, whereas a low level does not 
(McGrath, 2001). Portfolio management success factors also depend on a firm’s 
environment (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Top managers’ teamwork as a way of 
deciding the process criteria for portfolio management is a success factor of project and 
portfolio through the process of linking projects to strategy (Englund & Graham, 1999). 
A cross-functional portfolio committee improves effectiveness (Leenders & Wierenga, 
2002).  
 
Criticizing the “best practice” approach of portfolio management, Loch (2000) points 
out that firms are unique with regard to the specific new product developments and 
strategic options that result in that firm’s specific project clusters. Because of the mixed 
results reported in the previous literature, the effectiveness of business processes on 
performance should be studied further (Ray, Barney & Muhanna, 2004; Tatikonda, 
2008).  
 
There is conflicting opinion on how the performance of a single firm like Cinnamon 
should be judged against portfolio success. In the pharmaceutical industry, innovation 
management amounts to a large and important part of strategy. In this industry, firms 
maintain a high amount of slack for searching new solutions for institutional reasons 
(Chen & Miller, 2007), so firms maintain large R&D budgets in a path dependent 
manner. The business performance of these firms is dependent on how they manage 
their R&D projects. To an extent, managing research projects as businesslike 
investments resembles other types of project businesses (Artto & Wikström, 2005; 
Artto & Kujala, 2008). Therefore, it is appropriate to treat Cinnamon’s investment 
portfolio of R&D projects as a major determinant of the firm’s success in the long run.  
 
The project and portfolio management processes in Cinnamon fulfilled the criteria of 
three different scholarly studies. First, they were ostensibly in line with success factors 
outlined by Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) with regard to product development. In 
Cinnamon, organizational committees had clear responsibilities and priorities were 
communicated. Projects in the firm were probes for the future. Business units linked 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           109 
 
 
present products with at least some stage S5 and S6 projects. Second, Cinnamon 
projects fulfilled three criteria for sustained innovation defined by Dougherty & Hardy 
(1996). Considerable resources were available for new products. The organization had 
collaborative structures and processes. Some projects at stages S5 and S6 connected 
innovations with existing business. Innovations were a meaningful component of the 
firm’s strategy. Third, new product development in Cinnamon fulfilled the three 
normative interdependent objectives for managing a portfolio of new product 
development projects (Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt, 1997ab). The selection rule 
for prioritization tended to maximize portfolio value. In effect, the selection rule was 
tailored to make overall firm profit high through full use of marketing organization. A 
system of balancing the portfolio by allocating R&D funding by business unit was 
used. The project portfolio was aligned in order to realize firm strategy through the 
number of new project initiations. I was unable to find out whether the right projects 
were prioritized in the end. This could be studied only in comparing the final 
performance of all projects which were prioritized with the ones which were not. 
 
Based on the comparison of processes in Cinnamon and their descriptions in the 
literature I conclude that managers in the organization did their best with respect to 
process efficacy and efficiency of R&D project portfolio management. And yet, in the 
prioritized projects this was seemingly not enough under instances of co-selection. 
Studying the dependencies between the amount of variation and selection mechanism 
in the context of evolutionary framework provides further insight about the 
management of the portfolio.   
 
6.2 Variation, portfolio evolution, and uncertainty 
6.2.1. Sources of variation 
In Cinnamon, initiating new projects and passing projects to new development stages 
introduced variation to the portfolio. Initiations and terminations determined the 
portfolio size and much of the total variation. When unexpected terminations occurred, 
variance was reduced. Variance in the R&D portfolio was especially volatile, since 
Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) was a feature in terminations. Although the 
portfolio board did not restrict variation as such, variation was restricted by the R&D 
budget quota for the business units. The dynamics of the R&D project portfolio in 
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Cinnamon revealed that managers had difficulties sustaining the innovative process, 
especially in the focal business unit Lavender.  
 
One can test if Cinnamon had adequate funding of R&D projects for future success in 
two examples where discontinuities appeared. First, internally, the R&D portfolio 
suffered from the unexpected terminations of prioritized projects in the focal business 
unit. Second, externally, the overall R&D funding was affected by sales decreases in 
the latter part of the observation period. 
 
In the first instance, managers did not compensate sudden project terminations with 
new initiatives in a timely manner. The increasing age of R&D portfolio in Cinnamon 
suggests that both selection structures allowed projects to go on for lack of new 
candidates. Sudden terminations still had one consequence on R&D funding and 
adequate variation. Very few R&D portfolio projects were completed until towards the 
end of the observation period. True, some projects in stage S6 had been launched in 
some applications in some markets. They already generated revenues and product 
development went on to secure new applications and launches in new territories. 
However, unforeseen terminations of prioritized Lavender projects removed the 
candidates that were expected to be future revenue generating products. This may also 
partially explain the decrease in sales growth. 
 
In the second instance, shortly after the peak of initiations, sales and R&D spending in 
Cinnamon went flat (Appendix 11). Managers could no longer provide a sufficient 
number of new project initiatives to increase variation. R&D spending slightly 
decreased in years 7 and 8. Nevertheless, in years 7 to 9 a massive selection effort to 
complete projects and to increase prioritized projects took place in the portfolio 
committee.  
 
As to variation in Cinnamon, there was no public financial data on R&D spending by 
business unit. I analyzed R&D funding at a portfolio level and took the number of 
projects in each business unit at any year to be a rough proxy for the allocated funding 
for the business unit. Focal business unit Lavender had more projects than the other 
business units. There was also a peak of new project entries in the middle of the 
observation period, together with a minimum number of terminations. However, there 
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was no radical increase in the R&D budget at that time. On the contrary, the R&D 
budget increase was tightly aligned with revenue increase.  
 
New product development needs continuous high risk funding to maintain an adequate 
number of projects. Sufficient variation to allow for both successes and failures makes 
it possible for a selection mechanism to operate. There is no consensus in project 
portfolio management about the optimal number of projects for given resources (Lieb, 
1998; Adams et al, 2006). Generally, best performing firms tend to focus much more 
resources on new product development than on other projects (Cooper et al, 2004). The 
level of funding for an innovation project or portfolio relates to the amount of variation 
needed to cope with uncertainty. To calculate portfolio size, termination risks can be 
estimated under ideal conditions (Chapman & Ward, 2002, 2003), but not in the 
presence of Knightian uncertainty. In drug development, uncertainty is remarkably 
high. Under the conditions of Knightian uncertainty, variation is simply unknown 
(Klein & Meckling, 1958). The wide acceptance of portfolio balancing with bucket 
models in practice indicates that mathematical models do not capture Knightian 
uncertainty.  
 
The results of the test to find out if Cinnamon had adequate funding are now 
summarized. First, there was not sufficient variation to compensate the losses in the 
Lavender business unit. Second, there was not sufficient variation in Cinnamon to 
compensate for portfolio aging by the funding available for R&D. This suggests that 
timely new project entries were made difficult for two essentially external reasons: very 
sudden terminations and slow traction in sales. There was a decoupling between the 
plans for increased R&D funding for future business, and the reality of a sudden 
slowing of sales growth of the current business.  
 
6.2.2. Variation and slack 
In Cinnamon, managers had problems with adequate funding of their R&D pipeline. 
Unexpected terminations ruined prioritized projects in the Lavender business unit and 
slow sales growth restricted R&D funding. Hence, both the number and timing of 
additional variation were affected. To increase variation beyond the minimal planned 
level organizations must have resource slack. Slack refers either to resources or timing.  
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Financial slack is defined as the difference between total resources and total necessary 
payments (Cyert & March, 1963). Measuring slack in innovation project portfolio 
management has traditionally focused on indirect financial measures (Bourgeois, 
1981), and has neglected temporal measures (Adams et al, 2006). Scholars use slack to 
denote either an absorptive buffer within the organization against “bad times”, or as a 
means for top management to initiate and execute strategic change (Bourgeois, 1981).  
 
Good performance correlates with high financial slack (Singh, 1986). However, studies 
on the effect of slack on performance are inconclusive (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & 
Turner, 2004; George, 2005). Scholars regard slack as beneficial to facilitating 
innovation and strategic exploration (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003ab), or 
adaptation to new environmental landscapes (Levinthal, 1997). Some consider slack to 
be harmful since resource use is then unproductive (Jensen, 1988). A little slack 
encourages, whereas too much slack is harmful to innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). 
In their meta-analysis, Daniel et al (2004) conclude that there is mostly positive 
evidence of the effect of financial slack on performance. In more recent studies, 
scholars have found support for the idea that the effect of financial slack on R&D 
investment is an inverted U-shape, moderated by ownership as a contingency factor 
(Kim, Kim & Lee, 2008), but also that a higher level of slack steadily brings a higher 
level of innovation (Oerlemans & Pretorius, 2008). Therefore, studying slack should be 
more resource specific (Geiger & Makri, 2006), and a firm’s environment should be 
taken into consideration (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Giraud Voss, 2008). Both unabsorbed 
slack, defined as non-liquid administrative slack, and liquid financial slack, enable 
more exploration and variation in the form of innovative R&D projects (Singh, 1986; 
Greve, 2007).  
 
At an operative level, budgeting slack resources in advance has been shown to be 
consistent with successfully managing goals that go beyond keeping within the limits 
of cost budget. According to Davila & Wouters (2005), designing explicit budgeting 
slack over some years helps the firm to cope with an increased demand on service 
quality. They consider planning for slack to be not dysfunctional but rather as 
facilitating managerial flexibility for more demanding and multiple goals under 
uncertain conditions. As Davila & Wouters (2005) show, an intentional management 
reserve could benefit the managing of a R&D project portfolio.  
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Most academic scholars have not discussed temporal slack as a resource constraint 
(Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; Baker & Nelson, 2005). Workflows in organization 
also need internal absorbers (Bourgeois, 1981). Although recognizing workflow slack, 
Bourgeois (1981) does not provide an indicator for it. The notion of transient slack tries 
to capture its temporal aspect, but it is made operational only in short term financial 
indexes (George, 2005). Studies on the speed of product development do not directly 
address slack (for example, Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996). Reduced time to market by 
compressing a rational process with better planning and computer-aided design is 
suggested to be effective only in mature industries (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).  
 
In contrast, the project management literature and practitioners consider time as a very 
important constraint to new product development (Milosevic, 2004). Nobeoka & 
Cusumano (1997) emphasize speed with reference to new multi-product development. 
Scholars of project management suggest there are trade-offs between both cost and 
cycle time (Cleland, 2004; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Clark & Fujimoto, 1992; 
Crawford, 1992), and product performance and cycle time (Cohen, Eliashberg & Ho, 
1996). A level of uncertainty modulates the trade-off between product success and time 
to market (Chen, Reilly & Lynn, 2005). Delays in timing due to resource slack can be 
overcome with financial slack. 
 
The notion of a critical path as a means to shorten development or production time to 
market is temporal slack operationalized (Gantt, 1919; Goldratt, 1999; Leach, 2004; 
Chapman & Ward, 2002; Rolstadås, 2004). A critical path method aggregates 
contingency reserves to achieve performance in time under uncertainty (Rand, 2000; 
Steyn, 2000). In addition to time and cost buffers, Pich et al (2002) conceptualize 
flexibility as yet another form of slack to accommodate many different, yet possible, 
outcomes of risk and uncertainty. This flexibility is useful under conditions of 
uncertainty. Temporal buffers eliminate process overloading relating to capacity 
(Steyn, 2000). Chapman & Ward (2002) are not explicit about how to utilize an unused 
time buffer. Conceptualizing a critical chain helps to seize an opportunity for early 
completion of steps in a critical path. Critical chain thinking does not recognize an 
“optimal” project schedule. On the contrary, there are perhaps more than one “good 
enough” scheduling solutions (Steyn, 2000).  
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Attaching extra resources or time beyond the “optimized need” in order to achieve 
R&D goals seems counterintuitive. High level of variation is likely to induce additional 
cost with no extra benefit (Madsen, Mosakowski & Zaheer, 1999). Viewing the 
portfolio through “optimizing” lenses leads one to think that only successful R&D 
outcomes require funding. One easily forgets that these successes arose only because 
all the other candidates in the race were also funded, although they failed. Optimizing 
(Klein & Meckling, 1958) assumes that forecasting works all the time. But there are no 
real forecasts for even the most important projects if the variation of these forecasts is 
both huge and indeterminate (Taleb, 2008; Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004). Not every 
R&D project is successfully completed; indeed, many projects are terminated. Due to 
unforeseen Knightian uncertainty, these terminations are sudden. The need for slack to 
increase variation for new projects is closely connected with the presence of unforeseen 
events. If a firm has both resource and temporal slack available, the additional variation 
can be achieved. To achieve this, some additional reserve to provide additional 
projects, and thereby increase variation, should be at hand.  
 
Many scholars suggest using slack to increase variation. Minimizing both total cost and 
time in new product development is sensitive to uncertainty (Loch, Terwiesch & 
Thomke, 2001). Managers should build an element of slack resources to cope with the 
unexpected (Loch et al, 2006). Slack is needed to persist on a course of action in trial 
and error learning (Garud & van de Ven, 1992), and allows failures to be absorbed 
(Adams et al, 2006). Extensive variation for parallel projects, some of which do not 
survive, is needed to successfully manage a R&D portfolio under unforeseeable 
uncertainty (Pich et al, 2002).  
 
Financial data shows that Cinnamon’s reserve resources were not used for funding 
R&D to increase variation. As a consequence, the R&D portfolio aged for lack of new 
projects. References to measurements as a way to estimate the amount of slack in 
Cinnamon R&D beyond financial indicators from balance sheet were not found in the 
documents. I found no written evidence of using slack resources at the organization.  
 
In Cinnamon, prioritizing resulted in the aging of prioritized projects. Managing the 
portfolio with critical chain would have meant building reserves in the scheduling so 
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that projects which were prioritized would not be affected by congesting workflow. 
This would have been assigned to project committee from portfolio committee. Since 
the distribution of projects by phase remained constant and the portfolio was aging, this 
suggests that the management of critical path in product development was not system 
of improvement.  
 
The history of Cinnamon suggests that budgetary slack for additional new project 
variation and temporal slack to resolve bottlenecks at development phases were not in 
use. There was little or no resource or temporal slack available for making adjustments. 
However, this conclusion remains conjectural, since no interviews with top 
management were undertaken to reveal the internal financial activities.  
 
6.2.3. Variation and selection  
Selection mechanisms influence variation. Increasing variation widens the subset of 
possible survivors of selection (Dobbs & Molho, 1999). If selection structures inside a 
firm are heavily top down oriented (Burgelman, 1983ab, 2002ab), this reduces 
variation that feeds in as new R&D initiatives. On the one hand, selection rules should 
allow projects to survive more easily to maintain variation. On the other, selection 
should be effective in order not to be too expensive.  
 
Since not all combinations of attributes were co-selected, co-selection decreased the 
variation at least initially among prioritized projects A dominant design restricts 
variation. Variance was also reduced due to the interactions between selection levels 
when prioritized projects did not proceed through the milestones to the next 
development phases, but rather became older.  
 
Scholars do not agree on how to control evolutionary mechanisms. In agreement with 
March (1994a), Warglien (2002) observes that evolution is used as a design tool in 
animal husbandry. We can tune parameters of variation and set up selection 
mechanism, but have no firm control over the outcome. Variation control is possible by 
controlling the amount of slack resources. With selection control it is possible to affect 
retention. The tools could be population search heuristics and organizational policies. 
Evolution allows intentional experimentation and adjustment. Executive teams can 
influence variation and selection in product design (McGrath et al, 1992). Although 
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perhaps possible for the short term, it is very likely to be quite hard to “engineer” the 
conditions for evolution for the long term (March, 1994a). The fact that levels of 
selection exist and they interact is emphasized by Aldrich & Ruef (2006). Selection 
may occur at an aggregate level population level attributes and selection mechanisms 
may interact with different levels (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006).  
 
Experimenting with vicarious variation and selection still does not guarantee success in 
external competition against environmental selection. For vicarious selection, the 
selection mechanisms inside a firm are different from those in the outside environment 
(Campbell, 1994). The problem is to mimic the environmental selection criteria with 
the vicarious criteria, selection structure and process. To compensate for terminations, 
variation ought to be increased. Selection mechanisms need reserve variation to cope 
with the unexpected. In the evolutionary framework, managers can, in principle, 
influence variation and selection to modify retention. They can design selection 
structures and decide selection rules, and they can influence the amount of variation. 
Scholars have both advocated and shown skepticism about the management of 
evolution by actively adjusting variation and selection. They differ with regard to how 
much variation and adaptation they consider possible (Turnbull, 2000; Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979).  
 
Managing evolution addresses the problem of exploration and exploitation. Exploration 
increases variation, whereas exploitation reduces variation. Increasing variation is 
considered beneficial to create successful new ventures (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Burgelman, 1983ab, 1994). Expanding variation in product development requires more 
funding for new project initiatives. It has been documented that top managers give 
more time to current business than new business and value it more highly (Dougherty 
& Hardy, 1996; Greve, 2008). R&D activities contain both more exploratory (entirely 
new products) and more exploitative (product life cycle improvements) types of 
projects. At the firm level, all R&D investment is explorative in comparison with other 
investing activity, the improvement of internal processes or more general operations 
management.  
 
The notions of exploration and exploitation and tradeoff between them, have been 
elaborated upon by March (1991) and Levinthal & March (1993). Many scholars agree 
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that balancing exploration and exploitation is beneficial, but also recognize the 
difficulty of achieving and maintaining a balance (Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Burgelman, 2002ab; Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; Greve 2007). In the evolutionary 
framework (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; March, 1991), the choice between exploration 
and exploitation has been described as the balance between the processes of variation 
and selection. In Burgelman’s (1991) analyses, induced strategic behavior that 
decreases variance and selection is powerful, whereas autonomous strategic behavior 
that increases variance and selection is less powerful. Whether exploitation and 
exploration are exclusive or occur together remains controversial (Gupta et al, 2006). 
For example, Burgelman (1991) argues for ambidextrous firm structure, and, later, for a 
punctuated equilibrium structure (Burgelman, 2002a), depending on the firm under 
study. Exploring and exploiting can be analyzed on different levels (Gupta et al, 2006). 
  
In terms of R&D portfolio management, following March (1991) and Hannan & 
Freeman (1989), firms in an exploring mode increase portfolio variation and they are 
lax about portfolio selection criteria, whereas in the exploitative mood they carefully 
select to reduce variation. In uncertain environments, product variety is important 
(Sorenson, 2000). Pursuing ambiguous and contradicting tendencies jointly has survival 
value (Weick, 2004). Many scholars suggest that increasing variation in order to allow 
more trial and error type exploration is beneficial to managing the evolutionary 
mechanism (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Klein & 
Meckling, 1958; Loch et al., 2006; March, 1991; March, 1994a; McGrath, 2001; 
Nightingale, 2008). Managers can influence variance and selection in the evolutionary 
system of R&D development projects to some extent, but not wholly modify retention, 
that is, portfolio outcome.  
 
Scholars who are optimistic about managing the future such as Lovas & Ghoshal 
(2000) put more emphasis on the active role of top management. They maintain that by 
making “small timely interventions” managers can influence history. Managers’ 
understanding about when and how to intervene comes from their ability to utilize 
human and social capital. In other words, more acuity in vicarious selection drives 
better choices, and better organizational skills facilitate internal organizational changes. 
Managers have to adjust this internal balance against what is going on outside the firm. 
In Burgelman’s (2002a) account of Intel, the building of a strategic vector resulting in 
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successful exploitation came about from a onetime lucky circumstance. Recently, 
Burgelman & Grove (2007) have shown that Intel was able to shift the mode of 
operation between exploring and exploiting forms. However, foresight cannot be 
generally replicated. Hidden cyclical changes and historical time epochs may be of 
importance. Managers may sometimes choose between modes of exploring and 
exploitation for a suitable period of time, if they are careful in their search of 
environmental clues for which they provide an interpretative framework (Burgelman & 
Grove, 2007). This idea comes close to relying on the efforts of managerial cognition in 
framing opportunities and shaping new business models (Porac et al, 1995).  
 
Other scholars, for example March (1994a), think that managing evolution is illusory. 
Managers can definitely change their behavior and make “small timely interventions”. 
Lacking good enough clues about the consequences of their behavior, the outcomes of 
changes made by managers are likely to be not quite, and sometimes not at all, what 
they wanted. This logical argumentation is hard to crack. However, it still allows 
successes and leaves room for learning. Recently, de Rond & Thietart (2007) promote 
the view that managerial choices are insufficient to account for strategy. Knowing 
when to explore or exploit is a diagnostic problem clouded by uncertainty (de Rond & 
Thietart, 2007), in spite of the occasional one time success in doing the right thing. The 
views of de Rond & Thietart (2007) and Burgelman & Grove (2007) make an 
interesting and unresolved contrast. Interestingly, strategic consistency in competitive 
behavior has also been suggested to be important for long term survival (Lamberg et al, 
2009). Exploration to increase variation would help to meet the uncertain future and 
increase learning (March, 1991). Exploitation to decrease variation would be dangerous 
if the unexpected happens. Burgelman (2002a) notes that an exploitative “lock in” type 
of evolution leads to competency traps because variation is reduced.  
 
Co-selection during prioritization decreased variation in Cinnamon since not all 
possible combinations of attributes were selected. These constraints made variation 
asymmetric. The prioritization criteria in the portfolio committee could have been used 
to adjust the portfolio. However, managers kept selection structures and selection rules 
constant in Cinnamon. In the organization, selection structures and selection rules also 
interacted. Selection rules for milestones at project committee levels were not flexible. 
Managers did not increase variation due to sudden terminations and the R&D funding 
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crisis. Experimenting with variation and selection mechanisms in Cinnamon could have 
made a difference.  
 
By prioritizing stage S5 and S6 projects and refraining from making new initiations to 
fully compensate losses due to terminations managers in Cinnamon were taking more 
exploitative than explorative actions. The productivity gap in Cinnamon and sustaining 
projects in stage S6 after launch to document new applications were indicative of 
exploitation rather than exploration. In Cinnamon, prioritized projects at stages S5 and 
S6 increased over time. This is a sign of exploitation because these projects were either 
close to launching or were the subject of an expansion program for products already 
launched. 
 
In Cinnamon, selection for priority was vicarious. Terminations were managerial acts 
but basically resulted from technological hurdles, that is, events in the external 
environment. Although vicarious selection may have reflected the external environment 
quite well, it could not anticipate sudden terminations. A critical question for 
Cinnamon was to ask how long to wait before terminating a project for commercial 
reasons. This either did not happen at all, or only very seldom. The discrepancy 
between vicarious and external selection remained an unsolved problem.  
 
6.2.4. Evolutionary R&D portfolio management 
Attempts to treat project portfolios holistically have not been very successful (Elonen 
& Artto, 2003). Companies continue to suffer from resource allocation problems 
(Engwall & Jerbrant, 2003) and complexity caused by resource interdependencies 
(Dammer & Gemünden, 2007) in their project portfolios. There are problems of 
measurement in the study of R&D projects which have not been resolved (Adams, 
Bessant, & Phelps, 2006). Project portfolio decision aids are inadequate (Iamratanakul 
& Milosevic, 2007). Many questions in new product development project management 
are still open problems (Kavadias & Chao, 2008). 
 
Darwinian variation and selection logic applies best when diversity of goals and 
preferences are high and there is uncertainty about means-ends connections (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). Recognizing the importance of evolutionary logic, some scholars have 
addressed the management of a portfolio under conditions of uncertainty (McGrath, 
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2001; Pich, Loch & De Meyer, 2002; Sommer & Loch, 2004; Loch, Terwiesch & 
Thomke, 2001; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Loch et al, 2006; Loch & Bode-Greuel, 2001; 
Loch & Kavadias, 2008b). They pursue selectionism to manage portfolio by means of 
adjusting variation and selection mechanisms. When engaging in evolutionary portfolio 
management, one faces the seemingly “unnecessary” costs of projects that had to be 
later abandoned. However, some events in the future are fundamentally unpredictable 
(Cooksey, 2000; Knight, 1921; Klein & Meckling, 1958). Selectionism (Loch & 
Kavadias, 2002) recognizes that the cost of successful R&D projects must also include 
the cost of the failed projects.  
 
Maintaining control through intolerance to any deviations from an operating process is 
a high resilience procedure to avoid major damage from unknown causes (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). High resilience is a possible key to detecting co-selection. However, 
exploration for strategic renewal is the opposite of managing deviations by maintaining 
control. Calculative strategic experimentation in solving ill-structured problems under 
ambiguity is seen as the most profitable use of a firm’s R&D assets. Here content is 
overcome by process (Mosakowski, 1997). For the lack of a good causal picture, small 
scale low-cost probing is recommended (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) as the preferred 
way of coping with ambiguity. Project organization is suitable for trial and error 
learning (Lindkvist, 2008).  
 
The evidence from Cinnamon suggests that attempts to anticipate or detect co-selection 
were not made. At least, actions to compensate it were not observed. Detecting co-
selection faces the realm of unknown unknowns. Following resilient management 
practice, this would mean cautious monitoring of the portfolio for any anomalies, 
which could be caused by co-selection or unexpected terminations, and immediate 
action if anomalies are observed. Following portfolio management practice, this would 
amount to looking for externalities, internal constraints, and interactions between 
projects and selection mechanisms.  
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6.3 Co-selection as an explanation  
6.3.1. Co-selection mechanisms and portfolio evolution 
The discussion above shows that the evolutionary patterns of strategy in Cinnamon 
displayed in Table 13, (chapter 5.3), become plausible when the conjecture of co-
selection is applied to explain the observations. Managers pursued a policy that was 
aimed to reduce time to market. Prioritized projects increased in number but they also 
aged (pairs 1 and 2, Table 13). That there was an increasing number of old co-selected 
Lime projects which were not completed but were retained explains these trends. 
Managers focused project initiations and prioritizations in the Lavender business unit 
(pair 3, Table 13). They did not succeed in prioritizing enough of the Lavender 
projects. Unforeseen terminations cut many of the prioritized Lavender projects, but not 
Lime projects which were retained and carried co-selected attributes (pair 4, Table 13). 
This resulted in the increase of prioritized projects (in Lime) at development stages S5 
and S6 (pair 5, Table 13). These projects possibly acted as constraints for other projects 
to enter stages S5 and S6.  
 
In initiating and prioritizing more Lavender project against retaining old prioritized 
Lime projects managers faced a tradeoff. Pursuing both strategies would increase the 
number of prioritized projects and their age, leading to congestion at the end. Managers 
were unable to cope with the productivity gap arising from terminations of Lavender 
projects for lack of sufficient new initiations (pair 6, Table 13). Due to co-selection, the 
R&D resources were partially locked in to the prioritized Lime projects at stages S5 
and S6. These projects were not terminated, not deprived of priority status and not 
completed. Managers did not detect this effect of co-selection and were unable to cope 
with it.  
 
I conclude through a process of abduction that co-selection as a mechanism explains 
the observed conflicting pairs of evolutionary outcomes in portfolio retention. What 
happened in Cinnamon and why is presented as a short narrative to answer the research 
question.  
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6.3.2 Explanatory narrative 
The story of R&D portfolio evolution in Cinnamon starts from a specific historical 
situation. At the beginning, the majority of R&D development projects in the firm were 
held by business unit Lime. Lime also held the majority of prioritized projects. 
Managers intended to increase projects especially in the focal Lavender business unit 
and focused the majority of new project initiations in that unit. This is visible by the 
huge number of project initiations in Lavender. As a consequence, the Lavender 
business unit soon gained dominance in the R&D project portfolio. 
 
To increase efficacy in R&D by more precise targeting of the available limited funding, 
managers started to increase prioritizations as a means to decrease the time to market of 
selected prioritized projects. The selection rule for prioritizations was to favour projects 
with high revenue potential and global coverage. When managers pursued more 
initiations in the focal business unit Lavender, managers also prioritized more projects 
in focal business unit than elsewhere. The number of new or prioritized projects was 
not restricted. Applying the selection rule for priority, projects that were from different 
business units, not only from Lavender, were co-selected. The mechanism of co-
selection caused the retention of ancillary attributes, such as development stage, of the 
prioritized projects in Lavender. These projects were often at development stage S4 
and, later S5. But the mechanism of co-selection also retained the ancillary attributes of 
prioritized projects in Lime and Blue. These projects were often in development stage 
S5 or S6, and therefore generally older in age. As a consequence of co-selection, 
projects with distinctively different project development stages and age from the 
different business units were retained in the prioritized portion of the portfolio.   
 
During the development of the portfolio over years, the prioritized projects in the 
Lavender business unit were terminated due to unexpected, often technological causes, 
more frequently than prioritized projects in the other business units, especially Lime. 
This resulted in “missing” prioritized projects in Lavender. The prioritized projects in 
Lavender that were terminated were somewhat younger than the Lime projects. New 
projects were initiated to mend the gap. Consequently, prioritized projects in Lavender 
were in an earlier development stage relative to Lime. Older prioritized projects in the 
Lime and Blue business units at development stages S5 and S6 were retained together 
with Lavender projects. On a portfolio level, this dominance resulted in a further 
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increase in the average age of projects, especially prioritized projects. The project 
portfolio continues to age. In the end, there were not enough slack resources to increase 
variation in order to fully compensate these losses in Lavender. Managerial action to 
increase prioritized project in Lavender did not result in the dominance of prioritized 
Lavender projects in the portfolio as a whole.  
 
Project development stages were executed sequentially due to the project dominant 
design. Development times by stage were hard to compress. Consequently, total 
development time did not decrease beyond a definite minimum time. The selection rule 
for prioritizing in the portfolio committee interacted with the selection rule for 
milestone decisions in project committee in a way that was not anticipated. Milestone 
decisions were independent of prioritizations. Milestone decisions could not be 
accelerated unless the specifications of sub goals by consecutive development phases 
were met. For this reason, the project committee delayed rather than accelerated the 
projects prioritized by the portfolio committee. In the portfolio, the proportion of 
projects at different stages remained largely constant.  
 
Completing different stages required different types of resources; so free resources 
from one development stage were not transferable to another project at another 
development stage even if projects were prioritized. Only resources within a single 
development stage were readily transferable. There was insufficient unabsorbed slack 
to meet additional demand by providing resources to the project development stage. In 
addition, there were insufficient temporal buffers to overcome the temporal constraints 
in the critical chain. Therefore, the prioritized projects in business unit Lime did not 
necessarily proceed to the next development stage or to the market. Many prioritized 
projects in Lime were locked at stages S5 or S6. This constraint restricted the 
advancement of other prioritized projects, such as Lavender projects, to stages S5 and 
S6. Since many Lime projects were above average age, the aging of the prioritized 
portfolio increased. Projects in the Lime business unit that were at advanced 
development phases continued absorbing prioritized resources. This delayed the 
dominance of Lavender. Lavender had fewer projects prioritized than the proportion of 
its share in the total portfolio.  
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Contrary to managerial intent, prioritizing did not decrease the time to market. 
Managers did not terminate prioritized Lime projects for commercial reasons either. 
These projects went ahead. Managers had to consider whether to go ahead with old 
prioritized Lime or new prioritized Lavender projects. Co-selection of Lime projects in 
late development stages S5 and S6 during prioritization had created this problem. In the 
end, managers pursued both strategies, which eventually led to congestion in portfolio 
performance. In summary, the co-selection mechanism and interactions between the 
two selection structures with different selection rules influenced the portfolio dynamics 
to produce realized strategies in conflict with those that were intended, and with each 
other.  
 
6.4 Alternative explanations 
The conjecture of co-selection can be challenged. I shall present some possible 
criticism. I shall examine some alternative explanations to show that they are less 
compatible with the observed facts than the proposed conjecture, that of co-selection. 
  
Statistical tests for correlation between project attributes were not used. The 
correlations of statistical tests measure closeness and co-variation. They do not justify 
causal explanations, since the direction of cause and effect is not specified. However, 
QCA analysis provides the necessary causes as the antecedents to the observed events. 
If an attribute of a project was a necessary cause for prioritization in Boolean analysis, 
then it was also present at the selection event – when the selection rule for prioritization 
was applied – and was co-selected. This gives a logical justification that a co-selection 
mechanism explains observed retention in prioritized projects. 
  
Decision making was not shown to uncover the roots of co-selection. Analyzing 
Cinnamon, I did not attempt to use the decision theory to uncover the mechanism 
through which managers arrive at actions. I only pointed out where rational 
consequential logic breaks down and other means of solving problems appear; for 
example, the logic of identity (March, 1994b). The influences of top management team 
heterogeneity, composition, tenure, education or other demographics, on actions were 
not studied. Reviews were considered a proxy for focusing attention on specific 
projects. The influence of attention was not studied further. The top management 
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remained fairly stable during the years of analysis. In Cinnamon, selection for priority 
was based on consensus. This was also the case for other decisions in the portfolio 
committee. In the project committee, decisions were based on the following of rules. 
The selection rule for priority was well documented and did not change.  
 
An objection could be that decisions are based on factual substantial criteria, which 
would explain every separate decision. It is true that factual content issues – preference 
criteria – accounting for these decisions at the project level (for example, the ranking 
order of projects by modeling financial expectations) were not analyzed in detail. But 
the archival event data from the selection structures suggests that content data was not 
analyzed at the portfolio committee, although this was carried out at the project 
committee. When choosing projects for prioritization, top managers took into 
consideration aspects that reflected both signals from the external market and from the 
internal organizational environment. This was their basis for applying the priority 
selection rule. A detailed analysis of substance issues confronts the problem of which 
substance issues were neglected and which were totally unknown. Substance issues 
would have to cope with information overflow and misplaced illusory preciseness. 
Managerial judgment would still vary over changing times. Proposing that failure to 
apply project portfolio management model caused the observed correlations is 
unfounded because even the process model allows independent judgment against any 
model tools or norms at will. Although project features are likely to affect choices, they 
do not account for negative externalities arising from dependencies between projects 
and the opportunity windows. Content issues were handled with selection rules. 
 
In Cinnamon, the unit of explanation was the project portfolio, not a single project. 
Using selection mechanisms to provide an explanation meant that the analysis did not 
go into the details of the decision making process beyond selection rules. The concept 
of co-selection denotes a non-adaptive selection mechanism that collects the project 
attributes present at the time when the selection rule for priority is applied. Therefore, 
the consequences of co-selection totally come about from the prioritization in the first 
place. There is no need for further cognitive explanations for co-selection since it 
derives from both the selection rule and the project dominant design. In a sense, co-
selection cannot be avoided, once the selection rule and dominant design are a given.  
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It may be argued that sunk cost or escalation of commitment prevented the de-
prioritizing of some projects. This may be correct, but it does not exclude co-selection. 
Managers depend on their prior choices and may need to repeat their commitment to 
prior investments, and at the same time they allow the portfolio to age.  
 
With regard to milestone decisions, content analysis is not needed, since the decisions 
were based on the rule of fulfilling milestone criteria, mostly of external origin. The 
internal dependencies between the attributes of any single project, which were neither 
anticipated nor analyzed in portfolio models, were the effects of co-selection.  
 
There was either not enough or too much variation to apply evolutionary logic at all. 
When there is too little variation, like in a homogeneous population, the selection 
mechanism has nothing to work upon. When there is too much variation, the selection 
mechanisms do not differentiate between variable attributes, or the mechanisms 
become extremely complicated. There is no methodological or theoretical yardstick to 
relate the amount of variation to a specific selection mechanism. The evidence must be 
of a practical nature. In Cinnamon, the amount of variation increased due to new 
project initiations and successive milestone decisions. The portfolio size almost 
doubled. The portfolio changed and contained diverging trends. Since portfolio 
retention changed, it is likely that selection did operate and there was sufficient 
variation not to dampen the selection mechanism.  
 
Selection mechanism may be so strong that very few projects survive and may not 
contain sufficient attributes favored by selection. In Cinnamon, the portfolio size 
doubled, indicating that selection was not overly strong. The selection mechanism may 
also be too weak to select attributes present in only a small quantities in a much larger 
project population. This results to the retention of average attributes rather than those 
favored by the selection mechanism (McKelvey, 1999; Kauffman, 1993). Rapid 
adaptation may weaken a selection mechanism (Levinthal & Posen, 2007). Path 
dependence may restrict variation and selection (Lewin & Volberda, 2003b). In 
Cinnamon, the number of prioritized projects increased, supporting the view of an 
effective path dependent selection rule. High or low variation (Kauffman, 1993) does 
not make a difference to an evolutionary selection mechanism as such, although it is 
relevant to the survival quota via rates of reproduction. In summary, the portfolio 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           127 
 
 
dynamics in Cinnamon indicates that variation and selection worked to achieve changes 
in portfolio retention. 
 
Shifting selection criteria cause the observed evolution. Researchers do not always 
report selection criteria clearly. In Cinnamon, the selection mechanism, selection 
structures and selection rules for prioritization remained constant. This is consistent 
with the demands proposed by Campbell (1969, 1974). Generally, providing an 
explanation with co-selection is not tied to a specific selection rule about the 
prioritization that was in use. The particular baggage attached to ancillary attributes 
would correspond to a specific selection rule resulting from the project dominant 
design. 
  
In Cinnamon, the project dominant design did not change over time. Variation was 
increased through new project initiations and project development by stages. Selection 
mechanisms were shown to be at work. The growth of the portfolio was extensive 
rather than intensive. The size of the portfolio both increased and decreased. 
 
Termination criteria are market and technology dependent (Balachandra & Brockhoff, 
1995). Decision simulations show that project terminations are more difficult for 
respondents if they themselves have started the project, or the level of innovativeness is 
high (Schmidt & Calantone, 2000). Decisions to terminate new product development 
(NPD) projects tend to occur at the middle phase of development (He & Mittal, 2007). 
The majority of terminations occur for technological rather than market reasons 
(Christensen & Bower (1996). Managing innovations benefits from escalated 
commitment (Garud & van de Ven, 1992). In Cinnamon, for terminations to occur it 
was necessary that the project failed to meet financial or technical criteria.  
 
Co-selection effects are marginal when development times are short. One could claim 
that co-selection is industry specific due to long drug development times. Since co-
selection has been documented in a single case study, an industry specific effect cannot 
be ruled out. In Cinnamon, the lifetimes of prioritized projects varied between 1 and 9 
years. Co-selection was detected in projects of different ages. A long development time 
as such would not be necessary for co-selection to appear. Co-selection inevitably 
arises due to the dominant design. Many authors have argued for the existence and 
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importance of a dominant design in other industries (Murmann & Frenken, 2006; 
Mokyr, 2000; Ziman, 2000; Dew et al, 2004; Villani et al, 2007; Grandori, 2007). This 
should encourage the investigation of whether dominant design could also cause co-
selection in other industries.  
 
Co-evolution explains the developments in the case firm. Co-evolution refers to a path-
dependent development dynamic. Co-evolution is defined by Lewin & Volberda (1999) 
as “the joint outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional 
effects. Change can be recursive and need not be an outcome of either managerial 
adaptation or environmental selection but rather the joint outcome of managerial 
intentionality and environmental effects.” This definition describes a broad principle of 
recurrent mutual train of path-dependent interactions. The definition does not refer to a 
specific selection mechanism or co-selection. To explain particular outcomes with co-
evolution one needs to identify both a source of variation and a specific selection 
mechanism. For example, specific co-evolutionary lock-in processes may select “in” 
one technology and select “out” a number of others (Arthur, 1989). The co-evolution 
perspective combines the population ecology and adaptive intention research streams 
(Astley, 1985; Lewin, Long & Carroll, 1999; Burgelman, 2002a; Lewin & Volberda, 
2003ab). Co-evolution is not optimal but just “good enough” (Arthur, 1989).  
 
Co-selection refers to a non-adaptive, and often probably non-intentional, and dominant 
design driven selection mechanism that may be present in any evolutionary selective 
process that follows a rule. It may or may not occur during a co-evolutionary process. 
The history of the Cinnamon R&D portfolio shows evidence of a co-selection 
mechanism and not of adaption driven co-evolution. Hence, co-selection and co-
evolution describe two important and distinct phenomena.  
 
No selection is needed for evolution. If complexity increases over time, populations 
could develop increasing diversity without a variation and selection mechanism 
(Kauffman, 1993). But self-organization and complexity do not explain evolution 
(Anderson, 1999). Complexity does not overrule the logic of evolutionary mechanisms 
(Hodgson, 2002). Rather, complexity increases variation. The origins of increasing 
variation and the mechanism of selection are two things to be carefully defined and 
kept apart. Selection is irreducible to phenomena arising from complexity (Hodgson, 
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2002; Knudsen, 2002; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006). Selection effects may be masked or 
blurred under certain conditions, but not generally undone (Kaufmann, 1993; 
McKelvey, 1999, Hodgson, 2004). Complexity does not always increase, deterioration 
and evolution towards simpler specimen also occurs (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). In the 
realm of biology, most living creatures are simple unicellular beings or bacteria (Gould, 
2002).  
 
In Cinnamon, the interplay between variation and the selection mechanism is needed to 
explain the portfolio dynamics that were observed. The Cinnamon portfolio was 
fundamentally no more complex at the end than it was at the beginning. The 
interactions between the two levels of selection structure were present the whole time. 
The complexity of the R&D projects did not substantially increase during a decade in 
the pharmaceutical R&D. Regulatory requirements did not fundamentally change. The 
number of patients in clinical studies tended to increase due to regulatory requirements 
but this would not increase complexity as such.  
 
Other firm specific explanation is possible. One might argue that some entirely 
different cause in Cinnamon’s history rather than co-selection accounts for the portfolio 
dynamics that were observed. Based on external and company documents, no other 
surprising trends or events are apparent. The profit level of the firm remained steadily 
in the mid-range for the industry. The stable investment level on R&D was declining 
compared with an increase in the industry average. These performance statistics could 
justify the shift towards increased prioritizing in management of the portfolio. The 
company was publicly sold in Europe and at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
Shareholders and other stakeholders accepted the observed managerial performance. 
According to internal and public annual reports, notable changes in business unit 
charters did not occur. It is also stated in the annual reports that executive turnover was 
quite low so that suggests that new executives did not make later decisions 
incomparable with former executives. According to firm sources, there were only 
minimal changes in organizational structures and procedures that could affect the 
portfolio dynamics. The project and portfolio committees, the selecting structures, did 
not change during the period. In all, there was nothing very exceptional noted in the 
public records of Cinnamon that could explain the observed dynamics. 
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It is a recognized historical trend in the pharmaceutical industry that regulatory 
authorities have increased requirements by asking for more extensive evidence from 
pre- and post-marketing clinical studies, and that this tends to lengthen development 
times (Cockburn, 2004); this would explain portfolio aging in Cinnamon. As a 
consequence, the mean project age would tend to increase over time. But the Cinnamon 
data shows a clear decrease of mean project age at the end of the observation period. 
Hence, it is not likely that this industry-specific trend would alone account for all the 
observed outcomes. It would not explain the constancy of project stages in portfolio 
over the years. One would rather expect to see an increase in all projects at stages S5 
and S6, not only in the prioritized projects at these stages. It would also fail to explain 
the conflicting trend in the number of prioritized versus all projects arising from co-
selection in the Lavender business unit.  
 
The list of alternative explanations is open to further additional suggestions. However, 
it seems that co-selection can better address the anomalies detected in the portfolio than 
the other explanations discussed above. If we accept the concept of a co-selection 
mechanism, we can causally explain the portfolio dynamics. Applying this train of 
thought gives an integrated understanding of what was going on in Cinnamon. 
 
6.5 Study limitations and further research  
6.5.1 Limitations of the study 
The study builds on observations from only one firm in one industry during a specific 
historical period. Evidence for co-selection in a population comes from a single R&D 
project portfolio. Clearly, in order to reproduce the findings, one should search for 
signs of co-selection in project portfolio evolution in other firms across different 
industries.  
 
The archival records of portfolio and project committee meetings were sometimes open 
about specifying the causes for termination. To gain more information, project team 
level archival data could have been used as a source. The choice was made to limit the 
size and scope of the study to the documentation emanating from the portfolio and 
project committees.  Expanding data gathering to project team minutes would have 
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increased the number of archival documents to an unmanageable level. Therefore, no 
detailed project level analyses were presented.  
 
Interviews of top management were not carried out. This could have helped to link 
financial performance and R&D portfolio funding, portfolio size and the prioritization 
rule together more closely. However, this was a deliberate choice that was selected in 
order to avoid the bias of retrospective reporting that would have interfered with the 
dynamics emerging from the coded data. Financial and temporal slack were not 
measured.  
 
6.5.2 Future research 
This work is an exploration of the almost completely uncharted terrain of a thorough 
study of evolutionary selection mechanisms in the context of a project portfolio. 
Studies of evolutionary mechanisms, where selection objects are material entities or 
habits and routines, could improve our understanding of the Darwinian causal logic of 
variation, selection and retention. Explaining events with causal mechanisms should be 
continued when investigating economic phenomena. Other firms and their portfolio 
dynamics should be studied. New ways to address research problem in new product 
development projects should be tried.   
 
The relation between co-selection and dominant design would be an important research 
topic. Because co-selection is likely to occur when objects of selection have a dominant 
modular design, one should try to clarify how to detect co-selection. One should study 
whether it is possible to manage co-selection through adjustment of the dominant 
design, and modularity or adjusting variation and selection mechanisms. More studies 
designed at investigating the relationship between selection mechanisms and variation 
would be needed. Due to its non-adaptive nature, co-selection induces restrictions in 
variation on a project portfolio. It would be important to study its impact on managerial 
choice. 
 
In order to improve the understanding of project portfolio processes, one should study 
the interplay of various events in sequences or clusters. Techniques of sequence 
analysis would be a suitable methodology to disclose more structure and interaction in 
event streams. The study of dynamic interactions between the two managerial levels 
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did not fully reveal the nature and causes of these interactions. The evolution of 
prioritized project when co-selected development stages change at subsequent 
milestone decisions should be studied further. The sequencing of review events could 
also be analyzed. The interaction of the R&D portfolios of two different firms would be 
a way to observe the competitive dynamics in the field of innovation management.  
 
One could further uncover through QCA whether the attribute that was co-selected was 
acquired recently or more distantly in time. This could be studied to establish the 
possible sequences of causal antecedents to events.  
 
A fruitful avenue of inquiry would be to study project level attributes and interactions 
and not only project level attributes. It is not known whether, and how, managers 
respond to portfolio properties and their changes. It is also not known how managers 
cope with portfolio size in comparison to available resourcing.  
 
The relationship between managers’ vicarious selection in R&D innovation portfolio 
success and the external environment selection of firm success could be investigated 
further; although the methodological challenges to measure the causal relationship are 
huge. More detailed analyses of managerial intent could also be studied. To achieve 
this, a larger number of public documents relating to the goals of firms together with 
interviews of managers could be used to better document managerial intentions. The 
interactions of reviews and events could enlighten the role of attention, aspirations or 
information search in portfolio management. 
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7. Implications 
 
7.1 Implications for project portfolio management  
7.1.1. R&D project portfolio models 
New product development projects differ with respect to levels of uncertainty, and time 
to market (Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 2004). Development projects vary across 
industries, in degree of innovativeness and in the ways to manage projects (Artto & 
Dietrich, 2004). New product development, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, 
is technologically novel and carries high risk. Studies of project portfolio management 
have largely consisted of evaluating, prioritizing, and selecting projects based on 
strategy (Hall & Nauda, 1990; Henriksen & Traynor, 1999; Comstock & Sjolseth, 
1999; Graves, Ringuest & Case, 2000; Ringuest & Graves, 1999; Spradlin & 
Kutoloski, 1999; Killen, Hunt & Kleinschmidt, 2007), and allocating resources to 
projects in line with strategy (Hansen, Weiss & Kwak, 1999; Cooper & Edgett, 2003).  
 
Some scholars consider project portfolio models as empirically validated heuristic aids 
(Archer & Ghasemzadeh, 2004; Ghasemzadeh & Archer, 2000; Cooper et al, 1997ab, 
2004) that form an “adaptive toolbox” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003). More typically, 
according to Elonen & Artto (2003), some scholars (for example, Cooper et al, 1998; 
Chapman & Ward, 2003; Standard for Portfolio Management, 2008), regard models of 
project portfolio management as mathematically “right” and therefore normative and 
prescriptive. The prescriptive view is aligned with mathematical modeling in 
economics. Options theory is considered normative (Davidson, 1996; Merton, 1998).  
 
Although the literature on new product development is extensive, it seems that many 
research questions in managing a portfolio of new product development projects are 
open (for a recent review see Loch & Kavadias, 2008a). According to Kavadias & 
Chao (2008), research concerning decisions about resource allocation for a portfolio of 
new product development projects, should address problems such as: 
 
• cross interactions of factors that define portfolio performance 
• the impact of organizational levels and the modes of exploring and exploiting 
on resource allocation 
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• extending the study of isolated project level decisions in development funnels to 
a holistic process view that aggregates project level information to reflect the 
total portfolio value 
• comparing different portfolio strategies in event studies 
 
Empirical evidence from managerial selection and R&D project portfolio evolution in 
Cinnamon opens new perspectives for project portfolio management research. The 
findings in Cinnamon, somewhat surprisingly, address, to some extent, all of the above 
topics. In Cinnamon, the effects of co-selection in portfolio evolution are a new 
example of cross interactions in a project portfolio. Co-selection in the presence of 
unforeseen terminations sheds light on the internal interactions within a project and the 
outcome of portfolio strategies and performance. The importance of organizational 
levels in selection structures, with their different interacting selection rules that 
reinforce the effects of co-selection, has become visible in Cinnamon. The amount of 
variation in comparison with the selection mechanism, including co-selection, and the 
available slack has been identified as an important issue in Cinnamon. This problem 
has not been completely solved. The different approaches to project portfolio 
management have been compared, and to some extent, criticized. 
 
The evolutionary approach to R&D project portfolio management is helpful at directing 
the level of analysis to the portfolio instead of relying only on the level of an individual 
project. This is especially true of long-lasting new product development initiatives, 
where both new technology and new market often appear together. The internal 
interactions of projects, due to co-selection and the dominant project design, are a novel 
finding in portfolio research. Based on the findings of this study, I shall address some 
aspects of normative portfolio management models which build upon concepts such as 
rational decision making, ordinal utility, and optimizing.  
 
7.1.2. Rational decision making  
In Cinnamon, the settings for portfolio decision making were ambiguous. Top 
managers employed both a strategic and a structural contextual setting to establish 
meaning to managing the portfolio. In Cinnamon, processes were defined and issues of 
content taken into account by selection rules. Strategic decision making about project 
prioritizing did not slip out of the hands of top management.  
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In the organization, managers made portfolio decisions in committee according to a 
scheduled procedure. The logic of portfolio decisions in Cinnamon was more 
appropriate to a rule base, than a choice base. Choices of preferred projects were based 
on selection rules regarding priority. The portfolio committee in Cinnamon relied on 
consensus decisions. Executives avoided formal portfolio selection criteria that were 
based on models. Project terminations were unexpected, and R&D projects carried a 
high risk.  
 
The project committee made more content driven decisions in the course of fulfilling 
the milestone criteria. The selection rule for milestone decision could overrule the 
selection rule for prioritizing but prioritizing could not disregard the milestone selection 
rule.   
 
Both decision content and decision process are important for innovation decision 
making (van de Ven, 1986). Many decisions in projects are made by default according 
to a plan rather than by intent (Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001). Even quite unique strategic 
decision contents are reduced to a few categories (Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Théorêt, 
1976), because primary perceptions of managers yield to framing and channeling into 
categories (Nutt, 2002). Framing a problem (Nutt, 1998a) and also the degree of 
uncertainty in the decision context (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1989; Pich et al, 2002) have 
impact on decision effectiveness.  
 
The dominant paradigms in strategic decision making are the rational, the rule based, 
the power political and the garbage can model streams of research (Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992). In the anarchic garbage can model context, not content is important 
(Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). Institutional forces sometimes constrain garbage can 
anarchies (Levitt & Nass, 1989). Strategic decisions are of limited rationality (Simon, 
1947, 1955; Lindblom, 1959). In the rational decision models, decision making and 
information gathering is emphasized by the cost of neglecting action (Brunsson, 1982). 
Strategic decision making theory lacks good conceptualization which unifies the 
rational, action and interpretative perspectives and covers strategy process (Hendry 
2000), classifies decision processes or behavior (Cray, Mallory, Butler, Hickson & 
Wilson, 1988), and explains, how and why non-decisions arise (Hickson, 1987).  
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In a team that has to consider complex issues, there is too much rather than too little 
information at hand. Hence, managers try to establish meaning. They try to make sense 
of what is going on rather than merely solving well formulated problems (March, 
1994b; Weick, 1995), or focus attention (van de Ven, 1986; Ocasio, 1997; Greve, 
2008). In a reanalysis of Thomson’s (1967) predictions of effective decision making, , 
Nutt (2002) suggest that for effective strategic decision making in teams, judgment is 
used unless powerful actors interfere. In this latter case, bargaining is introduced. 
Analysis is avoided, since it is affected by biased data gathering or biased “clean” 
statements about issues that are inherently emotional and complex. In some instances, 
analysis is more effective than judgment (Nutt, 1998b). Some scholars (for example, 
Eisenhardt, Kahwajy & Bourgeois, 1997) claim that heterogeneous teams make more 
successful decisions. Others (for example, Dean & Sharfman, 1996) maintain that 
focusing on procedural rationality, where the process of information gathering is 
considered relevant and pursued systematically, makes teams effective, but focusing on 
a political decision makes teams less effective. A study on team effectiveness in a wide 
variety of teams shows no coherent overall findings which undermines the importance 
of context and team type in discussing group effectiveness (Cohen & Bailey, 1997).  
 
Managers are not committed to normative decision models because they suspect that 
models do not reflect the problems they are facing in their work in an adequate way 
(Bower, 1970; Nutt, 1984; March & Shapira, 1987). Rational normative axiomatic 
economics has been increasingly criticized for oversimplifying and other defects in its 
theoretical foundations (see for example Nelson & Winter, 1982; Lawson, 1988; 
Simon, 1979; Vanberg, 2004; Hodgson, 1993, 2004). For example, habits and rules, 
omnipresent in organizations, have been explicitly neglected in economic analysis of 
decisions by agents for over half a century (Hodgson, 1997). I will not attempt to 
review this wide discourse in detail. I just observe that this criticism has revealed a 
problem in the foundations of traditional financial models of the optimizing of 
portfolios (Markowitz, 1952, Sharpe, 1962, Merton, 1998). Their axioms, according to 
critics, do not apply if true uncertainty is present. As narrated by Nightingale (2008), 
the “skeptical” project manager described by Klein & Meckling (1958) recognizes that 
future performance of a project that has been specified today is often unknowable. 
Hence, there is no justification for one time historical optimization to succeed, as is 
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assumed by the “planner” project manager. Events in the future are not foreseen clearly 
enough to allow any numerical estimates about the probabilities of some important 
future outcomes, internal or external to the project or the firm. Moreover, not even the 
types or categories of some instances in the future are foreseeable. Alas, project 
portfolio management leans on rational decision theory and optimizing models of new 
product development for the unknown future (Standard for Portfolio Management, 
2008). Attempts to model uncertainty still assume that categories of future events are 
known (Orszag & Yang, 1995). What Knight (1921) called “true uncertainty” and 
Thompson (1967) “unknown unknowns” have no place in these models. Since true 
uncertainty does not fit the modeling approach, models do not recognize it.  
 
In Cinnamon, the features of project portfolio selection to prioritize did not support the 
idea of purely rational decision making. Normative project portfolio management 
models pursue rational decision making as a model for optimizing a project portfolio. 
Both the findings in Cinnamon and the general literature on decision making clearly 
regard rational decision making as highly insufficient to account for real life portfolio 
management.  
 
7.1.3. Ordinal utility  
In Cinnamon, projects were not ranked in absolute scale of measurement when they 
were prioritized. The two criteria in the selection rule for prioritization – high revenue 
and global access - were interdependent, but not reducible to a single one-dimensional 
measurement of utility. For example, achieving global access is important in order to 
guarantee that new products utilize the global marketing machinery which the firm 
wants to sustain. In Cinnamon, a funding quota for different business units prevailed. 
Balancing projects was needed because all attributes could not be ranked by an ordinal 
measure.  
 
Co-selection in Cinnamon also changed the portfolio over time. Project comparison 
models do not recognize internal project interdependencies that occur due to a 
dominant design and manifested by co-selection. Project comparison techniques for 
rank ordering or balancing tacitly assume that the attributes of single projects are 
always separable. This is unwarranted because of the dominant design of R&D 
projects. One cannot independently choose different project attributes to any balancing 
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heuristics and then compare them, since some project attributes are connected inside a 
project. Project comparison models also neglect the interactions between projects, 
which are negative externalities and affect balancing. In Cinnamon, the milestone 
selection rule interfered with the priority selection rule.  
 
Historically, the notion of utility in economics degenerated from the multi-dimensional 
and incommensurable utility considerations of Jeremy Bentham to a one dimensional 
marginal utility analysis found in the writings of Jevons, Walras and Marshall (Warke, 
2000). Classical ordinal utility theory is now being questioned (Simon, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1986). The empirical heuristics for portfolio balancing (Cooper et al, 
1998) tries to reinstate the lost delicacies of Bentham’s incommensurable utilities that 
collapsed to a one-dimensional ordinal valuation.  
 
Some portfolio management models state that there cannot be prioritizing without 
ranking (Standard for Portfolio Management, 2008). This is a manifestation of the 
“ordinality fallacy” found in these optimizing models. The assets in a R&D project 
portfolio are assumed to have one-dimensional utility so they can be compared like 
numbers in an ordinal transitive array. In fact, balancing with buckets and scoring 
models prioritizes without ordinal ranking (Cooper et al, 1998).  
 
Taking account of interdependency requires organization-dependent weighting of goals 
(Dickinson et al, 2001). Empirically oriented scholars suggest there is no one single 
technique that satisfies the needs of a practical R&D project selection technique 
(Ringuest, Graves & Case, 2004).  
 
Data from Cinnamon does not support the use of mathematically oriented ordinal utility 
models. Balancing was in use. As is evident in decision research results, choosing for 
preference is not necessarily ordinal, well-ordered, or transitive, and sequence 
preserving. The whole idea of balancing a portfolio in the practitioner-oriented 
literature goes against one-dimensional ordinal project ranking. Managerial judgment 
recognizes a multi-dimensional utility in portfolio selection.  
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7.1.4. Optimizing and path dependence  
The findings in Cinnamon do not support an exhaustive search procedure resembling 
optimizing in the selection to prioritize projects. Review events in the portfolio 
committee without decisions were rare compared to decision events. The empirical 
reality around portfolio management in Cinnamon was that of rule following selection, 
which operated within the selection structure of the organization. Decisions were part 
of a systemic interactive ecology. Interactions between selection structures took place. 
Cinnamon, like all firms possessing R&D portfolios started from a specific path-
dependent historical situation, both externally and internally.  
 
In Cinnamon, path dependence was created by persistent selection rules for prioritized 
projects. Some were terminated due to unforeseen technological hurdles. Path 
dependence was reinforced due to co-selection and the advancement of product 
development by stages, which changed portfolio retention. Prioritization decisions 
resulted in an accumulation of prioritized projects and their attributes over time in a 
path dependent way. New projects induced variation. Co-selection reduced variation. 
The development of projects to further stages changed variation. Co-selection resulted 
in a path dependent change of properties in the portfolio. These mechanisms created a 
new non-ergodic future. 
 
A mathematical portfolio model assumes rational decision making under ordinal utility 
by optimal choice. Optimization is about finding, through mathematics, a maximal or 
minimal utility value to a set of equations with several variables (for details see Luce & 
Raiffa, 1957; Ackoff, 1962; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). The first critique of 
“optimizing” normative project management was presented quite some time ago (Klein 
& Meckling, 1958). Managers search solutions rather than optimize them (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). Decisions are made by aspiration level to find “good enough” solutions 
rather than by maximizing some equations (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2007, 2008). 
Decision research reveals that people follow rules rather than optimize (Page, 2008).  
 
Mathematical optimization models do not account for historical specificity. In technical 
terms, they are ergodic. Path dependent processes are neither Markov nor ergodic 
processes (Page, 2006). The sequence in which selections are made over time does 
matter. Path dependence goes against the ergodic assumption. Optimizing is not path 
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dependent (Page, 2006). An evolutionary framework is path dependent (Carroll & 
Harrison, 1994). The escalation of commitment need not be just harmful; it is present 
and also needed when managers persist in funding projects through trial and error 
selection to achieve learning (Garud & van de Ven, 1992; Turner & Keegan, 2004). 
 
Option theory is a further development of mathematical optimizing. The mathematical 
model for option pricing began as a theory of speculation put forward by Bachelier in 
1900 (Merton, 1998; Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004). It was reintroduced in order to 
build a normative theory to evaluate the value of a financial portfolio by Markowitz 
(1952) and Sharpe (1964). Combining asset price variance to determine risk level, these 
authors formulated a capital asset pricing model. Portfolio theory relies on one-
dimensional ordinality of any attribute’s utility, which is incorporated to estimate 
portfolio value.  
 
The tradition of economic theory, including the theory of financial options, is axiomatic 
in structure and normative in the way it interprets the results of its scholarship 
(Davidson, 1996; Merton, 1998). The axiomatic approach has been recently challenged 
by many scholars (Davidson, 2003; Hodgson, 1997, 2004; Vanberg, 2004). An 
increasing amount of experimental evidence shows that theory derived from these 
axioms is not compatible with the data. R&D project portfolio management using the 
real options approach has been proposed by numerous authors (Merton, 1998; 
McGrath, 1997; Luermann, 1998; Lint & Pennings, 2001; Rogers, Gupta & Maranas, 
2002; McGrath, Ferrier & Mendelow 2004; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). According to 
McGrath & Nerkar (2004), managers in pharmaceutical firms actually reason by real 
option logic. Huchzermeier & Loch (2001) and Hartmann & Hassan (2006) consider 
there is little evidence of their use by managers.  
 
Using real option reasoning in innovation project portfolio selection has been 
extensively criticized. Optimizing is computationally intensive, especially when 
systems are complex (Blau et al, 2004; Seider, 2006). Unforeseen uncertainties 
(Knight, 1921; Keynes, 1937; Thompson, 1967) cannot be modeled with real options 
for lack of categories for unknown risks, or sensible probability estimates for uncertain 
events. After rejecting a development project, it is not possible to revitalize it if 
opportunities arise (Adner & Levinthal, 2004ab). Real option theory does not take 
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procedural elements in decision making into account. Real option theory in the case of 
R&D investment decisions would require estimates of value which are not available in 
practical business contexts and the oversimplification of calculations, which is 
theoretically deleterious (Lander & Pinches, 1998). Financial theory on option 
modeling needs exact data to allow forecasting, much of which is not available due to 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Real option reasoning over different time spans requires 
attention. One should recall that financial portfolio tools evaluate asset returns for the 
time span of weeks or months (Levy & Duchin, 2004). Compared to the time span of 
R&D investment over years, and cash flow generation over decades, the models are 
myopic. It is an open question regarding the extent that option modeling can be 
improved by relaxing assumptions on risk distribution to include asymmetric 
distributions beyond Gaussian ones with fat tails and long term path dependencies 
(Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004). It is also an open question, whether multi-dimensional 
measures of utility can be accommodated in real option theory (Lander & Pinches, 
1998).  In current practice, real option models use ordinal utility.   
 
Ultimately, mathematical portfolio models assume that the future resembles the past 
(Carlson, Fullér, Heikkilä & Majlender, 2004; Golosnoy & Okhrin, 2008). Market 
valuation of a firm’s R&D capital separating technological and market uncertainty have 
been presented (Oriani & Sobrero, 2008). It is evident from the discussion between 
Adner & Levinthal (2004a) and McGrath, Ferrier, & Mendelow (2004) that scholars do 
not always differentiate clearly between real option and more general iterated decision 
making (Noda & Bower, 1996). The heuristic and normative aspects of real option 
reasoning are also sometimes confused (Adner & Levinthal, 2004b). If real option 
reasoning is used in practice, it is only done so for projects where quantifiable benefits 
are small (Tiwana, Wang, Keil & Ahluwalia, 2007). The possible gains of practical 
NPD projects are huge. 
 
I have found no evidence in Cinnamon to support the claim that managers selecting a 
R&D portfolio use real options reasoning. Selection rules were applied. New products 
were not introduced to mend the performance gap of missing Lavender projects. 
Regarding real options as normative in R&D development may have resulted from first 
regarding financial options as normative in economic theory. Innovation portfolio 
management faces many-dimensional utility, for example, balancing a portfolio 
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between strategic business units or prioritizing projects in different geographical 
locations. Therefore, real option models should be applied with caution to phenomena 
beyond ordinal utility. 
 
7.1.5 Summary 
With regard to rational decision making, ordinal utility and optimizing, the findings in 
Cinnamon are not compatible with the model-centered view of portfolio management. 
The findings rather support a view of an empirical and heuristic approach, emphasizing 
the uncertain future, managerial judgment, procedural contingencies and firm specific 
solutions to multi-dimensional problems within portfolio management.  
 
7.2 Implications for practitioners 
7.2.1. Co-selection limits R&D portfolio management 
Managerial intention regarding decisions about R&D portfolio selection as a means to 
adapt the firm in the best possible way for future success is limited by co-selection. Co-
selection interferes with the prioritizing of projects in a portfolio. Practitioners should 
recognize that their lists of preference regarding R&D projects selected for 
prioritization bring about other choices they have not been intentionally made. There 
are previously unrecognized limits to managerial choice. These arise from internal 
dependencies within the projects. The project attributes that were not intentionally 
chosen still change the total portfolio. These changes may become visible more easily 
if unforeseen terminations kill some of the most favored projects, and projects with 
unexpected attributes are retained. Co-selection does not become visible only when 
portfolio models using one-dimensional ordinal utility measures are used. It may 
become visible with empirically derived portfolio balancing models. 
 
7.2.2. Experiment with selection mechanisms 
When managing a portfolio of new product development projects one should examine 
carefully how their current selection system operates and what it delivers. Since 
managers cannot anticipate every instance of co-selection, they should be encouraged 
to experiment with vicarious internal selection mechanisms. They should experiment 
with different sets of selection rules and selection structures and observe the outcomes 
of these choices. This is a way to learn about internal project constraints. Managers 
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should be alert to the interactions between different selection structures and their 
selection rules.  
 
7.2.3. Adjust variation for co-selection effects 
Increasing new R&D project initiatives helps to complete the development of future 
products that are drivers of the business. Managers should either initiate a larger 
number of projects or maintain a larger pre-project pool of discoveries that would make 
faster new project entries possible. Co-selection is a manifestation of constraint in 
project dominant design. Hence, it also constrains the scope of variation. Increasing 
variation creates more opportunities to circumvent the instances of co-selection which 
become amplified by sudden losses in the project portfolio. Managers should study 
carefully the interplay of variation and selection under the specific conditions of their 
firm and industry.  
 
In addition, managers should perceive that they are funding the totality of the R&D 
project portfolio, which includes both successes and failures. Both restrictions to 
managerial choice due to co-selection and instances of Knightian uncertainty change 
the project portfolio in an unanticipated way. Some of the R&D funding for future 
success gets allocated to future failures. However, these failures are not known until 
they materialize, sometimes even very late. 
 
7.2.4. Maintain financial reserve to achieve variation 
To increase variation managers should make allowances for slack resources. The 
previous prescriptions to increase variation and adjust selection rules and selection 
structures may be not possible to realize unless managers recognize the need to budget 
slack, both material and temporal. Slack resources in R&D project portfolio 
management are the means to finance increased variation and relieve temporal 
congestion. Variation makes exploratory search of new ideas possible. An unallocated 
reserve in resourcing enables managers to cope proactively with unforeseen co-
selection and sudden performance gaps in the R&D project portfolio. Building 
temporal slack and, when allocating resources, being more specific on the types of 
resources help to synchronize workflows when decisions about different levels of the 
organization interact. Evolution favors the prepared mind.  
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7.3 Conclusion 
With the help of rich empirical data from the case firm, I have longitudinally analyzed 
a multi-level intra-firm selection environment. This study has a number of specific 
contributions.  
 
First, I have conceptualized co-selection as a non-adaptive evolutionary mechanism in 
a R&D project portfolio driven by dominant design. I have presented empirical data 
from a new product project portfolio in a global R&D intensive firm to support the 
conjecture of co-selection. 
 
Second, I have causally explained deviant R&D project portfolio evolution with the 
help of the co-selection mechanism and thereby provided insight to the question of why 
the realized R&D strategies of a firm were in conflict with each other.  
 
Third, extending the work of Robert A. Burgelman, I have explicitly refined the 
analysis of vicarious selection mechanisms. I have differentiated between two 
organizational selection structures and a number of selection rules acting on different 
entities. I have described the interactions between hierarchy levels of selection 
structures using different selection rules. An improved classification of selection 
mechanisms benefits their analyses in scope, clarity and causal relevancy.  
 
Fourth, the study enriches the portfolio management literature with new empirical 
findings. When managing a R&D project portfolio, internal project constraints force 
decisions. Interactions between organizational levels regarding portfolio selection for 
priority and project milestone decisions occur. The amount of variation and the 
portfolio selection rules are connected; this can be detected by observing the total 
portfolio dynamics. 
 
Fifth, the results of the study suggest that a R&D project portfolio should be managed 
with the help of adjusting variation and experimenting with selection mechanisms in 
order to cope with co-selection and Knightian uncertainty. The study supports the view 
that sufficient financial slack to allow new product variation is beneficial to the 
development of innovation. The study supports the idea that temporal slack as a means 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           145 
 
 
to cope with interconnected selection structures is a helpful way to manage the critical 
path.  
 
Sixth, the study addresses some limitations found in normative project portfolio 
management models and managerial practices based on, or relating to, financial 
optimizing theory of ordinal utility. The use of empirical heuristic models that permit 
multi-dimensional utility is encouraged.  
 
Finally, study results point towards some practical prescriptions for managing R&D 
development project portfolios.  
 
The results of my study show that the concept of co-selection widens and sharpens the 
evolutionary logic of variation, selection and retention. This should encourage scholars 
to look for other features of selection logic not previously characterized, but possibly 
within reach of evolutionary inquiry. Co-selection arises from the fact that entities 
under selection are not put together in a way that allows illimitable modification and 
change in their structure, and unbounded adaptation. Non-adaptive, forced selection is 
likely to occur when adaptive selection rules are applied. My research suggests that 
non-adaptive co-selection may compel us to revise our understanding of managerial 
choice in a profound way. 
 
There are an increasing number of scholars who agree that economic and managerial 
theory benefits from pursuing research within the evolutionary framework; in Darwin’s 
(1859) and Veblen’s (1898) tradition (Aldrich et al, 2008; Beinhocker, 2006; Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2004; Hodgson, 2007bc; Pich et al, 2002). In the field of biology, forced 
non-adaptive selection has received immense and ongoing attention through the work 
of the late Stephan Gould. In establishing the material and temporal limits to 
Panglossian adaptation (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Gould, 2002) he developed 
Darwin’s theory. It is increasingly recognized that adaptive changes at many levels are 
far more restricted than previously assumed. The restrictions arise, first, from the 
structural constraints of internal design and, second, from the temporal constraints of 
the path-dependent historical constitution of organisms. However, adaptive constraints 
produce asymmetric variation in biological evolution. These constraints may therefore 
provide efficient opportunities for new growth based on limited variation. When 
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variation is immense yet miniscule, this causes the congestion of selection mechanisms. 
Gould’s conceptualization has new explanatory power beyond the traditional 
adaptation-centred approach.  
 
By introducing co-selection, this study helps to understand selection mechanisms in 
R&D project portfolio management in project based firms. Consider sowing and 
reaping as a metaphor for fostering projects in a portfolio. One does not know ahead, 
which exactly seeds will germinate. Some will sprout, others will not. They all are 
spread, and their totality yields the crop to harvest. Describing managerial action with 
Darwinian evolutionary logic, the effects of co-selection may become increasingly 
important in searching for the constraints to firms’ adaptation, guided evolution, 
exploration, variation or to managerial intent. This would lead to an improved strategic 
understanding of the limits and possibilities of the managerial pursuit for success. The 
discovery of internal, structure driven, modular and design related constraints, and 
temporal, path dependent and historically specific constraints may well go hand in hand 
with the detection of new instances of co-selection.  
 
The phenomena of dominant design and modularity are well established in the 
management and innovation literatures. Co-selection reveals these internal structural 
constraints to managerial choice in R&D portfolio management. These constraints may, 
hopefully, also provide signals of opportunity for managers to build upon what they 
have. The study of routines and habits to explain managerial choice is being revitalized 
(Hodgson, 2009). Routines can be connected with projects which are artefacts. The idea 
of co-selection among routines and habits is fascinating. Ideally, research on routines 
and habits could be conducted in the empirical context of project business firms. Future 
scholarship will judge the significance of the construct of co-selection in explaining the 
undetected consequences of managerial action. 
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9. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Full text 
EMEA 
 
European Medicines Agency (European Union) 
 
FDA 
Food and Drug Administration (USA) 
 
NPD 
New Product Development 
 
NYSE 
New York Stock Exchange 
 
PMDEC 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Evaluation Center (Japan) 
 
QCA 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
R&D 
Research and Development 
 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           172 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 Data coding dictionary for Excel table 
  
Code Definition Explanatory notes 
LAV Business unit color code 
 
The project is assigned to business unit lavender. For 
confidentiality, actual names are not disclosed. 
 
LIM Business unit color code 
 
The project is assigned to business unit lime. For 
confidentiality, actual names are not disclosed. 
 
BLU Business unit color code 
 
The project is assigned to business unit blue. For 
confidentiality, actual names are not disclosed. 
 
TAN Business unit color code 
 
The project is assigned to business unit tan. For 
confidentiality, actual names are not disclosed. 
 
PRI 
 
Prioritized project Divides the class of projects into two mutually exclusive 
categories. All other projects are non-prioritized. Prioritization 
occurs either through allocating more resources, or 
establishing priority in bottlenecks. 
 
NEW Initiate a new project 
 
Development stage code S(n) can vary at the start 
P Grant priority status to a project 
 
 
DEP Remove priority status from a project 
 
Negation to PRI 
ACC Accelerate project Put resources into project to increase the speed of 
development. Always coded to PRI. 
HLD Put a project on hold Stop all activities and wait for new information or resources, 
restart possible. Always coded as DEP. 
 
TER Terminate a project Project goal is not attained, problems of development or 
change in market situation. 
 
END Complete a project after the product has 
received regulatory approval or launched 
 
Contrary to termination, the completed product delivers 
revenues. 
OUL Out-license a project  Always coded as END. 
REV Review a project Number of reviews is a measure of managerial attention. 
A(n) Age of project 
 
Recorded as time difference from initiation to current time. 
T(n) Running time Calendar dates from individual minutes in ordinals (not 
intervals) from 1 to 83. 
 
D(n) Milestone decision  Milestones decisions move projects to the next stage when 
goals of the previous stage have been reached. Number (n) 
varies from 2 to 6. 
   
S(n)  Project development stage  Projects are at a development stage. Number denotes the stage 
of the project Number (n) varies from 2 to 6. 
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Appendix 3 Definitions of variables in terms of measurable entities 
  
Decisions  
Project initiation 
Project prioritization 
Project de-prioritization 
Project termination 
Project completion 
Project stage milestone decision (D2, D3, D4, D5, D6) 
Decision patterns 
Distribution of project initiations 
Distribution of project prioritizations 
Distribution of project de-prioritizations 
Distribution of project terminations 
Distribution of project completions 
Distribution of project milestone stage decisions (D2, D3, D4, D5, D6) 
Project attributes 
Prioritized project 
Not prioritized project 
Project membership in a business unit (Lavender, Lime, Blue, Tan) 
Development stage (S2, S3, S4, S5, S6) of project 
Age of project 
Portfolio attributes 
Number of projects 
Number of prioritized projects 
Number of projects by business unit (Lavender, Lime, Blue, Tan) 
Number of projects in a development stage (S2, S3, S4, S5, S6) 
Age of portfolio 
Portfolio patterns 
Distribution of projects 
Distribution of prioritized projects 
Distribution of projects by business unit (Lavender, Lime, Blue, Tan) 
Distribution of projects by development stage (S2, S3, S4, S5, S6) 
Distribution of projects by age 
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Appendix 4 Chronology of project and portfolio committee meetings 
 
year unit of time type of meeting Year unit of time type of meeting 
year 1 1 project committee year 5 43 portfolio committee 
year 1 2 project committee year 5 44 project committee 
year 1 3 portfolio committee year 5 45 project committee 
year 1 4 project committee year 5 46 portfolio committee 
year 1 5 project committee year 5 47 project committee 
year 1 6 project committee year 5 48 portfolio committee 
year 1 7 portfolio committee year 6 49 project committee 
year 1 8 project committee year 6 50 project committee 
year 1 9 project committee year 6 51 portfolio committee 
year 2 10 project committee year 6 52 project committee 
year 2 11 project committee year 6 53 portfolio committee 
year 2 12 portfolio committee year 6 54 project committee 
year 2 13 project committee year 6 55 portfolio committee 
year 2 14 project committee year 6 56 project committee 
year 2 15 portfolio committee year 6 57 project committee 
year 2 16 project committee year 6 58 portfolio committee 
year 2 17 project committee year 7 59 project committee 
year 2 18 portfolio committee year 7 60 portfolio committee 
year 3 19 project committee year 7 61 project committee 
year 3 20 project committee year 7 62 project committee 
year 3 21 portfolio committee year 7 63 project committee 
year 3 22 project committee year 7 64 portfolio committee 
year 3 23 portfolio committee year 7 65 project committee 
year 3 24 project committee year 7 66 portfolio committee 
year 3 25 portfolio committee year 7 67 project committee 
year 3 26 project committee year 8 68 project committee 
year 3 27 project committee year 8 69 project committee 
year 3 28 portfolio committee year 8 70 portfolio committee 
year 4 29 project committee year 8 71 project committee 
year 4 30 project committee year 8 72 project committee 
year 4 31 portfolio committee year 8 73 project committee 
year 4 32 project committee year 8 74 project committee 
year 4 33 portfolio committee year 9 75 project committee 
year 4 34 project committee year 9 76 project committee 
year 4 35 project committee year 9 77 portfolio committee 
year 4 36 portfolio committee year 9 78 project committee 
year 4 37 project committee year 9 79 portfolio committee 
year 4 38 portfolio committee year 9 80 project committee 
year 5 39 project committee year 9 81 portfolio committee 
year 5 40 project committee year 9 82 project committee 
year 5 41 portfolio committee year 10 83 portfolio committee 
year 5 42 project committee    
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Appendix 5 Organizational selection structures 
 
Selection structure 
 
Membership Mandate 
Project committee business unit, R&D, and functions 
leadership 
approve milestone decisions D2, D3, 
D4, D6, but propose decisions D5 to 
portfolio board 
 
Portfolio committee top management, business unit and 
regional business leadership 
approve milestone decision D5, 
approve project initiations, 
prioritizations, de-prioritizations, 
terminations and completions 
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Appendix 6 Project development stages, milestones and regulatory phases  
 
Stage of development 
 
Milestone Type of development activity FDA, EMEA and PMDEC  
regulatory scheme phase 
 
Project candidate  
 
n. a Drug discovery process  
S2 
 
D2 Chemical and biochemical characterization, 
animal models, manufacturing scale up 
 
phase 1 
S3 
 
D3 Pharmacological, toxicological, proof of 
concept in humans 
 
phase 1- 2 
S4 
 
D4 Proof of efficacy in humans phase 2 
S5 D5 Large scale clinical trials 
 
phase 3 
S6 
 
D6 Follow up clinical trials of marketed 
product, new clinical trials for new 
applications or product claims 
 
phase 3 - 4  
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Appendix 7 Selection events by selection structure 
 
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Portfolio committee          
Project initiations          
Lavender  10 9 11 14 6 9 6 12 6 
Lime 10 7 5 7 7 2 4 4 4 
Blue 7 2 1 11 0 6 6 7 1 
Tan 2 1 0 5 6 1 3 0 0 
Project prioritizations          
Lavender  5 5 2 2 4 4 4 13 12 
Lime 5 4 2 2 3 1 5 2 13 
Blue 6 5 0 4 3 0 1 1 7 
Tan 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Project de-prioritizations 2 4 2 5 0 1 0 1 7 
Lavender  1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 
Lime 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 
Blue 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Tan 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Termination all projects           
Lavender  2 5 6 1 5 5 7 4 5 
Lime 1 7 5 0 1 1 4 4 3 
Blue 0 1 3 1 0 6 4 2 5 
Tan 0 1 1 1 0 5 1 4 0 
Terminations prioritized projects          
Lavender  0 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Lime 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Blue 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 
Tan 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Ends all projects           
Lavender  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Lime 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 
Blue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 
Tan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Ends prioritized projects          
Lavender  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lime 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Blue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Tan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Project committee          
Milestone decisions*          
D2: Enter stage S2 23 11 12 24 12 18 15 17 9 
D3: Enter stage S3 14 4 5 13 9 3 8 5 4 
D4: Enter stage S4 16 3 3 9 7 11 7 7 7 
D5: Enter stage S5 15 9 6 6 8 5 6 6 6 
D6: Enter stage S6 12 6 1 5 2 2 2 6 5 
Note: Total annual values are reported. 
*) includes decisions reconfirmed by portfolio board, and for year 1, includes all entries 
from the year before 
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Appendix 8 Portfolio dynamics 
 
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Projects by business unit           
Lavender  16 19 21 33 33 36 36 37 36 
Lime 27 27 25 27 32 32 34 33 30 
Blue 12 15 12 11 19 17 19 18 17 
Tan 1 3 2 4 11 8 7 6 2 
Total 56 64 60 75 95 93 96 94 85 
Prioritized projects by business unit          
Lavender  3 7 4 5 7 10 11 11 15 
Lime 5 8 8 9 10 11 11 12 10 
Blue 3 6 4 4 9 8 6 4 4 
Tan 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Total 11 21 16 18 26 30 29 28 29 
Project by development stage          
Stage S2 16 17 14 26 26 27 24 21 22 
Stage S3 8 8 10 12 17 15 12 13 11 
Stage S4 11 14 9 10 13 11 17 17 17 
Stage S5 10 12 15 16 22 22 23 22 18 
Stage S6 12 16 16 15 16 18 21 19 17 
Priority status by project stage          
Stage S2 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
Stage S3 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
Stage S4 2 4 2 3 3 4 4 5 3 
Stage S5 4 6 5 7 13 14 11 11 9 
Stage S6 4 7 7 6 5 7 9 8 10 
Priority by project stage in Lavender          
Stage S2 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 
Stage S3 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Stage S4 1 2 1 2 2 4 4 4 3 
Stage S5 2 2 0 1 2 2 3 4 5 
Stage S6 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 
Priority by project stage in Lime          
Stage S2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Stage S3 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Stage S4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Stage S5 1 1 2 3 5 6 5 5 3 
Stage S6 3 5 4 4 3 4 5 5 5 
Note: Average (median) annual values are reported. 
 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           179 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 Portfolio age 
 
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Age of project by business unit           
Lavender  0 0 13 15 22 27 29 35 30 
Lime 0 0 19 23 26 35 40 46 46 
Blue 0 0 20 26 25 31 29 31 31 
Tan 0 0 20 17 10 20 24 19 20 
Age of prioritized projects           
Lavender  0 0 18 17 22 35 42 47 36 
Lime 0 0 21 30 36 44 50 54 59 
Blue 0 0 21 31 33 39 52 61 70 
Tan 0 0 0 0 0 13 21 29 0 
Age of projects by stage          
Stage S2 0 0 7 8 10 15 13 16 11 
Stage S3 0 0 16 18 18 26 27 28 28 
Stage S4 0 0 21 25 23 24 26 30 30 
Stage S5 0 0 19 25 31 39 44 47 51 
Stage S6 0 0 22 28 35 46 52 60 64 
Age of prioritized projects by stage          
Stage S2 0 0 12 16 17 22 19 26 12 
Stage S3 0 0 12 25 31 41 40 38 30 
Stage S4 0 0 22 28 34 38 39 45 39 
Stage S5 0 0 20 28 30 36 46 49 53 
Stage S6 0 0 22 28 41 52 59 66 68 
Age of prioritized projects in Lavender          
Stage S2 0 0 13 13 17 26 32 39 12 
Stage S3 0 0 12 25 33 43 43 37 26 
Stage S4 0 0 23 27 31 38 40 47 40 
Stage S5 0 0 17 7 15 26 41 42 45 
Stage S6 0 0 23 8 0 54 62 70 62 
Age of prioritized projects in Lime          
Stage S2 0 0 13 21 0 0 5 12 5 
Stage S3 0 0 0 0 29 39 45 38 33 
Stage S4 0 0 22 30 29 0 0 0 13 
Stage S5 0 0 24 34 36 41 52 55 59 
Stage S6 0 0 20 30 0 52 57 64 71 
Note: Project age is measured as the number of committee meetings during project 
lifetime. Portfolio ages are annual averages. 
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Appendix 10 Frequencies of project ages by business unit and project phase 
 
Age  >80 >70 >60 >50 >40 >30 >20 >10 >0 
All projects by business unit          
Lavender  3 3 3 7 6 14 11 24 20 
Lime 10 4 3 5 4 9 9 12 10 
Blue 3 1 1 5 4 3 10 11 9 
Tan 0 0 1 0 0 3 4 7 3 
Total 16 8 8 17 14 29 34 54 42 
Prioritized projects by business unit          
Lavender  0 0 1 1 3 4 4 9 7 
Lime 2 3 2 1 0 3 3 1 1 
Blue 2 0 1 0 2 2 2 2 4 
Tan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 4 3 4 2 5 9 9 12 14 
All projects by stage          
Stage S2 0 0 0 1 2 6 24 43 71 
Stage S3 0 0 0 0 2 6 14 18 22 
Stage S4 0 0 0 0 5 9 11 18 19 
Stage S5 1 1 3 6 2 7 12 15 15 
Stage S6 4 4 2 2 2 5 5 8 9 
Prioritized projects by stage          
Stage S2 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 13 21 
Stage S3 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 3 3 
Stage S4 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 6 7 
Stage S5 1 1 1 2 2 6 8 7 5 
Stage S6 2 2 1 1 0 2 3 4 3 
Note: Project age is measured as units of time from the number of committee meetings 
during project lifetime. 
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Appendix 11 Sales, performance, and investment in personnel and in R&D  
 
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Firm performance indexes*          
Sales index 100 103 115 141 152 157 151 154 166 
Earnings index 100 104 110 145 141 145 143 152 195 
Personnel index  100 102 105 111 118 123 125 123 118 
R&D investment indexes*          
R&D cost index 100 110 120 143 152 166 162 161 173 
Project number index 100 106 106 134 153 144 144 136 134 
Prioritized projects index 100 171 159 171 200 253 247 253 271 
R&D cost per project 100 104 113 107 99 115 113 118 129 
R&D cost per prioritized project 100 64 75 83 76 66 66 64 64 
* Year 1 = 100 
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Appendix 12 Necessary conditions for co-selection by business unit 
 
Lavender * Lime * Blue * Tan * 
S2 + 
S3 + 
pre-priority * S4 + 
pre-priority * S5 
S2 + 
S3 + 
S4 + 
S5 
S3 + 
S4 + 
pre-priority * S6 
S3 
 
(+) Denotes Boolean addition, corresponds to the logical connective “or” 
(*) Denotes Boolean multiplication, corresponds to the logical connective “and” 
(S2) Denotes stage S2 
(S3) Denotes stage S3 
(S4) Denotes stage S4 
(S5) Denotes stage S5 
(S6) Denotes stage S6 
(Pre-priority) Denotes “already prioritized project” 
 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                           183 
 
 
 
Appendix 13 Projects and prioritized projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years  
Vertical axis: number of projects 
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Appendix 14 Median age of projects and prioritized projects 
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Appendix 15 Median age of projects by business unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: age of projects, units in time 
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Appendix 16 Median age of prioritized projects by business unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: age of projects, units in time 
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Appendix 17 Project age distribution by business unit 
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Horizontal axis: number of projects 
Vertical axis: duration, units in time 
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Appendix 18 Prioritized project age distribution by business unit 
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Appendix 19 Project age distribution by development stage 
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Horizontal axis: number of projects 
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Appendix 20 Prioritized project age distribution by development stage 
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Appendix 21 Projects by development stage  
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Appendix 22 Prioritized projects by development stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: number of projects 
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Appendix 23 Average age of all projects by development stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: age of projects, units of time 
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Appendix 24 Portfolio decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: number of events 
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Appendix 25 Decisions to initiate projects by business unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: number of events 
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Appendix 26 Decisions to terminate projects by business unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: number of events 
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Appendix 27 Firm performance indexes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal axis: time in years 
Vertical axis: index figure 
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